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LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE
FOR THE 1977 REGULAR SESSION
A Student Symposium*
INTRODUCTION
The production of new law has reached such a state of the art that the
output of the 1977 regular session of the legislature is unmatched by any
session in the history of the state. Of the 2780 bills introduced during the
session, 759 were signed into law by the governor and forty-five were
vetoed.' Few areas of the Louisiana law were left untouched by those
enactments. Despite the magnitude of this session's activities, many
additional major changes in the law may 'be expected before sine die
adjournment of the next regular session if the committees charged with
revision complete their assigned tasks during the interim.
2
Unlike the 1976 regular session, in which the legislature labored
under intensive pressure from the forces of labor and industry, there was
no matter before this session to sustain the attention of either house for
more than few days. The lack of overriding issues should not lull the
practitioner into a false sense of security. Many significant changes were
achieved that will affect the day-to-day practice of law. Most notably, the
* The authors of the Legislative Symposium Sections are as follows: Linton
W. Carney: Matrimonial Regimes, Administrative Law and Procedure, Executive
Reorganization, Environmental Law; Albert M. Hand, Jr.: Criminal Law, Pre-Trial
Criminal Procedure, Postconviction Procedure; William Hardy Patrick III: Insur-
ance, Workmen's Compensation, Consumer Protection; David S. Rubin: Trusts
and Estate Planning, Expropriation, State and Local Government, State and Local
Taxation, Civil Procedure; John Miller Shuey, Jr.: Property; William E. Steffes:
Persons, Security Devices, Corporations, Financial Institutions.
1. Figures are taken from disposition tables compiled by the Louisiana Legis-
lative Council published in Resume, 1977 Louisiana Legislature iii. For a statistical
breakdown of the legislature's action, see the footnotes to this Introduction at note
7, infra.
2. One of the most far reaching studies will be that undertaken by the commit-
tee assigned the task of developing an "equal management" system in the commu-
nity property laws of the state under authority of Senate Concurrent Resolution No.
54, 1977 regular session. The task of considering the equal management system is
assigned to Senate Committee on the Judiciary A and the House Committee on Civil
Law and Procedure who are to be assisted by an advisory committee nominated by
the deans of the law schools of the state and appointed by the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House. See the Matrimonial Regimes section of this
symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 84 (1977), for a discussion of the debate over commu-
nity property laws during the 1977 session.
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long anticipated changes in the Civil Code, originally commissioned in the
1940's, 3 have now begun to ease to fruition. The major work of revision in
Book II of the Civil Code has been completed, 4 the title of Things being
the only casualty of the session.5 This Book should be completed by the
end of the next session. 6 A number of constitutional mandates 7 were met
3. Civil Code Revision was assigned to the Louisiana Law Institute by Act 335
of 1948.
4. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 103; 1977 La. Acts, Nos. 169, 170, 514.
5. La. H.B. 213, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977), dealing with Things, died in the House
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure.
6. The defeat of House Bill 213 marks the first time in the history of the
Louisiana Law Institute that a "book" bill, one proposing a major change in the
law, has ever been defeated. See the property section of this symposium, 38 LA. L.
REV. 62 (1977), for a discussion of the property revision and especially the rejection
of House Bill 213.
7. These mandates will be discussed in the section on Louisiana Constitutional
Law of the forthcoming symposium on the work of the Louisiana appellate courts
for the 1976-77 session.
DISPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS
1976 REGULAR SESSIONa
Passed House Passed Both Died in Signed by Vetoed by
Introducedd of Origin Houses Conference Governor Governor
House Bills 1852 626 560 1 524 36f
House Joint
Resolutions' 22 0 N/A N/A
Senate Bills 928 547 244 1 235 9
Senate Joint
Resolutions b  10 0
House
Resolutionsc 40 31e N/A N/A
House
Concurrent
Resolutionsc 325 257 N/A N/A
Senate
Resolutions c  37 30c N/A N/A
Senate
Concurrent
Resolutionsc 155 81 N/A N/A
a) Data summarized in this table is taken from disposition tables compiled by
the Louisiana Legislative Council and published in Resume, 1977 Louisiana
Legislature, iii-v.
b) Joint Resolutions are instruments which propose amendments to the con-
stitution. They follow the same processes as bills [LA. CONST. art. III §
15(A)]. They are also included in the total bill counts for both houses.
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with legislation in the session and the process of executive reorganization
stands nearly complete. 8 The legislative response to problems in the area
of criminal justice has produced a new discovery law, 9 sentencing proce-
dures,' 0 a theft of crawfish law" and an enhanced punishment for those
criminals who commit crimes of violence on senior citizens. 12
The analysis which follows in an attempt to put the work of the
session in perspective, to analyze its impact on the day-to-day operation of
the law and to suggest ways the legislation failed to address the problems it
was meant to correct. Practitioners should also be alerted to problems
being considered in interim by committees since it is expected that major
legislation for the next session will be drafted as a result of their hearings
and studies.
ODD YEAR SESSIONS
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 abolished the 1921 Constitutional
provisions providing for "fiscal sessions" in odd numbered years. 3 The
only vestige of the prior system is the prohibition against the enactment of
new or increased taxes in the regular session occurring in odd numbered
years. 14 This system, which allows odd year special session consideration
of tax increases, was criticized in the press as a violation of constitutional
intent when as the 1977 regular session drew to a close the governor
announced that he would call a special session to deal with the question of
an increase in taxes. 5 The criticism is without a constitutional foundation
c) Resolutions do not require the signature of the governor but are forwarded to
him for informational purposes.
d) Introductions include all bills and resolutions including bills and resolutions
reported by substitute.
e) Approval of simple resolutions by house of origin constitutes final adoption.
f) All vetoes sustained either in session or by declaration of no necessity for a
veto session as provided in La. Const. art. 11, § 20(c).
8. See 1977 La. Acts, No. 83. See also the Executive Reorganization section
of this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 110 (1977).
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 515.
10. 1977 La. Acts, No. 635.
11. 1977 La. Acts, No. 349.
12. 1977 La. Acts, No. 506.
13. LA. CONST. art. III, § 2(A) replaced La. Const. art. III § 21 (1921).
14. LA. CONsT. art. 111, § 2(A) states in part: "No measure levying a new tax or
increasing an existing tax shall be introduced or enacted during a regular session
held in an odd-numbered year."
15. The 1977 regular session of the legislature adjourned sine die on July 11,
1977, and an extraordinary session was convened by the governor on August 7,
1977, under the authority of art. 3, § 2(B) for purposes enumerated in the proclama-
tion of the governor.
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since the prohibition is directed only at regular sessions. The rationale on
which the section is postulated is that in a special session, even one
following closely on the close of a regular session, both public and
legislative attention would be focused on the narrow issue of taxes and
related matters. 16
A number of revenue raising measures were considered in the regular
session when various fees for services rendered by the state were raised.' 7
The increase in these service charges is clearly distinguishable from
prohibited tax increases in that the matter considered is not a tax. One of
the bills not subject to that type of analysis provided for the repeal of a tax
credit granted by statute to those state industries who utilize natural gas in
their production process.' 8 Some discussion prior to final passage of the
bill centered on the application of Article VII, § 2 requiring a two-thirds
vote of the elected members of each house before an "existing tax
exemption" may be repealed.' 9 In the case of the natural gas tax credit,
the issue was more properly approached under the provisions of Article
VII, § 14(D) which provides, ". . . things of value of the state . . .
heretofore granted by prior state law . . . shall so remain for the full term
as provided . . .unless the authorization is revoked by law enacted by
two-thirds of the elected members of each house of the legislature prior to
the vesting of any contractual rights . .. 20
The function of that section of the new constitution was to validate
practices existing at the time of the section's adoption which would
become invalid under the new charter. 2' The existing tax credit fell within
the scope of "grandfathered" provisions, because it may be properly
construed as a credit or property or simply as a thing of value. 22 Since the
credit was granted validly under the 1921 constitution, it continued by its
own terms until repealed by a two-thirds vote. 23 The procedures utilized in
implementing the tax credit were such that a serious question was pre-
sented regarding the constitutionally permissable effect date of the act,
16. 5 DOCUMENTS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973,
248-250, 299-304.
17. See La. 1977 Acts, Nos. 409,415,416,417,418,419,420,421,422,424,427,
482, 492, 503, 567.
18. La. H.B. 249 (1977 La. Acts, No. 546).
19. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
20. Id. art. VII, § 14 (D).
21. Id.; 9 DOCUMENTS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973 at 2888-91.
22. LA. R.S. 47:7 (1972) (prior to 1977 amendment). The latest increase in the
credit was created prior to the adoption of the 1974 constitution.
23. Id.
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since there existed vested contractual rights in the credit for the current
year. For this reason, the effective date of the act is January 1, 1978.24
Thus the Speaker of the House was correct in his ruling that final
passage of the bill would require a two-thirds vote of the elected member-
ship or seventy votes in the House of Representatives. 25 In addition, the
bill by its terms avoided the potential problems of violating the vested
contractual obligations earlier granted in the natural gas tax credit act.26
A. Edward Hardin
PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
SEPARATION, DIVORCE, AND ALIMONY
The 1977 regular legislative session produced several important
pieces of legislation dealing with family law and related areas. Primary
among these is Act 735 which adds, as a tenth ground for judicial
separation, living apart for six months accompanied by the presence of
irreconcilable differences.' The enactment requires that both spouses ex-
ecute an affidavit stating that they have voluntarily lived apart for the
required period and that irreconcilable differences between them make the
common life impossible.
2
24. 1977 La. Acts, No. 546, (§ 3).
25. Journal of Proceedings (House), June 30, 1977, at 45.
26. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 735, adding LA. Civ. CODE art. 138(10).
2. A separation judgment cannot be rendered solely on the basis of the
required affidavit since it would amount to a mere summary judgment, prohibited in
actions for divorce or separation. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 969. The jurisprudence is
unsettled as to whether a spouse's testimony alone, though uncontroverted, sup-
plies the "preponderance of evidence" necessary for issuance of a separation
decree. Some cases indicate that corroboration is required: Harman v. McLeland,
16 La. 26 (1840); Ellois v. Ellois, 145 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). But see
Rosen v. Rosen, 218 La. 245, 49 So. 2d 1 (1950); Chamblee v. Chamblee, 340 So. 2d
378 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Seeling v. Seeling, 133 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961). Since "fault" is not an issue (thus the problems engendered by the Fulmer
case, discussed at notes 9-11, infra, are not present) and collusion is unlikely, it is
suggested that the affidavit itself should be held sufficient corroboration of one
spouse's testimony for a separation judgment under Civil Code article 138(10).
1977]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
This legislation is apparently designed to reduce the number of
separation suits based on the defendant spouse's fault. Under Civil Code
article 138(9), the spouses must wait a full year after voluntarily separat-
ing before either can file suit and obtain a separation without proving the
other's fault. During this delay, the community of gains, generally tacitly
contracted, 3 remains in existence 4 which may lead to uncertain and some-
times inequitable results upon final dissolution and division of the commu-
nity. The husband retains legal authority and responsibility for any chil-
dren of the marriage although the wife may have actual care and control of
them. 5 Also, until a suit for separation is filed, there can be no judicial
determination of the amount of monetary support owed to the wife or
children. 6 Moreover, final divorce based on living apart for one year
following judicial separation is delayed an additional year.7 Because of
these delays, it is often more expedient for one spouse to seek an im-
mediate separation based on fault even though both may actually prefer to
avoid airing their grievances in a public forum. 8
Prior to the decision in Fulmer v. Fulmer,9 there was little reason for
a defendant spouse to litigate the issue of fault in situations in which both
spouses desired a separation. But Fulmer held that if the wife obtains a
fault-based separation judgment, the husband is precluded from rearguing
her pre-separation fault should she thereafter seek alimony after divorce.
The spouse's dilemma is obvious: he or she can allow judgment to be
rendered in favor of the other, obtaining the desired separation but perhaps
assuring (or forfeiting, if the wife is the defendant)' 0 the wife's right to
However, the wary practitioner may still wish to produce additional witnesses to
prove the plaintiff's case. It should be noted that a legal separation based on
voluntarily living apart for one year is still available when one spouse refuses to sign
the affidavit required by Act 735. LA. CIv. CODE art. 138(9).
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2399.
4. Muse v. Yarborough, I I La. 521 (1838). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2405.
5. See State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306, 131 So. 28 (1931). Cf. LA. CIv. CODE arts.
216, 221.
6. With some exceptions, not applicable here, suits between spouses, or by
minor children against their parents, are prohibited prior to judicial separation. LA.
R.S. 9:291, 571 (Supp. 1960).
7. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 702.
8. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-73 Term-
Persons, 34 LA. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1974).
9. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
10. Fulmer indicated, in dictum, that a fault-based separation judgment ren-
dered against her should also preclude relitigation of her fault for the purpose of
alimony under Civil Code article 160. Id. at 629. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 317 So.
2d 629 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 320 So. 2d 912 (La. 1975).
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alimony; or he or she can avoid Mr. Fulmer's fate by showing his or her
freedom from fault, thereby foregoing, in many cases, the immediate legal
separation both may want. I
Thus, Fulmer indirectly reduced the possibility of collusive separa-
tion judgments at the cost of increased litigation and the additional animos-
ity, delay, and expense that it entails. Obviously, the combined result of
the tendency to seek an immediate separation based on fault and of the
Fulmer rule is contrary to the legislative policy favoring reconciliation.
Act 735 should indeed induce more couples to wait the necessary delay to
obtain a "no-fault" separation,' 2 thereby eliminating much of the litiga-
tion which Fulmer has spawned. However, a delay much shorter than six
months would virtually assure the demise of suits based on fault,' 3 thus
"eliminating the unseemliness of a public trial in which the parties hurl
accusations . . .at one another," 4 and would not be fatal to the policy
favoring reconciliation.15
I1. Civil Code article 141 alleviates the problem to some extent by mandating
that a separation be granted even when both spouses are shown to be guilty of legal
fault. However, it is of no aid if the defendant spouse, spurred by Fulmer, dis-
proves his own fault but is unable to place legal blame on the other. Furthermore, a
mutual fault judgment, grounded on proof by each of the other's misconduct,
hardly encourages reconciliation.
12. It can be argued that the requirement of an affidavit, signed by both
spouses, attesting that "irreconcilable differences" exist between them implies that
the separation is grounded on mutual fault. Support for this view might lie in the
fact that Louisiana's other "no-fault" statutes merely require the spouses to live
apart voluntarily for a time and require no showing that the marriage is irretrievably
broken. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 138(9); LA. R.S. 9:301, 302 (1950). However, since
the legislature has already provided for mutual fault separations in Civil Code
article 141, this interpretation seems to render the new act superfluous. Further-
more, a wife who might be unsure of her need for alimony in the future would be
unlikely to sign the affidavit since it would amount to a judicial confession of fault
on her part and, presumably, Fulmer would apply.
13. The bill, as originally introduced, had provided for a three month delay. La.
H.B. 393, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977). The senate bill provided the same. La. S.B. 296,
40th Reg. Sess. (1977). Another proposal required no delay between separation and
filing suit. La. S.B. 168, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
14. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-75 Term-Per-
sons, 36 LA. L. REV. 335, 337 (1976).
15. The justification for any delay between actual separation and filing suit is
the hope that the parties will "cool off" and reconcile during that time. However,
as discussed in the text above, the long delay may actually influence one spouse to
file for an immediate separation grounded on fault and lead to increased hostility
between them. It is important to remember that a separation judgment does not
dissolve the marriage and the parties are free to resume their life together if they so
choose. Even the community property regime, which they probably contracted, can
be easily reestablished. LA. CIv. CODE art. 155. It is suggested that the one-year
1977]
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In Act 702 the legislature has finally repealed the requirement that the
losing party in a separation suit wait one year and sixty days before filing
for a divorce based on the prior judgment. 16 If this Act is effective despite
being in apparent conflict with Act 448, either party may now sue one year
after the separation judgment becomes final. The old rule seemed to serve
no valid purpose and thechange should be welcomed.
CHILD CUSTODY
Act 448"7 eliminates the language in Civil Code article 157 which
required the custody of children after separation or divorce to be awarded
to the prevailing party unless their "greater advantage" would be served
by placing them with the other spouse. 8 Although this language seems to
establish a presumption, the courts have not treated it as such. Instead,
they have consistently based the award on "the best interests of the child
or children" (the same rule specified by Act 448), and have generally
preferred the mother over the father. 9 It can be argued that this amend-
ment was intended to do away with the so-called "maternal preference"
rule since it specifically directs that custody be granted to "the husband or
the wife. '"20 However, the courts have made it clear that the rule of
decision is the welfare of the child and the maternal preference is only an
evidentiary presumption based upon traditional, if antiquated, 2 notions that
children are generally better cared for by their mother. 22 Furthermore, if
wait, generally necessary before filing a divorce action, furnishes ample time for the
spouses to resolve their differences and sufficiently promotes the policy favoring
reconciliation.
16. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 702. Other
divorce legislation introduced but not passed included La. S.B. 170, 288, 40th Reg.
Sess. (1977) (shortening the period of separation required for a no-fault divorce to
one year); La. S.B. 169, 174, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977) (shortening the delay necessary
to procure a divorce on the basis of a separation judgment to six months); La. S.B.
168, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977) (providing for divorce based on irreconcilable differ-
ences).
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 157, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 448.
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 157 (as it appeared prior to Act 448 of 1977).
19. See, e.g., Nethkin v. Nethkin, 307 So. 2d 563 (La. 1975); Fulco v. Fulco,
259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Crowe v. Crowe, 344 So. 2d 408 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1977).
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 157, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 448.
21. The maternal preference rule and the "best interests" standard have been
thoroughly criticized as outmoded, unconstitutional, and inadequate guides for
determining child custody. See, e.g., The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1975-76 Term-Persons, 37 LA. L. REV. 305, 313-14 (1977); Note, 34 LA. L.
REV. 881 (1974).
22. See cases cited in note 19, supra. In order to forbid any presumption
[Vol. 38
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the legislature was attempting to abolish the maternal preference rule, it is
difficult to explain why Civil Code article 146, which provides that
custody pending a separation or divorce suit should normally be given to
the mother, was not similarly amended.
The same Act also requires that custody hearings ancillary to divorce
or separation be heard by the judge in chambers.23 Although article 2595
(1950) of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates that summary proceedings
for original grants of custody or changes in custody may be heard in
chambers, custody hearings generally have been conducted in open court.
In an effort to comply with the intent if not the letter of the law, at least
one court has begun excluding all persons not directly involved in the
custody case being litigated from the courtroom. 24
Finally, Act 448 amends the last paragraph of Revised Statutes 9: 302
to conform with the change made in Civil Code article 157, but fails to
reduce the waiting period of one year and sixty days found in the statute's
first paragraph. 25 Thus it is in apparent conflict with Act 702 which
repealed the additional sixty day delay for the loser in a separation suit, but
did not alter the last paragraph as it appeared in the pre-1977 version. 26
This is an obvious legislative oversight and, logically, the courts should
give effect to both changes made in the prior law. 27 There is also some
authority indicating that the Louisiana Law Institute may have a composite
printed as the new Revised Statute, and thereby implement the changes
made by both Acts. 28 In any case, it is suggested that the conflict should be
legislatively resolved during the next regular session.
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE SUPPORT DUTIES
Under an addition to the "long-arm" statute, Louisiana's courts may
now exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents to enforce duties of
favoring the mother, the legislature may explicitly have to prohibit presumptions
favoring either parent. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-5(7) (1967).
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 448.
24. The Family Court for East Baton Rouge parish instituted this procedure to
provide the privacy impliedly necessary under the Act and, at the same time, to
utilize the recording equipment in the courtroom to record the proceedings.
25. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 448.
26. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 702.
27. See Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Normand, 249 La. 1027, 192 So. 2d 552
(1967).
28. Cf. LA. R.S. 24:253 (1950). See State v. Smith, 254 La. 78, 222 So. 2d 864,
65 (1969) wherein the court approved a composite version of two acts of the same
legislative session which were much more difficult to reconcile than are Acts 448
and 702 of 1977.
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support owed to children, spouses, and former spouses who are domiciled
in Louisiana. The cause of action must arise out of the support obligation
and the defendant must have formerly resided in Louisiana with the person
to whom support is owed.29 Martin v. Martin,30 which held that failure to
pay support is not an offense as contemplated by the long-arm statute, is
thus legislatively overruled. Since the statute requires seemingly sufficient
"iminimum contacts,"- 31 and the cause of action centers in an area in which
the state has a manifest regulatory interest, 32 it should withstand possible
challenge as a violation of due process of law. In conjunction with Act
462, 33 the new enactment should significantly increase the scope and
availability of relief afforded persons in need of monetary support due
from others. 34
Louisiana's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, pro-
viding another means to collect support from a non-resident, has been
revised to conform with the latest version recommended by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 35 Although some
minor procedural changes have been made and many provisions have been
rewritten and clarified, the new statute does not substantively differ from
the prior version. Two new provisions worthy of note, however, require
the prosecuting attorney to seek diligently to locate the obligor or his
property within the state, 36 and allow attorneys for the Department of
29. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 734.
30. 250 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
31. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
33. See text at note 38, infra.
34. Formerly, other than possible relief through the district attorney's office
under the Uniform Reciprocal Support Enforcement Act, LA. R.S. 13:1641-98
(Supp. 1977), a Louisiana resident could enforce a duty of support owed to him by a
nonresident only by suing him in another state or, in two other limited instances, by
suit in a Louisiana court. If a Louisiana court has previously obtained personal
jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of determining his support obligations
to the plaintiff, that same court retains "continuing jurisdiction" to change a
previous award or to render an executory judgment for arrearages. Imperial v.
Hardy, 302 So. 2d 5 (La. 1974); Anthony v. Anthony, 288 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974). If the defendant owns property in Louisiana, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
may also be available. de Lavergne v. de Lavergne, 244 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ refused, 258 La. 357, 246 So. 2d 680 (1971).
35. LA. R.S. 13:1641-98 (Supp 1966), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 610.
The Act generally provides that a verified petition for support or arrearages, when
filed in this state, may be forwarded to the state where the obligor resides. A court
of competent jurisdiction in this latter state may then render or enforce support
decrees against the obligor tinder the substantive law of his state of residence.
36. LA. R.S. 13:1673A (Supp. 1977).
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Health and Human Resources to prosecute the action should the district
attorney refuse or neglect to do so. 37
Act 462 provides that the court may award attorney's fees when it
renders an executory judgment for past-due child support or alimony. 38
House Bill 1 13, which also passed the legislature, but was vetoed by the
governor, would have made the award mandatory. 39 The enacted version
appears fairer since it allows the judge to consider any excuse for nonpay-
ment that the defendant may be able to offer before condemning him to
pay the plaintiff's legal fees. The new statute should have a threefold
effect. First, it should make legal representation in suits for arrearages
more readily available since an attorney will now be able to collect his fee
from either the obligor or the obligee. Second, the obligee normally will
not have to pay his attorney out of the arrearages collected, thus conserv-
ing funds he or she may desperately need. Finally, the fear of additional
liability, beyond the support payments in arrears, may help prompt some
recalcitrant obligors to comply with support decrees.
ADOPTION
Under Act 659,' after a child is adopted the original birth certificate
and adoption decree are to be sealed in an envelope by the state registrar.
The envelope can only be opened by court order, issued on its own motion
or that of the adopted child, adoptive parents, or the registrar. Only
compelling reasons can justify issuing such an order, and disclosure of the
information may be made only to the extent necessary to satisfy those
reasons.4 1 Thus, the dictum in Spillman v. Parker4 2 which suggested that
an adopted child had an unqualified right to see his original birth certificate
is rejected by Act 659. 43 The Act also provides that the hearing on a
motion to open the envelope must be held in chambers and that all records
of the proceeding are to be sealed and kept strictly confidential."
37. LA. R.S. 13:1672C (Supp. 1977).
38. 1977 La. Acts, No. 462, adding LA. R.S. 9:305.
39. La. H.B. 113, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
40. 1977 La. Acts, No. 659, amending LA. R.S. 40:81A (1950), adding LA. R.S.
40:8 1C.
41. LA. R.S. 40:81A (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 659. It is not
clear what is meant by "only to the extent necessary" to satisfy the compelling
reasons for granting the order. Beyond the names of the adopted child's biological
parents and their addresses and some personal data about them as of the time of his
birth, there seems to be little else to learn from the original certificate or adoption
decree.
42. 332 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
43. Id. at 576.
44. LA. R.S. 40:81C (Supp. 1977).
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OTHER AcTs
Two other acts of this session affect family law. Act 192 allows a
tutor to use certificates of deposit in state or federally chartered banks as
security for faithful performance of his duties. 45 Finally, the legislature
has again reenacted Civil Code article 95 to validate all marriages, viola-
tive of its prohibitions, entered into prior to the effective date of this
reenactment. 46
PROPERTY
Four bills containing revisions of Civil Code articles on property
were introduced in the 1977 legislative session upon the recommendation
of the Louisiana State Law Institute. House Bill 216, containing provi-
sions on Predial Servitudes, was passed after several substantive changes
were made; House Bills 214 and 215, containing provisions on Bound-
aries and on Building Restrictions, respectively, were passed with little
modification; and House Bill 213, containing redefinitions of Things, was
killed by the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure. Revisions of
complete titles of the Civil Code occur infrequently, and each proposed
change or enacted provision requires a careful examination of the princi-
ples of Louisiana law which are affected.
PREDIAL SERVITUDES
The major work submitted to the legislature by the Louisiana State
Law Institute during this session was House Bill 216, enacted as Act 514,
a revision of Book II, Title IV on Predial Servitudes.' The revision was
45. 1977 La. Acts, No. 192, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4132.
46. LA. CiV. CODE art. 95, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 365.
1. The legislature rejected the provisions of proposed articles 654, 660, 661,
662, 663, and 666, relative to the public use servitude (see text at note 11, infra), and
the abuse of right theory (see text at note 26, infra). Instead, the legislature decided
to retain present articles 665, 667, 668, 669 and 707, which cover these areas. This
action made the article numbers of the remainder of the bill, which was passed,
non-sequential and conflicting. The Louisiana State Law Institute, acting pursuant
to the provisions of LA. R.S. 24:253, corrected this problem by retaining existing
articles 665, 667, 668 and 669 with their respective article numbers, redesignating
existing article 707 as 666, and redesignating proposed articles 664, 665.1, 667. 1,
668.1, 669.1 and 707.1 as articles 660, 661, 662,663, 664 and 707 respectively. This
symposium will refer to articles as they were finally numbered, with the exception
of articles which were rejected, which will retain their proposed numbers.
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primarily to clarify the substance of the existing title, by replacing awk-
ward or obscure language with more readable language to express suc-
cinctly the underlying principles of law.' Articles which contained exam-
ples were eliminated and flexible language substituted. 3 The Law Institute
and the legislature are to be commended on this work, which brings the
concepts of the law closer to the understanding of the citizenry, rather than
leaving the law shrouded in the obscurity of archaic terms.
The revision did include substantive additions and changes. New
article 670 contains provisions for buildings built in good faith which
encroach on the land of another. While another article adequately deals
with constructions built totally on the land of another,4 no provisions
covered the situation where the building merely encroached upon the
neighbor's land. 5 Article 670 allows the person who did not know that his
construction was encroaching on neighboring property to acquire a predial
servitude on the land on which he has encroached. However, the en-
croacher obtains the servitude only if the true owner did not complain of
the encroachment before substantial completion of the construction and if
the encroacher pays the full value of the servitude taken as well as any
damages which the true owner has suffered. 6 This article reflects an
admirable balancing of the societal interests in protecting both the good
faith builder and the true owner.
The new provisions of article 707 eliminate the troublesome and
sometimes specious distinctions previously made between continuous and
discontinuous servitudes,7 while retaining and clarifying the distinctions
2. For example, new article 646 replaces in two short sentences the ideas
contained in former articles 646, 647, 648 and 649. The article provides, "A predial
servitude is a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. The
two estates must belong to different owners." This clarity of thought and succinct-
ness of terminology is a great improvement on the comma-ridden articles on which
thenew article is based.
3. Article 662 combines the ideas found in former articles 692-95, and elimi-
nates outmoded examples such as "necessaries," while retaining the concept that a
work built near another's property should be built in such a way as not to injure the
neighbor's property. Other favorites of Code perusers, such as the servitude of
drip, have been eliminated as terms, although the principles have been retained in a
streamlined form. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 664, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No.
514.
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 508.
5. In the early case of Gordon v. Fahrenberg & Penn, 26 La. Ann. 366 (1874),
the Louisiana Supreme Court was unable to find any law applicable to this area, and
resorted to its equity powers under Civil Code article 21 for a solution.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 670, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 514.
7. For an illustration of the problems of this differentiation, see Nash v.
Whitten, 326 So. 2d 825 (La. 1976). See also Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes;
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between apparent and nonapparent servitudes.8 The scheme for acquiring
apparent servitudes by acquisitive prescription is systematized in articles
739 to 743 and the method of extinguishing these servitudes is found in
articles 753 and 754. An important clarification is found in article 759
which provides, "A partial use of the servitude constitutes a use of the
whole." This provision indicates that the servitude, apparent or not, on a
tract of land may be preserved as long as any part of the servitude is used,
and is consistent with both the jurisprudence9 in the area and the principle
that servitudes are indivisible.
10
New article 716 abolishes the right of the grantee of a servitude from
a co-owner to bring an action against the other co-owners to partition the
property.
The major opposition faced by this bill stemmed from two major
substantive changes, both of which were rejected by the legislature. The
Law Institute proposed a new article 660,11 which would have replaced
present article 665.12 The new article would have limited the servitude
burdening riparian estates to the "making and repairing of levees," thus
suppressing the language "roads, and other public or common works"
General Principles: Louisiana Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 31-42 (1968);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-76 Term-Property, 37
LA. L. REV. 317, 327-29 (1977); Note, 40 TUi. L. REV. 397 (1966).
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 707, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 514:
Predial servitudes are either apparent or nonapparent. Apparent servitudes are
those that are perceivable by exterior signs, works or constructions; such as a
roadway, a window in a common wall, or an aqueduct. Nonapparent servitudes
are those that have no exterior sign of their existence; such as the prohibition
of building on an estate or of building above a particular height.
This article clearly provides that there are only two types of predial servitudes, and
the test provided for each is one understandable to the ordinary person.
9. Hanks v. Gulf States Util. Co., 253 La. 946, 221 So. 2d 249 (1969). See The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Property, 33 LA.
L. REV. 172, 189-97 (1973).
10. This principle was contained in article 656 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 and has been retained in substance in article 652 of the revision.
11. Proposed article 660 provided, "Lands adjacent to navigable rivers are
burdened with a servitude for the making and repairing of levees. Incidents of this
servitude are governed by special laws and regulations."
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 665:
Servitudes imposed for the public or common utility, relate to the space which
is to be left for the public use by the adjacent proprietors on the shores of
navigable rivers, and for the making and repairing of levees, roads and other
public or common works.
All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined -by laws or particular
regulations.
See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 863.
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found in the existing article. The proposed limitation on the public's
servitude raised significant questions of law' 3 and public policy.
Louisiana courts have guarded the public's right to use the shores of
navigable rivers from early times. 4 Early decisions enunciated the view
that. the servitude should be given the broadest construction, because
"[tihe public is a great usufructuary .... ,," Later cases have consis-
tently held that riparian ownership is inherently subject to a broad public
servitude for constructing levees, roads and other works such as
wharves.' 6 The state or other public agency does not need to compensate
13. The proposed restrictions raised the question whether the legislature had
the power to limit the existing servitude. Article VII, section 14 of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution provides, in part, that "things of value of the state or of any
political subdivision shall not be loaned, pledged, or donated to or for any person,
association, or corporation, public or private." The existing servitude is certainly a
"thing of value" and the limitation of the servitude could be considered a donation
to the class of riparian owners, who would stand to benefit, either by greater
freedom in the use of their land or by compensation when their land was used for
purposes other than levee construction. See note 20, infra. If this analysis is
correct, however, the legislature would have no power to extinguish or modify the
existing servitudes in favor of the public. The correctness of these propositions is
not at issue; rather the argument is presented to illustrate the kind of fundamental
legal and policy questions which develop when a Civil Code revision is attempted.
14. In Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 122 (1841), the
supreme court exhaustively reviewed Spanish, French and Roman law, and held
that the riparians owned the batture, although the public had the right "to establish
wharves and other conveniences which commerce may require." Id. at 228.
15. Pulley & Erwin v. Municipality No. 2, 18 La. 278, 285 (1841). The court also
stated that the examples given in the Civil Code of public uses were merely
illustrations, not restrictions, on the types of public use. The court stated, "They
[the public] have the right to all the profit, utility, and advantages it [the batture]
may produce, and can make works and improvements to increase revenues." Id. at
285.
16. In Delaune v. Board of Commissioners, 230 La. 117, 87 So. 2d 749 (1956),
the court summarized:
It is the well-established law and jurisprudence of this State that a servitude in
favor of the public is imposed upon the land adjacent to navigable rivers and
streams for the purpose of constructing and repairing levees, roads and other
public or common works.
It is equally well settled that land burdened with this servitude may be taken for
the purpose of making or repairing public levees without compensation and
that such appropriation violates neither Section 2 of Article 1 of our Constitu-
tion, forbidding the taking or damaging of private property except for public
purposes and after just compensation is made . . . nor the due process clause
of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States for the reason
that riparian ownership is subject to the superior right of the public to the space
necessary for levees, roads and the like.
230 La. at 123-24, 87 So. 2d at 751 (authorities omitted). See also Jeanerette Lumber
and Shingle Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 249 La. 508, 187 So. 2d 715 (1966);
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the riparian owner when it exercises its rights under article 665, since the
state is not expropriating or taking private property through the power of
eminent domain. On the contrary, it is appropriating or using a legal
right 7 which has burdened and limited all riparian ownership since the
earliest days of Louisiana and subject to which the present owner acquired
his title. i8
The levee aspect of the servitude has been the most closely examined
and litigated part of article 665. The United States Supreme Court has
upheld the uncompensated levee servitude, finding that the process did not
offend the fourteenth amendment. 9 When the Louisiana Supreme Court
was called upon to interpret article XVI, section 6 of the 1921 Constitu-
tion, requiring the riparian owner to be paid a sum not to exceed the
assessed value for the previous year of land used for levee purposes, it
held the payment to be "purely gratuitous" because the state already
possessed the right to use the property without paying any compensation. 20
Board of Commissioners v. Baron, 236 La. 846, 109 So. 2d 441 (1959); Dickson v.
Board of Commissioners, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946); Audubon Park Com-
mission v. Board of Commissioners, 153 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1%3). Other
cases express the idea that the construction of public works is part of the police
power of the state, and that no compensation is owed because the damage is
"damnum absque injuria ...... Warriner v. Board of Commissioners, 132 La.
1098, 62 So. 157 (1913); Ruch v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 9 So. 473
(1891).
17. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 3, 14-16
(1970). The term "police power" is used as a justification of appropriation in
Warriner v. Board of Commissioners, 132 La. 1098, 62 So. 157 (1913) and Ruch v.
City of New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 9 So. 473 (1891).
18. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Ruch v. Cityof New Orleans, 43 La. Ann.
275, 280, 9 So. 473, 475 (1891), stated that "the riparian owner enjoys his property
sub modo, i.e., subject to the right of the public to reserve enough space for levees,
public roads, and the like. Over this space the front proprietor never acquires
complete dominion. It never passes free of this reservation by a deed to a pur-
chaser." This language has been quoted with approval by the United States Su-
preme Court in Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1895) and by later Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions. Dickson v. Board of Commissioners, 210 La. 121, 26 So.
2d 474 (1946); Peart v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421, 12 So. 490 (1893). See also Hathorn
v. Board of Commissioners, 218 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 253 La.
881, 220 So. 2d 461 (1969).
19. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1895). See also Geiieral Box Co. v.
United States, 351 U.S. 159 (1956); Town of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U.S. 676
(1927).
20. Boyce Cottonseed Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 160 La. 727,
740, 107 So. 506, 510 (1925). Differing opinions are expressed in Wolfe, The
Appropriation of Property for Levees: A Louisiana Study in Taking Without Just
Compensation, 40 TUL. L. REV. 233, 246-53 (1966); Schwartz, Levees and Battures
in the Law of Louisiana, 21 TUL. L. REV. 649 (1947); Note, 27 LA. L. REV. 321
(1967); Note, 29 TUL. L. REV. 799 (1955).
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The general language of the article concerning other public or com-
mon works has not been the basis of comprehensive legislation or exten-
sive litigation. The 1974 Constitution specifically classifies only levee use
as appropriation and this provision may be interpreted to give the riparian
owner the right to due process and just compensation when his land is used
for public purposes such as wharves or docks.
21
No cases have been found which decided the merits of the issue of the
state's free use of riparian estates for non-levee purposes, 22 although the
supreme court did hold in Hebert v. T.L. James & Co. ,23 that the
servitude imposed by the Civil Code was "not intended to serve the public
for any purpose other than that which is incident to the nature, navigable
character, or use of the stream,''24 and therefore did not grant the public
the right to the free use of riparian lands for general road purposes. Other
recent cases recognize that riparian owners are allowed to construct works
on the shores or batture of navigable streams as long as the constructions
do not seriously obstruct or prevent the public use of the river or banks.
25
The problems presented by this proposal are primarily economic. If
the public has no servitude on the riparian estate to build public works such
as wharves without compensating the riparian owner, it can certainly
acquire the necessary land by expropriation. The cost of compensating the
riparian owner could be prohibitive if the expected revenue from a facility
designed primarily to promote commerce were insufficient to warrant the
acquisition. The riparian owner would stand to benefit, either because he
would be paid full market value for land without a servitude burdening it,
21. See 6 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973:
CONVENTION TRANSCRIPrs, August 30, 1973 at 1053-54. Cf. Hargrave, The Declara-
tion of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1974);
Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REV. 9, 26-27 (1975).
22. The issue was presented in City of New Orleans v. Board of Commission-
ers, 148 So. 2d 782 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 204, 151 So. 2d\493
(1963), in which Judge Yarrut, in his concurring opinion, stated that, "The servitude
claimed by the Dock Board to build wharves and docks over which it will have
complete dominion and control, is equivalent to appropriation. In view of the lack
of clear constitutional or statutory authority, or necessary implication, giving the
Dock Board such paramount right, the Dock Board has no such right at this time."
Id. at 788. However, this was merely a concurring opinion, and the issue was not
reached in the majority opinion, which held that the property in question was not
burdened by the article 665 servitude, because the servitude was extinguished by
confusion when the state acquired ownership of the property. Id. at 786.
23. 224 La. 498, 70 So. 2d 102 (1953).
24. Id. at 508, 70 So. 2d at 106.
25. Parish of Jefferson v. Universal Fleeting Co., 234 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970); Lake Providence Port Comm'n v. Bunge Corp., 193 So. 2d 363 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1966).
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or because he would be in the desirable position of being able to develop
his riparian estate for commercial purposes. The legislature rejected this
policy change and chose instead to retain the existing servitude provisions.
The Louisiana State Law Institute also proposed a revision of the
Civil Code articles regarding the relief available to those injured by the
activities an owner has performed or is about to perform on his own land.
The proposed system of regulation of an owner's use of his land was based
on the civilian concept of abuse of right, a doctrine recognized in Louisia-
na jurisprudence. 26 The rejected articles contained provisions defining the
abnormal use of property 27 and the unreasonable use of an estate, 28 as well
as provisions for the protection of servitudes 29 and prevention of unlawful
activity through injunctive relief. 30
The principle that certain activities by an owner may constitute a
violation of the obligations which the owner owes to his neighborhood has
26. This concept was first introduced into the jurisprudence by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Higgins Oil& Fuel. Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So.
206 (1919) and has been applied in several later cases. See Cueto-Rua, Abuse of
Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965, 1004-13 (1975).
27. Proposed article 661:
Abnormal use of property
An act, activity, or work of a property owner that, under the circum-
stances existing when it is done, exceeds the normal exercise of the right of
ownership constitutes an abuse of the right.
An abuse of the right of ownership that may cause damage to another or
deprive him of the enjoyment of his property subjects the property owner to
civil responsibility.
28. Proposed article 662:
Unreasonable use of estate
An unreasonable use of an estate that causes damage to property or
excessive discomfort to persons of normal sensibilities by the diffusion of
smoke, dust, vapor, noise, heat, vibrations, odors, and the like, may be
enjoined. Damages may be recovered without regard to defendant's negli-
gence.
Whether the use of an estate is unreasonable is determined in light of the
nature of the neighborhood, governmental regulations, local customs, and the
attending circumstances.
29. Proposed article 654:
Protection of Servitudes
Predial servitudes may be protected by personal and real actions. They
may also be protected by mandatory and prohibitory injunctions without re-
gard to the limitations of Article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
30. Proposed article 663:
Injunction
Injunction lies when an act, activity, or work on property is prohibited by
governmental regulations or local customs, or when there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Article 662 will be violated.
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been accepted in Louisiana. 3 Most opponents of the measures did not
object to the principle; their opposition was to the principle's wide scope
of application. One view was that the new provisions would enable any
person to bring an action for damages or injunction, not just neighboring
landowners.32 Current jurisprudence has already recognized that actions
for injunctive relief may be brought by non-owners such as lessees 33 or
tenants,3 4 but has not recognized the right of all persons who have
somehow been adversely affected to bring such actions.
The major opposition to the revision was based on the provisions for
injunctive relief. Opponents pointed out that proposed article 663 would
have provided for mandatory injunctions when any activity is prohibited
by governmental regulation. Their feeling was that the language "govern-
mental regulation" was entirely too broad, since many activities are
potentially within the prohibitions of some local, state or federal regulation
and litigation would necessarily occur to resolve the applicability of the
governmental regulation to the activity. The delay would be costly and, in
many cases, unnecessary. Essentially, the opponents felt that the language
of the provisions was so broad as to allow injunctions which were no more
than harassments.
31. In the recent case of Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69, 72 (La. 1976),
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "it is clear that the right of ownership is
subject to limitations imposed by law." Excellent summaries of the jurisprudence
in this area are found in Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of
Vicinage: Articles 667-669 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REv. 195 (1974)
and Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of Vicinage: Remedies Under
Articles 667 and 669, 34 LA. L. REV. 475 (1974)..
32. Opponents pointed out that proposed article 661 merely requires that the
abuse of right may cause damage to another, and that the article does not require
proof of damage to another property owner. However, the comments to article 661
indicate an intention that a property owner would bring the action, even though
those introducing the revision conceded that the courts would probably be required
to decide whether the action could be brought by any party who has been damaged.
A policy decision to expand the class entitled to bring the action would reflect
cognizance of the non-owner status of many citizens, whose right to a healthy and
safe environment should not depend on their economic condition. However, since
predial servitudes are by definition burdens on estates imposed on or in favor of the
land itself, the desirable expansion of this right of action to non-landowners should
be properly placed in another area of the Code, perhaps in the title on quasi-delicts.
33. A lessee was given injunctive relief in Salter v. B. W.S. Corp., Inc., 290 So.
2d 821 (La. 1974). Note that in Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board, 284 So. 2d
905 (La. 1973), the supreme court found that the activity which causes the injury
need not necessarily be one performed by the owner. The court reasoned that the
word "proprietor" as used in the Civil Code, was not merely a substitute for the
word "owner." But see id. at 917-18 (Barham, J., concurring).
34. Tenants whose health and safety were threatened were given injunctive
relief in Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971).
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An exhaustive examination of the relief already available, either in
the form of damages or injunction, under articles 667 and 669 exceeds the
scope of this symposium. 35 Moreover, the recent cases indicate that the
law is far from settled. 36 However, it is evident that the injunctive relief
currently available3 7 is much harder to obtain than the relief that would
have been available under the proposed articles. The legislature evidently
decided that the harm of increased injunctive relief outweighed the bene-
fits which would have been derived, and left the development of this
increasingly important area to the courts and to future legislation. 38
BOUNDARIES
Act 169 contains a revision of the Civil Code and Code of Civil
Procedure articles relative to the boundary action. 39 The language and
35. At least one commentator has indicated that articles 667 and 669 have
already been bypassed by an expansive judicial interpretation of article 2315. Stone,
Servitudes of Good Neighborhood in Louisiana Law, 50 TUL. L. REV. 621 (1976).
Cf. Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of Vicinage: Remedies Under
Articles 667 and 669, 34 LA. L. REV. 475 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976); Salter v. B.W.S.
Corp., Inc., 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974); Chaney v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 249
So. 2d 181 (1971).
37. In Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., Inc., 290 So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974), the.
Louisiana Supreme Court stated, "We find the availability of injunctive relief in an
action predicated on C.C. article 667 is controlled by C.C.P. 3601. C.C. 667 does not
specifically provide for injunctive relief; thus an injunction is only available under
this article upon a showing of irreparable injury." The court added in a footnote,
"We expressly do not decide the circumstances under which an injunction will
issue in cases involving interference with conventional servitudes or under a posi-
tive legal servitude, such as C.C. 665." Id. at 825 n.2. The court then referred to
Poole v. Guste, 261 La. 1110, 262 So. 2d 339 (1972) in which an injunction was
granted to prevent interference with a natural servitude of drain. Justice Barham's
concurrence in Salter, presents the position that Civil Code article 667 is a positive
legal servitude and that injunctive relief should be available to prevent interference
thereunder. Id. at 825-27. In the recent case of Moreland v. Acadian Mobile Homes
Park, Inc., 313 So. 2d 877, 884 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 319 So. 2d 442, 443
(La. 1975), the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that the power to grant an
injunction to prevent the owner of a dominant estate from increasing the burden of
drainage on a servient estate was discretionary, and that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by awarding damages rather than an injunction.
38. The important policy considerations present in this area necessitate careful
legislative directives. The proposed articles may have contained ambiguities creat-
ing potentially inequitable results; however, the increasing awareness of the pub-
lic's right to a satisfactory environment dictates that the legislature institute a more
comprehensive method of achieving this end, rather than leaving the task to the
piecemeal and often inconsistent approach of the judiciary.
39. Act 169 repealed Title VI, Of New Works, articles 856 through 869, of Book
II of the Civil Code. The provisions of articles 861, 862 and 863, dealing with works
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procedures of the former articles were cumbersome and caused problems
when the courts insisted on strict conformity to all procedures.40 The
revision was primarily one of clarification and codification of the existing
law and jurisprudence. For example, a clear distinction is made between a
boundary and a boundary marker, thereby eliminating the confusion re-
sulting from the poor English translation of the French text of the Civil
Code of 1825."' A more complete definition of "fixing the boundary" is
also provided.42
Several substantive changes were made. Under the prior articles, a
lessee had no right to bring a boundary action,43 but did have a right to
compel his lessor to bring the action." The revision specifically limits the
lessee's right to demand that his lessor bring the action to situations in
which the lessee's rights are threatened.45 A boundary may now be fixed
extrajudicially even if one of the owners is a minor or an interdict.'
The procedure for extrajudicial boundary determinations is sim-
plified; the adjacent owners, or those who possess as owners, merely sign
an agreement describing the boundary between them. 7 The agreement is
an act translative of title, having the effect of a compromise, 48 and serves
obstructing piblic places, navigable river beds or banks, buildings encroaching on
public places and municipal construction of navigation facilities on public places,
respectively, were to be transferred by House Bill 213 into the title on Things.
When action was deferred on House Bill 213, an unwanted lacuna developed. Act
188 transferred the texts of these articles into La. R.S. 9:1111, 1112 and 1113
respectively, thus allowing their continued existence and facilitating the implemen-
tation of the Civil Code revisions expected next year. See 1977 La. Acts, No. 188, §
6.
40. For an example of this strict adherence to technicalities, see Alcus v.
Elliser, 310 So. 2d 663 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1975). For a general discussion of the
procedures formerly required, see Heck, Fixing Limits, and Surveying Land, 28
LA. L. REV. 625 (1968).
41. Compare the French and English versions of articles 822 and 828 of the
Civil Code of 1825. The French word "bornes" corresponds to boundary markers,
not to the boundary itself.
42. LA. Civ. CODE art. 785, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 169.
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 823 (prior to 1977 revision).
44. LA. Civ. CODE art. 831 (prior to 1977 revision).
45. LA. Civ. CODE art. 787, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 169. This article
as amended conforms closely to the French text of article 827 of the Civil Code of
1825.
46. LA. CIv. CODE art. 789, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 169. Since the
boundary action necessarily affects the rights of the incompetent, the tutor or
curator must obtain court authorization to participate in the boundary action.
47. Id. If one of the owners is the State of Louisiana, however, the provisions
of LA. R.S. 41:1131 still apply, since this statute was specifically excepted from the
general repealing provisions of section 4 of Act 169.
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 795, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 169.
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to convey ownership to the parties up to the designated line. 49 The
boundary line may be specifically described in the agreement, or the
parties may agree that a survey or placement of boundary markers shall
constitute the boundary line." ° An action claiming error in the agreement
may be brought unless the ten year liberative prescription has run."' If the
boundary markers have been erroneously placed by one of the contiguous
owners alone, or not in accordance with a written agreement fixing the
boundary, the error can be rectified unless a party has acquired ownership
by thirty year acquisitive prescription.5 2
If an action is brought to fix the boundary judicially, the court is
given discretion to appoint a surveyor to determine the boundary "in
accordance with the prevailing standards and practices of his profession
indicating the respective contentions of the parties," 53 thus eliminating the
formalities required in former articles '834 through 837. The judicial
determination has the effect of res judicata and can be attacked only for
fraud, and then only if an action is brought within one year of the
judgment.5 4
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
Act 170 contains new provisions regulating building restrictions.
55
No similar articles were previously contained in the Civil Code;5 6 rather,
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 789, comment (c), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No.
169.
50. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 789, 795 and the comments thereunder, as amended by
1977 La. Acts, No. 169. Th4e principle is that the parties may describe the boundary
line in whatever manner they wish. Problems may arise when the parties agree that
a survey shall be the line, since "survey" may refer either to a survey description of
the boundary or to the boundary markers placed by the surveyor. In any case of
confusion of this sort, the intent of the parties is determinative.
51. LA. CIv. CODE art. 795, and comment thereunder, as amended by 1977 La.
Acts, No. 169.
52. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 795-96, and comments thereunder, as amended by 1977
La. Acts, No. 169. It would seem that if the parties had agreed in writing that the
placing of boundary markers, either by themselves or by a third party, should create
the boundary between them, an action claiming error would be barred by the ten
year prescription rather than the thirty year prescription.
53. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3692, added by 1977 La. Acts, No. 169. This
provision will become part of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than the Civil
Code.
54. LA. CIv. CODE art. 795, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 169. See also
Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482 (1924).
55. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 775-83, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 170. This act
repealed Title V of Book II, articles 823-55, relative to fixing limits and surveying
lands, and substitutes a new Title V, Building Restrictions.
56. Articles 856 through 869 of the present Civil Code do contain provisions
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building restrictions were the product of jurisprudence. 57 Unfortunately,
the jurisprudence was not consistent and the need for uniform law in this
area was apparent.58 The new title presents a unified approach to the
subject. 9 Conceptually, building restrictions are recognized to be "real
rights likened to predial servitudes." '  The rules of predial servitudes
apply except where contrary to the nature of building restrictions. For
example, a building restriction can impose an affirmative duty on an
owner, 6 1 while a predial servitude cannot.6 2 The title also contains the
procedures required to establish, 63 enforce, 64 interpret65 and terminate"
building restrictions. The concepts underlying these procedures are not
new, but the act serves the valuable function of systematizing the law in
this increasingly important area.
THINGS
Action on House Bill 213, containing revisions of Book II, Title I of
the Louisiana Civil Code, was deferred indefinitely by the House Commit-
tee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 16, 1977.67 The deferral was
regulating new works; however, these articles do not contain principles broad
enough to regulate the complex area generally known as building restrictions. LA.
R.S. 9:5622 did contain some regulations in this area. This statute was repealed by
Act 170 in order to ensure that the Civil Code provisions would be the authoritative
and comprehensive source of regulation.
57. The leading case is Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 137 La. 724, 67
So. 641 (1915). For other cases and analysis, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE, §§ 104, 114 & 124 (1966).
58. See Smith, Building Restrictions in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 468 (1961).
59. The area in question is limited to those building restrictions imposed by a
subdivision developer or other individual wishing to restrict the subsequent use of
real property. 1977 La. Acts, No. 306, contains the procedures to be followed by
municipalities in creating restrictions via zoning regulations, including requirements
for notice, creations of a board of adjustment and appeals procedures.
60. LA. Civ. CODE art. 777, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 170:
Building restrictions are incorporeal immovables and real rights likened to
predial servitudes. They are regulated by application of the rules of predial
servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the nature of
building restrictions.
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 778, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 170.
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 651, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 514. This article
corresponds to article 655 of the Civil Code of 1870.
63. LA. CIv. CODE art. 775, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 170.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 779, as amended by 1977.La. Acts, No. 170.
65. LA. CIv. CODE art. 783, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 170.
66. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 780-82, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 170.
67. At the same time, the committee set up an interim study committee to work
with the Louisiana State Law Institute and other interested persons to solve the
problems of the proposed revision. Another revision will probably be offered in the
next regular session.
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prompted primarily by opposition to the changes proposed by the Louisia-
na State Law Institute to articles 451, 455 and 457 of the present Civil
Code, which define the seashore and the banks of navigable rivers.
The proposed replacement of article 451 provided that "seashore is
the land between the mean low water stage and the mean high water stage
of the sea. " '68 Accurate determination of any seashore involves many
problems, 69 and the determination of the seashore of Louisiana has already
caused protracted litigation in both federal7 ° and state courts. 71 Part of the
difficulty results from the definition presently given that seashore is "that
space of land, over which the waters of the sea spread in the highest water,
during the winter season. "72 This language was borrowed from Roman
sources and referred to the Mediterranean Sea, which reaches its highest
level in the winter.73 The highest level of the sea in Louisiana is reached
during the summer, 74 and thus the definition is not well suited to Louisia-
na. Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have chosen to follow the letter of the
law rather than its spirit and have limited the seashore to the highest
ordinary level in the winter, 75 rather than the highest ordinary level during
the higher summer level.
The revision would have corrected this problem but would also have
created new ones. The term "stage" has a technical meaning and is
customarily used to describe the height of riverwaters, 76 not the level of
the sea. By setting a lower boundary on the seashore, any existing public
rights to use the sea bottom would have been restricted. 77 The upper
68. La. H.B. 213, art. 451, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
69. A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 3-14 (1962).
70. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), 363 U.S. I (1960), reh.
denied, 364 U.S. 856, 394 U.S. I 1 (1968), reh. denied, 394 U.S. 994, decree suppl.,
394 U.S. 836, decree suppl., 409 U.S. 17 (1972), decree suppl., 422 U.S. 13 (1975).
71. See, e.g., A.K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 238 La. 926, 117 So.
2d 60 (1960). For earlier cases dealing with the seashore see Buras v. Salinovich, 154
La. 495, 97 So. 748 (1923); Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So.
249 (1906); Morgan v. Negodich, 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636 (1888).
72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 451.
73. Note, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 272, 274 (1934).
74. A. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 28 (1967).
75. See cases cited in note 71, supra.
76. RUSSELL, GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN FLUVIAL, DELTAIC, AND COASTAL
MORPHOLOGY AND PROCESSES 81 (1969).
77. Although Civil Code article 450 provides that the sea is a common thing,
"the ownership of which belongs to nobody in particular," the courts have indi-
cated that the word "sea" refers to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, rather than to
its bottom or bed, with the result that the sea water was considered a common thing
while the seabed was a public thing owned by the state of Louisiana. LA. R.S. 49:3
provides that the State of Louisiana owns the waters of the Gulf as well as the beds
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boundary of the seashore would have been the mean high water mark, not
the highest ordinary level, which might have led to an assertion of
ownership by bordering landowners in some cases. 78 Even though these
problems could have been resolved by litigation, the committee felt that
the better solution was to defer action and to allow more time for study and
correction of the problems raised.
Even more difficulty was encountered with proposed article 456,
providing that, "the banks of navigable rivers are private things subject to
use for purposes that are incidental to navigation. The bank of a river is the
land lying between the ordinary low and ordinary high stage of the river."
This article would have replaced present articles 455 and 457.79 Since the
and shores which are within the boundaries of Louisiana. Professor Yiannopoulos
states that the result of the jurisprudence and the law is that the sea, both waters
and bottom, must be regarded as a public rather than a common thing. A. YIAN-
NOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 27 (1966). In United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), the United States Supreme Court held that by the
Submerged Lands Act of May 22, 1953, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1315, the
United States quitclaimed to the state of Louisiana the lands underlying the Gulf of
Mexico within three geographical miles of its coast line, which is defined under the
Act as "the line of ordinary low-water along that portion of the coast which is in
direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland
waters." The determination of the applicable baselines led to extended litigation,
which finally ended in 1975. See United States v. Louisiana, 422 U.S. 13 (1975). The
state owns this area within the three mile limit, and is forbidden to alienate it by the
provisions of article 9, section 3 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. However, the
question remains concerning what area of the seabottom is affected by the public
use provision of article 452, which declares that the public has free use of the
seashores. The proposed lower boundary of the seashore would clarify the limit of
the public's right, since the right only applies to the seashore. This clarification
would also terminate any contention that the public right to use the sea bottom
freely extends as far as the state boundaries. The sea bottom below the boundary of
the proposed article would have been subject exclusively to state control and
regulation.
78. The proposed upper boundary of mean high water may or may not be the
same as the existing boundary, depending on many factors. If the new boundary is
below the existing boundary, the adjacent landowners would have a claim to the
area of which the state has effectively renounced its ownership. If the new boun-
dary is above the existing boundary, the adjacent landowners might claim that their
property was being taken without compensation, in contravention of article 1,
section 2 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. Additionally, the state would be
required to compensate the landowners for public facilities, such as beaches, which
were to be constructed in the area above the mean high water level, in order to
comply with-the above mentioned constitutional provision.
79. LA. CIV. CODE art. 455:
The use of the banks of navigable rivers or streams is public; accordingly every
one has a right freely to bring his vessels to land there, to make fast the same to
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present text of article 455 provides, in part, that the "use of the banks of
navigable rivers or streams is public .... ,o the proposed article
would have limited existing public rights, unless the term "river" is
inclusive of "streams." The Civil Code differentiates the two terms8 1 and
one recent supreme court decision also recognized a difference.82 Al-
the trees which are planted there, to unload his vessels, to deposit his goods, to
dry his nets, and the like.
Nevertheless the ownership of the river banks belongs to those who
possess the adjacent lands.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 457:
The banks of a river or stream are understood to be that which contains it in its
ordinary state of high water; for the nature of the banks does not change,
although for some cause they may be overflowed for a time.
Nevertheless on the borders of the Mississippi and other navigable
streams, where there are levees, established according to law, the levees shall
form the banks.
The term "banks" in the above article is a mistranslation from the French text of
the Code of 1825. The ramifications of this mistranslation are discussed in note 100,
infra.
80. LA. CIv. CODE art. 455. See note 79, supra, for the full text of article 455.
81. LA. CIv. CODE art. 509, for example, provides in part:
The accretions, which are formed successively and imperceptibly to any soil
situated on the shore of a river or other stream, are called alluvion.
The alluvion belongs to the owner of the soil situated on the edge of the
water, whether it be a river or stream ....
Other articles containing language distinguishing river and stream are articles 455,
457, 511, 512, 517, and 518. The French texts of articles 453 and 665 use the broad
expression "rivieres navigable" or navigable streams to apply to the general pro-
positions of public ownership and public use. An authoritative dictionary of French
legal terminology, published at approximately the same time as the Civil Code of
1825, defines a "fleuve" or river as a large stream which has its mouth in the sea,
and a "riviere" or stream as any body of water formed by springs or run-off
rivulets, which flows through a naturally created bed. BIRET, VOCABULAIRE DES
CINQ CODES, LIBRAIRIE TOURNACHON-MOLIN (Paris 1826). Streams are either
navigable, floatable but non-navigable or neither floatable nor navigable. Streams
discharge into rivers which discharge into the sea. Id.
82. In State v. Placid, 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974), on rehearing, the Louisiana
Supreme Court examined the jurisprudence classifying certain bodies of water as
lakes. The court noted that "[in State v. Erwin, supra, this Court was concerned
with the classification of Calcasieu Lake in Cameron Parish as a lake, river or
stream." Id. at 173. The court also provided characteristics which were to be used
in "stream classification." Id. at 175.
Justice Barham, who dissented from the original opinion in the case, but joined
the majority in the rehearing opinion, stated in his dissent, "it is of particular
importance to note here that-our words river and stream come from the French
words fleuve and riviere. Fleuve is a river like the Mississippi, the Red, the Black,
and the Atchafalaya. Streams are those smaller bodies of running water, which
according to the French, carried some kind of flotation." Id. at 170. This decision
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though the comment to the proposed revision indicates that no such change
was intended, 83 comments are not the law and are not intended to be
considered as part of the law.84 In addition, although the courts have
constantly rejected the argument that the public use of banks under article
455 includes all purposes, they have consistently recognized that the use
does include those purposes which are incident to both the nature and the
navigable character of the waterway.8 5 The jurisprudence has never
specified the purposes allowed under the article, 6 but it is clear that the
restrictive language of the proposal would have placed limitations on the
existing rights of the public.
87
and the cases examined therein indicate to this writer that the courts do recognize a
conceptual difference between lakes, rivers and streams, although the judicial
categorizations of lakes and streams have been inconsistent. Stream is a broader,
more inclusive category, containing all waterbodies that meet the "pertinent
characteristics" test set out in State v. Placid. Id. at 175. The elimination of the
general language "or streams" from present article 455 can only lead to the conclu-
sion that proposed article 456 would have limited the scope of existing public rights.
If the intent of the lawmakers is to preserve the status quo, while eliminating
unnecessary wording, the law should retain the general category of streams and
eliminate the more limited term river; otherwise the terminology of the Code will be
subverted in a manner which could only restrict public rights.
83. La. H.B. 213, art. 456, comment (a), 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
84. LA. R.S. 1:13 (1950). Section 2 of House Bill 213 would have provided that
"the Comments in this Act are not intended to be considered as part of the law and
are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act."
85. Hebert v. T.L. James & Co., 224 La. 498, 70 So. 2d 102 (1953); Lyons v.
Hinckley, 12 La. Ann. 655 (1856); Carrollton R.R. v. Winthrop, 5 La. Ann. 36
(1850); Parish of Jefferson v. Universal Fleeting Co., 234 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970). Certain public uses of the banks of navigable streams, such as fishing,
are cognizable as part of the nature of the stream. These uses would no longer be
freely permitted unless the courts were able to find that fishing is incidental to
navigation.
86. Professor Yiannopoulos states that the uses listed in article 455 are illustra-
tive rather than exclusive. Yiannopoulos, The Public Use of the Banks of Navigable
Rivers in Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REV. 563, 571-74 (1971).
87. It may be that the public presently has no right to fish from the shore into
the stream. Dictum in Warner v. Clarke, 232 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
refused, 255 La. 918, 233 So. 2d 565 (1970) indicates that the public has no right to
hunt or fish upon the land between the levees and the Mississippi River, and it is
certain that trespass statutes such as LA. R.S. 14:63 have effectively denied land-
ward access to many river banks. However, much sport fishing and commercial
fishing, such as crawfishing, is done from boats, even though the nets or traps are
placed on the area jurisprudentially defined as the banks. If the public's right to use
the banks is limited to purposes incidental to navigation, these fishermen would
face potential trespass charges if they attempted to use the banks for fishing, unless
fishing is declared incidental to navigation. The difficulty in obtaining permission
from riparian owners to use the banks as well as the difficulty of ascertaining the
boundary between the ordinary low water mark and some other low water stage
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The proposed definition of the banks would have resolved long-
standing problems. In the early case of Morgan v. Livingston,88 the
Louisiana Supreme Court decided a case involving the ownership of the
land known as the batture. No article corresponding to article 457 existed
in the 1808 Civil Code8 9 and the language corresponding to present article
455 indicated that the riparian owner had ownership of the shore (rivage)
of the river or stream, although his ownership was subject to the servitude
for public use. 9 The court, lacking a Civil Code definition, cited Roman
and Spanish sources and stated that "the bank is that space which the
water covers, when the river is highest in any season of the year.' 91 The
court continued by pointing out that the bank is part of the river, the other
parts being the bed and the water. However, the court did not delimit the
bank from the bed. 92 The redactors of the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825,
including the same Livingston involved in the Morgan case, 93 felt that a
definition of the banks was necessary to ascertain the area burdened with
the servitude of public use, and offered a definition consistent with the
decision in Morgan.94 The legislature, however, expressly rejected the
proposed definition and substituted the word "lits" or beds, 95 thereby
ensuring that the state, not the riparian owner, would own the land
normally covered by the river or stream in its ordinary stage of high
water. 96 The banks would necessarily be located above the ordinary high
would seriously hamper the efforts of commercial fishermen, as well as the many
sport fishermen, to fish in the streams of Louisiana.
88. 6 Mart.(O.S.) 19 (1819).
89. 3 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, pt. 1, at 259 (1940).
90. Id. at 257-59.
91. 6 Mart.(O.S.) at 229.
92. Id.
93. Flory, Edward Livingston's Place in Louisiana Law, 19 LA. HIST. Q. 32-49
(1936); W. HATCHER, EDWARD LIVINGSTON, JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN AND JACK-
SONIAN DEMOCRAT 139-89, 251 (1940). Hatcher notes that Livingston aroused the
wrath of the citizenry of New Orleans by his batture activities, which led to his
celebrated confrontation with Thomas Jefferson. Hatcher observes that the batture
controversy probably caused Livingston to lose at least two public elections. Id. at
193, 229. One can only suppose that the Legislators were well aware of the public's
view toward Livingston and perhaps political expediency was a consideration in
their decision to reject the Projet wording, since the adoption of the bank terminolo-
gy could have helped Livingston in his batture battles.
94. 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 36 (1940).
95. 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES pt. 3, at 259 (1940).
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 453 provides, in part:
Public things are those, the property of which is vested in a whole nation,
and the use of which is allowed to all the members of the nation: of this kind are
navigable rivers, seaports, roadsteads and harbors, highways and the beds of
rivers, as long as the same are covered with water.
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water line, which is consistent with the Code provisions97 regarding its
use. 98 Unfortunately, the English translation of the article used the word
banks instead of the correct translation of beds, and later courts have
followed this mistranslation, even though the supreme court has often held
that where a discrepancy exists between the French and English texts of
the Civil Code of 1825, the French text must be considered as control-
ling.99 The result has been that decisions such as State v. Richardson t
°
97. See note 79, supra.
98. The courts have always had difficulty in resolving the bed/bank problem
because of the fluctuating nature of Louisiana streams. In the early case of Hender-
son v. Mayor, 3 La. 563 (1832), the court found that article 448 (now article 457)
provided a definition of banks and levees as banks. The court stated that
-[a]ccording to this definition, all the space between the levees and the natural
banks of the river at low water, which in most places, is annually inundated at
certain seasons of the year, must be alternately a part of the bed or a part of the
bank, according to periodic changes, between the highest and lowest stages of the
water." Id. at 567.
This theory of ownership was perhaps feasible in the nineteenth century, and
does solve many of the problems of fluctuation; however, the theory became
unworkable when the discovery of oil in the twentieth century necessitated a
determination of the surface ownership in order to determine the ownership of the
minerals located below. It is clear that the early decisions favored the public's
rights. In McKeen v. Kurfust, 10 La. Ann. 523 (1855), the court stated: "The
appellants contend for too literal an interpretation when they say that the public
have no servitude upon the shore above the ordinary high water line, which
constitutes, strictly speaking, 'the bank!"' Id. at 524.
The Court continued by finding that when the water is at the ordinary high
stage, the public is not denied the right to deposit goods on the banks, which are
under water, but can deposit them on the shore above the high water line. Other
early cases such as Pulley & Erwin v. Municipality No. 2, 18 La. 278 (1841), and
Bass v. State, 34 La. Ann. 494 (1882), contain language supporting the interpreta-
tion that the banks are the area which contain the river in its ordinary state of high
water, although the cases do not delimit the beds from the banks. These decisions
seem to favor the mistranslation of article 457 but the issues presented did not
necessitate a holding that the riparian owned the land above the low water mark.
The twentieth century cases which embraced this view are discussed in note 102,
infra.
99. The supreme court stated in Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547, 551 (1886)
that"ilt is well settled that when there exists a discrepancy between the English
and French texts of the Code of 1825, the latter prevails." This principle was
restated in the later case of Straus v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1037, 1051-52,
118 So. 125, 130-32 (1925). In the very recent case of Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d
287 (La. 1976), the supreme court reexamined the language of a Civil Code provi-
sion and found that the French text and the concept contained therein expressed the
law, not the English expression found in the 1825 or 1870 Code article. See also
Note, 3 LA. L. REv. 452 (1941). But see Yiannopoulos, The Public Use of the Banks
of Navigable Rivers, 31 LA. L. REV. at 563, 569 n.36, for the suggestion that the
mistranslation was intentional and designed to conform the text of the law to the
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and Wemple v. Eastham' °' have ensured that the riparian owner, not the
state, would receive the mineral revenue from the area between the high
and low water marks. The proposed revision would have dispelled doubts
on the validity of the interpretation that the banks are the area between the
mean high and mean low water marks by codifying the jurisprudence. 102
text of the Projet. The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a similar view in State v.
Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916), when it rejected the argument that the
French text of article 457 was controlling, because the English mistranslation was
necessary to resolve difficulties in construing the term "bed" with the other
provisions of the article. The court failed to explain what the difficulties were, nor
why such difficulty should allow the court to take a position contrary to the clear
wording of the controlling text. The court did cite the Morgan decision, but that
case was decided before the article defining the bed (bank) was enacted. See text at
note 91, supra.
100. 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916). The state of Louisiana claimed, as owner,
the royalty revenues from the area below high water mark of a navigable river,
relying in part on the language of the French text of article 455 (see text at note 95,
supra). The supreme court rejected this argument in one sentence and then held
that although the state of Louisiana had gained title to all the land below the
highwater mark of navigable waters within the state when it entered the Union, the
state had enacted laws which granted to riparian owners the banks of the rivers. 140
La. at 350, 72 So. at 991. No argument is made against this contention; however, the
definition of the banks set forth in the subsequent decision of Wemple v. Eastham
(see text at note 101, infra) and indirectly given in State v. Richardson was contrary
to both the express law and the jurisprudence existing at the time. See text at note
102, infra. The effect of these decisions was to overrule jurisprudentially the
legislative intent expressed in article 457. See text at note 94, supra.
101. 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922). The supreme court stated:
The bed of a navigable river-that is, the land which the state holds in her
sovereign capacity-is only ihe land that is covered by the water at its ordinary
low stage. The land lying between the edge of the water at its ordinary low
stage and the line which the water reaches at its ordinary high stage-that is,
the highest stage that it usually reaches at any season of the year-is called the
bank of the stream, and belongs to the owner of the adjacent land, subject to
the right of the public to use the bank, to land and unload boats, to dry nets,
etc.
150 La. at 251, 90 So. at 638. This definition was followed in Pizanie v. Gauthreaux,
173 La. 737, 138 So. 650 (1931).
102. Serious doubts exist as to the correctness of the present jurisprudence.
Federal law clearly holds that the bed of a river extends to the high water mark.
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). However, the
United States Supreme Court, in the recent decision of Oregon ex rel. State Land
Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 97 S. Ct. 582, 587 (1977), stated, "[a]lthough
federal law may fix the initial boundary between fast lands and the riverbed at the
time of a State's admission to the Union, the State's title to the riverbed vests
absolutely as of the time of its admission, and is not subject to later defeasance by
operation of any doctrine of federal common law." This decision leaves the deter-
mination of riparian rights entirely up to the states, and overrules the prior holding
of Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
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Even though the committee felt that the problems contained in the bill
were too great to be corrected without major revision, no objection was
made to some aspects of the bill. For example, proposed articles 462 to
471 would have abolished the confusing category of immovables by
The controlling French text of the Code of 1825 clearly defines the beds as the
area up to the high water mark. See note 99, supra. Nineteenth century courts had
difficulty in applying the Civil Code articles. See note 98, supra. In the early part of
the twentieth century but before the discovery of oil, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found in three cases that the high water mark was the delimitation between the bed
and the banks of navigable rivers, and that the area below the high water mark was
owned by the state, subject only to the rights of the riparian owner to claim the
accretion which had built up on the bed sufficiently to be distinguishable above high
water. Perry v. Board of Commissioners, 132 La. 415,422, 61 So. 511, 513 (1913);
Board of Commissioners v. Glassel, 120 La. 400, 405-06, 45 So. 370, 372 (1907);
Minor's Heirs v. City of New Orleans, I15 La. 301, 311, 38 So. 999, 1003 (1905).
These decisions, as well as the express legislative intent, were overruled jurispru-
dentially. See notes 100-01, supra. It should be noted that the jurisprudence holds
that the bed of a lake extends to the high water mark, and that the state owns this
bed. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
700 (1937). Although lakes have a relatively stable water level, the analogy is
important. In the recent case of Gulf Oil Corporation v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.
2d 576 (La. 1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court decided a case involving the
ownership of the bed of a navigable lake. The court stated that "it is readily
apparent that the navigable water bottoms we consider were lands held by the State
for the people and were not subject to alienation. There was no original authority to
transfer title and therefore there could be no ratification of any attempt to create
title in another . . . . Because of the equal footing doctrine, states subsequently
admitted to the Union likewise acquired the beds of navigable waters, but only in
the capacity of trustee for the interest of the people of the state." Id. at 588-89. The
court held "that patents conveying state property to private individuals are ineffec-
tive insofar as they purport to alienate the beds of navigable waters, and that Act
No. 62 of 1912 did not have the effect of ratifying such absolutely null transfers."
Id. at 592. The court then expressly overruled prior decisions to the contrary. This
holding is consistent with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), in which the Court decided
that the legislature of Illinois did not have the power to cede its ownership to lands
underlying Lake Michigan because the state only had dominion over the land in its
capacity as trustee for the people of Illinois. Civil Code article 453 provides that the
beds of navigable rivers are public things, as long as they are covered with water,
and the controlling text of article 457 defines these beds in a manner consistent with
the problem of fluctuating water levels of the river, since the beds are covered with
water at least part of the year. The Gulf Oil Corporation rationale provides defini-
tive support for the conclusion that the beds of the rivers, being beds of navigable
waters, are owned by the people of Louisiana, and that the legislature, as trustee of
the people, has never had the power to alienate this public property. Any attempt by
the legislature or the courts to grant the ownership of the beds to a private person or
class of persons is an absolute nullity, which cannot be cured by the passage of
time. In this light, the holding of Wemple v. Eastham is incorrect, and the people of
Louisiana own the land below the high water mark of navigable rivers and streams.
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destination and substituted more precise and workable definitions of im-
movables and movables. 1°3 The Law Institute is expected to propose
another revision of this title in the next regular session of the legislature,
and these same problems and policy issues will necessarily be raised.
SERVITUDES FOR NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
Act 234 provides for the creation of a servitude which may be granted
to a nonprofit corporation chartered for.the "furtherance of educational,
charitable or historical purposes."" The servitude is not a predial ser-
vitude because it is not granted in favor of another estate; 10 5 rather, it is a
limited personal servitude.'°6 The grantor may grant the servitude on any
immovable property or part thereof, and may include the right to "alter,
improve, renovate, and maintain the immovable property." The right of
access necessary for the exercise of the servitude is automatically a part of
the grant. The grantor has the option of making the servitude binding on
subsequent owners of the property, and, if he exercises this option, the
servitude becomes extinguishable only by non-use, since the act specially
provides for the transfer of the servitude to another similar nonprofit
corporation if the original grantee is dissolved."'0 This servitude allows the
grantor to take advantage of Internal Revenue Service deductions for
donations' ° 9 and provides a means to ensure the preservation of historical
buildings. "0
103. La. H.B. 213, arts. 462-71, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
104. 1977 La. Acts, No. 234, adding LA. R.S. 9:1252. The provisions were not
added to the Civil Code; instead they were placed in title 9 of the Revised Statutes.
105. LA. CIv. CODE art. 646, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 431.
106. LA. CIv. CODE art. 534, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103. The
servitude is a limited personal servitude of the right of use. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 639-
45, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103.
107. The act provides that the servitude will be transferred to another similar
nonprofit corporation, to the State of Louisiana or to the parish or municipality in
which the immovable property is located in the event that the original grantee is
dissolved. 1977 La. Acts, No. 234, adding LA. R.S. 9:1252.
108. 1977 La. Acts, No. 234, adding LA. R.S. 9:1252.
109. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(A), 2522(a)(2), 2522 (c)(2); 16 id. 1285 (1970). The
new servitude is comparable to the common law easement of facade. The new law
thus gives an incentive to landowners to participate in the socially beneficial
practice of preserving buildings with historical value, even though the building itself
need not be of such value as long as the non-profit corporation is established for the
required purposes.
110. It is not necessary that the immovable property have any historical value
for the servitude to be granted, as long as the grantee is a corporation meeting the
required standards.
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TRANSFERS BY NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS
Act 489 amends Civil Code article 446 by adding procedures for the
transfer of immovable property owned by nonprofit unincorporated associ-
ations. Article 446 already allowed unincorporated associations the right
to own immovable property, but the jurisprudence made transfer extreme-
ly difficult."' The new law removes the judicially imposed barriers,
which had placed some immovable property out of commerce,1 1 2 by
authorizing the transfer of such property by a resolution adopted by a
majority of the association members present at a meeting called specifical-
ly for this purpose. Other provisions require notice of the meeting by
publication on two separate days at least fifteen days prior to the date of
the meeting ' 3 The resolution of transfer may designate an agent to
effectuate the transfer of title.' 4
11. The supreme court, in United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local
No. 1846, Inc. v. Stephen Broadcasting Co., 214 La. 928, 938, 39 So. 2d 422, 425
(1949), held that an unincorporated association could only transfer immovable
property "pursuant to charter, constitution, bylaws, rules or regulations, under
which the association is organized and governed and exists .... ." This rule was
followed in Jennings v. Lester, 76 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) and Rock Zion
Baptist Church v. Johnson, 47 So. 2d 397 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1950). The difficulty
which arose was that many such associations were not organized under any charter
or constitution, and even those that had a charter or constitution had no provisions
regarding transfer of property. The result was that once an unincorporated associa-
tion acquired real property, the property was often removed from commerce even if
the association desired to transfer its title.
112. In the unusual case of Levy v. BonFouca Hunting Club, 223 La. 832, 838,
67 So. 2d 96, 98 (1953), the court restated its position that "real estate belonging to
an unincorporated association must be disposed of pursuant to a resolution duly
adopted by the entire membership in accordance with its constitution and by-laws
.... " (emphasis added) and that this rule did not apply when the association had
no constitution or by-laws authorizing such a transfer. The court recognized that
this rule often made transfer impossible since the association involved in the
litigation, like many others, had no constitution, and that, even if it did, the
requirement of authorization by all members would be unattainable in light of the
realities of death and dispersion of the original membership. The court then allowed
transfer of the immovable property, which had been in receivership for eighteen
years, holding that "it was the duty of the court under its equity jurisdiction to
authorize the sale of the property." 223 La. at 838, 67 So. 2d at 99. It is certainly
preferable to have specific law dealing with such situations, rather than relying on
the courts to exercise their extraordinary equity powers.
113. The publication must be in the official journal of the parish in which a
majority of the members reside, or in a newspaper of general circulation if there is
no official journal. LA. CIV. CODE art. 446, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 489.
114. It should be noted that the provisions of Act No. 489 apply only to non-
profit unincorporated associations such as churches or hunting clubs. Presumably
unincorporated associations for profit will have provisions for transfer of real
property in their charter or constitution, or adopt some form of organization other
than an unincorporated association.
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RIGHTS OF WAY TO ENCLOSED LAND
Act 187 repealed the provisions of Revised Statutes 48:731, 732 and
733, which contained procedures to obtain a right of way to enclosed land.
These statutes had been declared unconstitutional'"5 and the act does not
affect the Civil Code articles 16 relative to obtaining such a right of way.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Only one act concerning matrimonial regimes was passed by the
legislature in 1977, and its effect on the community of gains may be
termed more apparent than real. Act 483 amends two articles of the Civil
Code to state clearly that a judgment.of divorce effects a dissolution of the
community retroactive to the date on which the original petition in the
action was filed.' This enactment is a second attempt2 by the legislature to
clarify this area of the law after the confusion caused by Tanner v.
Tanner,3 a 1956 supreme court decision which declared the community of
gains to be dissolved only as of the date of the rendition of a judgment of
separation or divorce. 4 Although arguments may be made that Act 483
was unnecessary,5 the intent of the legislature to eradicate any possible
vestiges of Tanner is commendable.
115. In Brown v. Terry, 103 So. 2d 541,543-46 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958), the First
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court holding that these statutes violated
the separation of powers doctrine by purporting to confer on police juries powers
clearly reserved to the courts by section 1 of article VII of the 1921 Constitution.
This decision was followed in Morgan v. Culpepper, 324 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1975).
116. The Civil Code articles on right of ways for enclosed lands are articles 699-
703.
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 483, amending LA. Civ. CODE arts. 155, 159. The
amended version of article 159 follows the provisions of article 155 which limit the
retroactive effect of the dissolution with respect to attorney's fees and costs in the
litigation and to rights validly acquired between the action's commencement and the
judgment's recordation. On the vagaries of the last exception, see Louisiana
Legislation of 1962: A Symposium-Civil Code and Related Legislation, 23 LA. L.
REV. 41, 42 (1962).
2. See 1962 La. Acts, No. 178, § 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 155.
3. 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80 (1956).
4. Id. The decision is criticized in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1955-1956 Term-Persons, 17 LA. L. REv. 303, 306-07 (1957).
5. Certainly one could argue that the language of article 159 prior to its
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Although numerous bills were introduced to revise the Civil Code
provisions on matrimonial regimes, action in this area was deferred until
next year. However, two different schemes for revising the law came into
focus during the session.
The first scheme would give to each of the spouses, inter sese, the
right to manage community assets which are produced by his individual
effort, skill, or industry.6 However, as between a spouse and third per-
sons, each spouse would be entitled to administer, encumber, or alienate
community immovables with the title in his name individually, any mov-
ables registered in his name, or any movables in his possession.7 Upon
dissolution, each spouse would account for the community assets that
were under his administration and would reimburse the other for any
community property used to satisfy separate obligations.' Each spouse
could also renounce his interest in the community assets which had been
under the other spouse's administration.
9
The second scheme emphasized a system of "equal management" of
community assets.'° Under such a regime either spouse would have the
authority to acquire and dispose of community assets, and his creditors
could enforce their claims against his separate property and all community
assets, even those which could not have been alienated without the consent
of both spouses." Between the spouses, however, exceptions were made
for certain acts which required the consent of both parties, such as the
alienation, incumbrance, or lease of immovables or of movables registered
in the names of both husband and wife.' 2 Both proposals would have
permitted either spouse to give written authorization to the other to act
alone for such matters. 3 Renunciation of the community upon dissolution
amendment incorporated the provisions of article 155: "The effects of a divorce
shall not only be the same as are determined in the case of a separation from bed
and board. LA. CIv. CODE art. 159. However, problems which could arise
through a strict construction of article 155 were recognized in Comment, Judicial
Dissolution of the Marital Community in Louisiana, 49 TUL. L. REV. 167, 175
(1974). The retroactive effect of the divorce judgment was also recognized by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, albeit in dictum. Malone v. Malone, 229 La. 759, 763,
257 So. 2d 397, 398 (1972).
6. La. H.B. 783, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. La. H.B. 247, 1278, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. However, House Bill 247 would have made such authorization revoc-
able at any time, whereas House Bill 1278 would have made the authorization.
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is not provided for under the equal management scheme and would appear
theoretically impossible since both spouses would have participated in the
management of the community assets.
Although the legislature failed to enact any revision of Book III, Title
VI, Senate Concurrent Resolution 54 demonstrates that the concept of
equal management is in its ascendancy.' 4 This resolution requests the
Senate Committee on Judiciary, section "A", and the House Committee
on Civil Law and Procedure to establish a ten member subcommittee to
draft a revision implementing the concept of equal management.1 5 In
drafting its proposals, the subcommittee is to consider the equal manage-
ment systems established in several western states 6 "in order to profit by
their experience and to incorporate into the proposed bill the basic concept
of equal management common to these states." 17 The, subcommittee is to
be aided by a six-member advisory committee composed of three men and
three women, 18 and must submit its proposed bill to the legislature at least
two months before the beginning of the 1978 regular session.' 9
SECURITY DEVICES
The most important legislation affecting the laws governing security
devices is Act 251' which regulates mortgages given on rural property.
Rural property is defined as a tract of land, forty acres or larger, located in
an unincorporated area, from which at least seventy-five percent of the
income produced is derived from agricultural or livestock use or mineral
production. 2 The law provides for maximum limits on penalties assessable
revocable only after thirty days from its recordation unless the original authoriza-
tion specified a different period of time.
14. 1977 La. Acts, S. Con. Res. 54, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
15. Id.
16. Id. The resolution lists Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Washington.
17. Id.
18. Id. Two members are to be appointed by the president of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, and four members will be selected by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate from lists supplied to
them by the deans of the state's law schools.
19. Id.
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 251, adding LA. R.S. 9:5321-26.
2. LA. R.S. 9:5321(2) (Supp. 1977).
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should the mortgagor make a partial or full prepayment of the secured
debt.' However, the Act does not apply to mortgages securing loans made
for consumer or agricultural purposes which do not exceed twenty-five
thousand dollars in amount.4
Generally, the parties to a conventional mortgage can agree to pre-
payment penalties in any amount.5 Thus the purpose underlying Act 251
seems to be to facilitate repayment of secured debts by rural mortgagors as
quickly as possible by eliminating overly burdensome prepayment penal-
ties. Profits from farming, ranching, and mineral operations can fluctuate
greatly and the new law will make it economically feasible to liquidate all
or large parts of mortgaged debt during profitable years. This will free the
property for use as security during less productive times when additional
capital may be needed.
Act 369 amends the statute which confers a privilege for the price of
the parts installed or service performed upon automobiles or other ma-
chinery. 6 The Act provides that if an estimated price for the work is given,
the repairman must obtain authorization to exceed the estimate for the
privilege to secure the difference between it and the final price.7 -However,
Civil Code article 3217(2), which gives an artisan a privilege on the thing
repaired as long as it remains in his possession, was not similarly amend-
ed. Thus, in noncredit transactions, the repairman still has a privilege on
the thing for the full amount of the price without obtaining authorization to
exceed the estimate.'
Act 253 extends the right to file a claim under the Public Works Act
to architects or engineers employed by the owner and to consulting
3. Id. 9:5322-24 (Supp. 1977).
4. Id. 9:3516(8), (10) (Supp. 1973), 5325 (Supp. 1977).
5. See, e.g., id. 6:826C (1950).
6. 1977 La. Acts, No. 369, amending LA. R.S. 9:4501 (1950). Act 102 of 1976
provided that a written estimate must be given if repairs would exceed one hundred
dollars in cost in order for the privilege to secure the portion of the price over that
amount. Also, written authorization to exceed the estimate was required. However,
the provisions of that Act were suspended until sixty days after the adjournment of
the 1977 regular session and thus never became effective. 1976 La. Acts, La. H.
Con. Res. No. 244.
7. It is not clear whether authorization to exceed an estimate was necessary
under the prior version. But cf. Blanchard v. Donaldsonville Motors Co., 176 So.
669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937); Mahfouz v. Yawn, 31 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1947).
8. See, e.g., Thompson v. Warmack, 231 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
In addition, the "artisan's privilege" conferred by the Civil Code does not prescribe
in ninety days as does the statutory repairman's privilege.
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engineers hired by the general contractor or subcontractors. 9 The Public
Works Act confers a right of action against the general contractor or his
surety for payment for materials furnished or work performed in the course
of construction. The contractual defense of lack of privity is not available
to the contractor or surety against those authorized to file under the
statute." However, the amendment specifically provides that the architect
or engineer hired by the owner is not protected by the surety bond and has
no claim to any funds owed to the contractor or subcontractor by the
owner.II Thus, it is difficult to fathom what, if any, additional protection
is actually given to these employees of the owner.' 2
Act 311 provides that all judgments against individuals, in favor of
the state, in a principal amount of $3,000 or less shall prescribe ten years
from the date signed by the trial judge or rendered by an appellate court. ' 3
In addition, the statute now provides that all liens or privileges in favor of
the state, which secure claims of three thousand dollars or less, will
prescribe in ten years or when the secured claim expires, whichever is
shorter.
Several other Acts of the 1977 legislative session alter statutes deal-
ing with secured transactions. Act 226 clarifies a statute, enacted last year,
which regulates the designation of a keeper in the event of foreclosure on
property subject to a conventional mortgage. ' 4 The law now specifies that
the owner must be named keeper of mortgaged buildings, containing four
or fewer dwelling units, which he occupies as his home. Act 340 allows
savings and loan associations to take their own shares or savings accounts
in pledge as additional security for loans secured by immovable proper-
ty. ' 5 Under the new law, the association may set a minimum percentage of
the loan amount which must be secured by the appraised value of the
immovable and can secure the remainder of the loan with the pledged
shares or savings.' 6 Act 65 provides that certified mail may be used to
serve the owner with notice of a claim under the Private Works Act. ' 7 Act
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 253, amending LA. R.S. 38:2242 (1950).
10. See, e.g., Thurman v. Star Elec. Supply, Inc., 307 So. 2d 283 (La. 1975);
Richard & Gaudet v. Housing Authority, 323 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
11. LA, R.S. 38:2242 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 253.
12. These employees already have a limited privilege on the construction pro-
ject itself under LA. CIV. CODE art. 3249.
13. LA. R.S. 9:5685 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 311.
14. 1977 La. Acts, No. 226, amending LA. R.S. 9:5136 (Supp. 1976).
15. 1977 La. Acts, No. 340, amending LA. R.S. 6:835 (1950).
16. Prior to the 1977 amendment, the immovable property had to have an
appraised value equal to, or exceeding, the loan amount. LA. R.S. 6:835 (1950) (as it
appeared prior to Act 340 of 1977).
17. 1977 La. Acts, No. 65, amending LA. R.S. 9:4802 (1950).
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689 provides that service of notice on a savings and loan association,
required at least ten days before petitioning for judicial sale of property
mortgaged to the association, must be made by certified or registered
mail. 18
TRUSTS AND ESTATE PLANNING
THE MARITAL PORTION
Under the Louisiana Trust Code, the legitime of a forced heir may be
placed in trust.' Now, under similar provisions, the legislature has au-
thorized that the marital portion of the surviving spouse in necessitous
circumstances 2 may also be placed in trust.3 The net income accruing to
the surviving spouse must be paid at least once a year. 4 The trust may
place restrictions upon the alienation of the marital portion, and its term
cannot exceed the life of the surviving spouse. 5 The provision allows an
unconditional income interest in trust, with income payable at least annu-
ally for the life of the beneficiary, to satisfy the marital portion to the same
extent as would the full ownership out of trust. Upon termination of the
portion of the trust that affects the marital portion, the principal must be
delivered to the surviving spouse or his heirs. 6 Similarly, the creation of a
usufruct in trust or unconditional income in trust, without an interest in
principal, payable at least annually for a term or for the life of the
beneficiary satisfies the marital portion to the same extent as would a
usufruct not in trust for the same term.7 Finally, a provision of a trust
instrument that is incompatible with the provisions of the Act shall be
reformed to comply with the Act.' The new provisions will allow the trust,
with its safety and convenience of management, to be used to satisfy the
marital portion as well as the legitime.
18. 1977 La. Acts, No. 689, amending LA. R.S. 6:833 (1950).
1. LA. R.S. 9:1841 (Supp. 1974).
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2382.
3. 1977 La. Acts, No. 67, adding LA. R.S. 9:1851-54 (Supp. 1977).
4. LA. R.S. 9:1851 (Supp. 1977).
5. Id.
6. LA. R.S. 9:1852 (Supp. 1977).
7. LA. R.S. 9:1853 (Supp. 1977).
8. LA. R.S. 9:1854, (Supp. 1977).
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FEDERAL ESTATE MARITAL DEDUCTION CLAUSES
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 increased the maximum marital deduc-
tion to the greater of $250,000 or fifty percent of the value of the adjusted
gross estate qualifying as a transfer.9 Because the legislature realized that
many testators, although using a formula clause, may not have intended to
leave more than one-half the estate (the limit under prior law) to their
spouses, the Act provided a three year transition rule. For decedents dying
between January 1, 1977, and January 1, 1979, the increased estate tax
marital deduction will not apply to transfers resulting from a will executed
or a trust created before January 1, 1977 which contain a marital deduction
formula clause unless the formula clause is amended after December 31,
1976 and before the decedent's death and the state of decedent's residence
does not enact a law which would construe the formula clause as referring
to the increased marital deduction as amended. " Act 512 of 1977 provides
that any maximum marital deduction clause contained in any testament,
donation, or trust executed prior to January 1, 1977 is to be interpreted as
referring to the marital deduction allowed by the Tax Reform Act of
1976. " Thus, decedents who die between January 1, 1977 and January 1,
1979, and who executed wills, donations, or trusts prior to January 1,
1977, will have their formula bequests automatically revised. It is possible
that the law will hurt some decedents due to the increased credit under the
new law, or decedents who are no longer capable of altering their will or
trust to take advantage of the new provisions because of mental or physical
infirmities.
OTHER ISSUES
Act 52612 defines "real estate investment trust" and provides that an
entity which loses its federal tax status as such may retain its rights and
duties as such a trust under state law.
There was an attempt in the legislature to exempt the annuities paid
by the United States government to most retired federal civil service
workers from Louisiana individual income taxes. 3 Although House Bill
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056, 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1954).
10. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2002(d)(1).
11. 1977 La. Acts, No. 512. The Act will not be part of the Revised Statutes.
12. La. H.B. 977, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977). The bill would have added a new
subpart to LA. R.S. 47:291 (Supp. 1974).
13. La. H. Con. Res. No. 92,40th Reg. Sess. (1977). The resolution indicated in
part that "the ravages of inflation continually reduce the effective purchasing
power of these fixed income retirees."
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977 failed to pass in the session, the legislature did memorialize Congress
to amend the Internal Revenue Code to exempt state retirement income
received by retirees over the age of sixty-five years from federal income
taxes. 14
The legislature refused to enact a provision for a "living will" which
allows an individual to decide in advance whether he wants his life to be
artificially prolonged by life support systems. 1
5
CORPORATIONS
Act 730' adds yet another group to the ranks of those professions now
able to do business in corporate form.2 Professional nursing corporations
may now be organized by one or more natural persons if all are duly
licensed to practice nursing in Louisiana. The new law limits the liability
of shareholders for debts of the corporation but not for their individual
negligent or wrongful conduct. As with other professional corporations,
only common stock may be issued and officers and directors must be
shareholders. The corporation must solely engage in the practice of nurs-
ing and can hold property only for that use or for investment.
Act 210 significantly clarifies and perhaps broadens the exemption
given to corporations, and partnerships with limited liability, from the
state's usury law. 4 The statute now provides that such entities, whether
foreign or domestic, may agree to pay interest in excess of the legal
Two other related bills failed. House Bill 152 would have excluded the first
$8,000 from Louisiana individual income tax received from any retirement system
by any individual over the age of sixty-five years. House Bill 41 would have
excluded any private retirement benefits subject to federal income tax from the
Louisiana individual income tax.
14. La. S.B. 578, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977); La. H.B. 1240, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
Perhaps the most famous provision for a "living will" is that of California. See
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (Deering Supp. 1976).
15. 1977 La. Acts, No. 526, amending LA. R.S. 12:491(B)(Supp. 1970), adding
LA. R.S. 12:492(F).
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 730, adding LA. R.S. 12:1071-85.
2. Presently, attorneys, medical doctors, dentists, accountants, chiropractors,
and industrial development companies may incorporate. LA. R.S. 12:801-1065
(Supp. 1976).
3. 1977 La. Acts, No. 210, amending LA. R.S. 12:703 (1950).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2924.
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maximum and neither they nor any co-maker, guarantor, or endorser to the
agreement may thereafter assert a claim or defense of usury.5 In addition,
any partnership composed solely of corporations and/or limited partner-
ships is clearly exempted by the 1977 amendment. Although such a result
might have been reached under the prior law, the clarification should make
financing of high-risk ventures by such partnerships somewhat easier.
Act 139 prohibits the articles of incorporation or bylaws of a non-
profit corporation from requiring a higher percentage of the members'
voting power.to overrule a change in the bylaws made by the board than
the percentage of directors necessary to effectuate that change. 6 Although
the directors may still be given the power to make, amend, or repeal
bylaws, the percentage of members required to override any change can be
no greater than that needed for the directors to exercise their power.
If the articles of incorporation or amendments thereto are acknowl-
edged or executed by authentic act, they will be given retroactive effect to
the date of acknowledgment or execution if timely filed with the Secretary
of State's Office. Act 408 extends the delay allowable between acknow-
ledgment or execution and filing to five days, exclusive of holidays, for
amendments to the articles of both business and nonprofit corporations. 7
The Act also changes the delay for filing the original articles of incorpora-
tion to five days for nonprofit corporations.8
Medical corporations may' now do business under any name they
choose, provided the name is approved by the Secretary of State and
clearly identifies the firm as a medical or professional corporation.9 The
prior law required that the corporate name be the full or last name or
names of a present or former shareholder or shareholders or predecessor
partnership.!° Presumably the medical corporation now has as much free-
dom in choosing a name as a business corporation and is subject to the
same limitations."
5. If the maker is exempt, usury may not be pleaded by the co-maker,
guarantor, or endorser, whether or not it is, itself, an exempt entity. LA. R.S. 12:703
(1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 210.
6. LA. R.S. 12:222A (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 139.
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 408, amending LA. R.S. 12:3213, 205C, 238B (1950).
8. The delay was extended to five days for business corporations during the
1976 session. LA. R.S. 12:25C (Supp. 1968), as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 580.
9. LA. R.S. 12:903 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 450.
10. LA. R.S. 12:903 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 450 of 1977). This is still
the law regarding naming most other professional corporations. See, e.g., id. 12:803
(1950), 1013 (Supp. 1970), 1053 (Supp. 1976).
11. See id. 12:23B (1950).
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Substantial changes in the laws governing state chartered credit
unions were made by the enactment of Act 165.1 The maximum par value
of a share in the credit union has been raised to twenty-five dollars.2 More
flexibility has been provided for payment of dividends to shareholders and
interest on accounts by allowing the credit union to establish different
types of shares and accounts and to vary the amount and frequency of
payments to each type.3 The Act also raises from $8,000 to $15,000 the
maximum amount which can be lent to a single member and extends the
maximum term to eight years.4 First mortgage real estate loans can now be
made in amounts up to $45,000.5 Finally, executors, tutors, public offi-
cials, and other fiduciaries are empowered to invest funds held by them in
credit unions without obtaining court authorization.6 On the whole, Act
165 should serve to promote the growth of credit unions in the state by
making them more competitive with other financial institutions.
Act 6901 amends one of several confusing and inconsistent statutes'
governing the ability of a financial institution to deal with property of a
decedent, minor, or interdict which is in its possession.' Under present
laws, a bank must transfer money or any other property deposited in the
name of a deceased person, minor, or interdict, to a properly identified
representative of the estate or incompetent (or an heir or heirs recognized
as such in a judgment sending them into possession). 9 Apparently the bank
is conclusively immunized from any potential liability, either to the state
for unpaid inheritance taxes' 0 or to adverse claimants of the property
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 165, amending LA. R.S. 6:641B(3), 646A(3), 656A(3),
656A(4)(c) & 658A (1950), adding LA. R.S. 6:646A(4), 652.1 & 652.2.
2. LA. R.S. 6:641B(3) (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 165.
3. LA. R.S. 6:658A (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 165; LA. R.S.
6:652.1 (Supp. 1977).
4. LA. R.S. 6:656A(3) (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 165.
5. LA. R.S. 6:656A(4)(c) (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 165.
6. LA. R.S. 6:652,2 (Supp. 1977).
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 690, amending LA. R.S. 6:770A-C, E (1950).
8. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 6:66 (1950), 66.1 (Supp. 1975), 66.2 (Supp. 1976), 770
(Supp. 1976); id. 47:2413 (1950).
9. Id. 6:66 (1950), 66.1 (Supp. 1975), 66.2 (Supp. 1976); id. 47:2413 (1950). The
fact that these statutes say the bank "may" transfer the funds does not mean that it
may refuse to do so when demand is made by an heir or representative who
furnishes the documents required by their provisions. Thorn v. Whitney Nat'l Bk.,
326 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
10. Although LA. R.S. 6:66 (1950) expressly prohibits transfer until payment of
inheritance taxes is verified, LA, R.S. 47:2413 (1950), as amended by 1960 La. Acts,
No. 35, and 1975 La. Acts, No. 704, provides an exemption from tax liability if a
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transferred," if the clerk of court has certified the copy of the judgment of
possession or letters issued to the representative presented to the bank. 2
However, the situation is quite different if the depository is a savings
and loan association. First of all, the association may release any of a
decedent's money or other property in its possession to a validly appointed
succession representative or to heirs with a valid judgment of possession
without potential inheritance tax liability.13 But Act 690, by deleting the
reference to "money or other property" of the depositors which appeared
in the pre-1977 version, seems to restrict the statute's shield from potential
liability of the association to adverse claimants, solely to transfers of the
contents of safety deposit boxes.' 4 Furthermore, since the statute as
amended expressly authorizes only the transfer of those contents, an
argument can be made that a tutor or curator now needs a judgment of
homologation, as well as his letters of appointment, to withdraw an
incompetent's funds from a savings and loan.' 5
It is difficult to understand why it should be potentially more hazard-
bank or other depositary transfers a decedent's money or property to a succession
representative or the judicially recognized heirs; furthermore, LA. R.S. 6:66.1
(Supp. 1975) expressly prohibits transfers, prior to ascertaining payment of state
inheritance tax, only to succession representatives appointed or heirs recognized by
non-Louisiana courts. That section 66 was not repealed with the enactment of
section 66.1 is obviously a legislative oversight, since both govern precisely the
same subject. If the latter statute controls, as the latest expression of legislative
intent, then a bank transferring funds or other property to a succession representa-
tive or heirs sent into possession by a Louisiana court is exempt from inheritance
tax liability.
11. See LA. R.S. 6:66 (1950), 66.1 (Supp. 1975), 66.2 (Supp. 1976).
12. See id. 6:66.1 (Supp. 1975), 66.2 (Supp. 1976).
13. See id. 6:770B (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 690; LA.
R.S. 47:2413B (1950). However, a savings and loan association, unlike a bank, may
not absolutely rely on a certified copy of the representative's letters or a judgment
of possession as full and conclusive proof of its validity. Compare id. 6:770 (Supp.
1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 690, with LA. R.S. 6:66.1 (Supp. 1975).
See also id. 6:66.2 (Supp. 1976). Furthermore, sections B and E of Act 690 appear
to conflict and it is not clear whether the association is exempted from inheritance
tax liability if the transfer is made pursuant to letters or a judgment of possession,
validly issued or not, by a non-Louisiana court. Id. 6:770 (Supp. 1976), as amended
by 1977 La. Acts, No. 690.
14. Compare LA. R.S. 6:770 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 690 of 1977),
with id. 6:770 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 690.
15. Cf. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 4270, 4554. Withdrawal of funds seems to
qualify as a "change in the.investment" of the incompetent's funds. If so, absent
express authority to the contrary conferred by statute, a judgment of homologation
seems necessary. However, the heir's judgment of possession and the succession
representative's letters would seem to entitle them to possession in any case. See
LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3062, 3191, 3211.
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ous for a savings and loan association to transfer property of a decedent,
minor, or interdict than it is for a bank. The inconsistent provisions seem
to be the result of piecemeal revisions made over the years in response to
particular problems. Absent evidence that these complex, incongruous
statutes are justified, the legislature should act to bring them into accord
and clarify the law in this area.
Another significant Act of the past session gives the commissioner of
financial institutions the power to issue "cease and desist" orders to state
banks engaging in, or those which he reasonably believes are about to
engage in, unsound or illegal banking practices.' 6 A notice, fixing the
hearing date and relating the facts upon which the alleged violation is
based, is to be mailed to the bank. A hearing is held and, if the evidence
establishes a violation, the order may be issued. The bank may appeal the
order to a review board and/or to the district court of the parish where the
bank is located.
Act 201 requires that the bank itself obtain and maintain a fidelity
bond covering each officer or employee who controls or handles bank
funds before allowing him to begin work. 7 The new law differs from the
former version by allowing either individual, schedule, or blanket bonds to
be used and placing the duty to obtain the bond on the bank rather than the
individual officer or employee.' 8 Act 209 provides an exception to the
bond requirement for banks which are members of mutual surety com-
panies. 1 9
Other legislation enacted in 1977 affecting financial institutions in-
cludes an Act which makes it clear that the state and its political subdivi-
sions may invest public funds in savings and loan associations.2" Another
Act defines a "target company" as any issuer of securities, domiciled or
having its principal place of business in Louisiana, with assets in excess of
fifteen million dollars.2' Finally, a semantic change has been made in
Revised Statutes 6:766 to allow a depositor in a savings and loan full
freedom to deal with an account standing in his own name.22
16. 1977 La. Acts, No. 204, adding LA. R.S. 6:168.
17. 1977 La. Acts, No. 201, amending LA. R.S. 6:22 (1950).
18. See LA. R.S. 6:23 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 201 of 1977).
19. 1977 La. Acts, No. 209, amending LA. R.S. 6:23 (1950).'
.20. 1977 La. Acts, No. 341, amending LA. R.S. 6:748A (1950).
21. 1977 La. Acts, No. 301, amending LA. R.S. 51:1500(12) (Supp. 1976). Fora
general discussion of this statute, see The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the
1976 Regular Session-Financial Institutions, 37 LA. L. REV. 134 (1976).
22. 1977 La. Acts, No. 337, amending LA. R.S. 6:766 (1950). The prior enact-
ment allowed a married woman to deal with accounts in her name as if she were a
"femme sole." LA. R.S. 6:766 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 337 of 1977).
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PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
AGENCY ADMINISTRATION
One of the most significant bills affecting agency procedure was
Senate Bill 244,' introduced to amend the Louisiana Administrative Pro-
cedures Act.2 The bill proposed to strengthen the legislature's control over
administrative agencies by requiring legislative oversight committees to
approve any rule changes proposed by the agencies. 3 This would have
been a great departure from the present law under which agency rule
changes are viewed by the committees, but a committee report on the
proposals is not dispositive and other elements of Louisiana society are
heard in the rule making process.4 The bill passed both houses of the
legislature but was vetoed by the governor. 5
However, many other acts important to the internal administration of
agencies were signed by the governor. Two acts have the effect of
concentrating more power in the office of the legislative auditor and
thereby centralizing more of the state's auditing. Act 487 permits the
auditor to examine the books of all quasi-public and private agencies
which receive state funds.6 Act 485 increases the auditor's duties by
giving him new authority over the audits conducted by municipalities. 7
Another important change in the state administration is brought about
by Act 440 which alters the procedure for obtaining fund transfers within
1. La. S.B. 224, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
2. LA. R.S. 49:951-68 (Supp. 1974).
3. La. S.B. 224, § 968(F), 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
4. LA. R.S. 49:968 (Supp. 1974).
5. Baton Rouge State-Times, July 29, 1977, at I-B.
6. 1977 La. Acts, No. 487, amending LA. R.S. 24:513(C) (Supp. 1976). How-
ever, the auditor must be requested to do so by a grand jury, the legislature, or the
Legislative Audit Advisory Council. The provision of law providing for the termina-
tion of the Legislative Audit Advisory Council as of July 31, 1977 was repealed by
Act 161. See 1977 La Acts, No. 161, repealing LA. R.S. 24:586 (Supp. 1976).
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 485, amending LA. R.S. 24:517(A) (Supp. 1976). Under
the new law, the municipalities must submit copies of their annual audits and copies
of audits and actuarials prepared for the audits of any municipal retirement system
which obtains state funds. The auditor is authorized to establish guidelines for the
certified public accountants in the preparation of these audits, and may also veto
the audits submitted to him by the municipalities if they do not conform to these
guidelines. However, the guidelines may not be inconsistent with the Municipal
Audit and Accounting Guide.
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an agency.8 Prior law provided that transfers of funds from one category to
another had to be approved by either the governor or the commissioner of
administration. 9 The present enactment relieves the governor of this duty
and allows the commissioner to approve unilaterally transfers which
amount to $20,000 per month, but requires the commissioner to secure the
Legislative Budget Committee's approval for any larger amounts. 0 Trans-
fers approved by both the commissioner and the committee are permitted
only upon a showing that the unit's operations are or will be impaired
without the transfer, but there is some question whether such a showing
must be made to the commissioner if he alone may authorize the transac-
tion. 1 Funds appropriated for salaries may not be transferred. 2
The procedures for acquiring and disposing of state property were
also altered in some respects by recent acts. The legislature banned the
purchase or lease of luxury automobiles by the division of administration 3
or any other state agencies in Act 511. 14 The Act further forbids purchas-
ing standard vehicles with luxury options as well as adding luxury equip-
ment to vehicles already purchased.' 5 However, certain well established
accessories or options such as automatic transmission, air conditioning,
and power steering and brakes, are still allowed,' 6 and special exceptions
8. 1977 La. Acts, No. 440, amending LA. R.S. 39:57 (Supp. 1956).
9. LA. R.S. 39:57 (Supp. 1956) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
10. Id., as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 440. The act also changes the
allotment period from quarterly to monthly.
11. -[B]ut such transfers shall only be made when sufficient evidence is pre-
sented to both the commissioner of administration and the Legislative Budget
Committee or its successor, by submitting the request and evidence of the need for
the change to both parties at the time of the initial request indicating that the
operations of the unit are being or will be impaired without such transfer ...
provided, however, that the division of administration by unilateral action may
approve .... LA. R.S. 39:57 (Supp. 1956), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No.
440.
12. Id. Their transfer would be deemed unauthorized and would be charged
against appropriations for the following year.
13. 1977 La. Acts, No. 511, adding LA. R.S. 39:364. The division of administra-
tion had already been placed under a similar prohibition by Executive Order 76-8.
14. 1977 La. Acts, No. 511, adding LA. R.S. 39:364. Luxury cars are defined as
those vehicles weighing more than 4500 pounds, with a wheelbase over 121 inches
in length, or a V-8 engine with a displacement of more than 360 cubic inches.
15. Id. Luxury equipment includes: automatic or electric powered seats, win-
dows, antennas, and locks; automatic speed or cruise controls; sun-roofs; vinyl or
hardtopped roofs; spoked or sportscar hubcaps; citizen band radios; dual or multi-
colored exteriors; tilting or telescopic steering wheels; tape players; and stereo
radios.
16. Id. State cars may also have AM-FM radios, tinted windows, and electric
rear window defrosters.
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are made for the governor, lieutenant governor, and law enforcement
agencies. Handicapped state employees may also have special safety
equipment in their vehicles.' 7 A related concern is expressed in Act 638i8
which provides that all passenger sedans purchased by the division of
administration, with a few exceptions, 9 must have mileage ratings of at
least twenty miles per gallon according to the standards promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency. Both Acts require the division of
administration to buy American-made automobiles.
20
Act 599 removes the division of administration from the position of
sole agent for selecting and purchasing data processing services and
equipment. 2' This responsibility is placed in the Data Processing Coor-
dinating and Advisory Council, a body appointed by the governor and
composed of representatives of six executive departments, 22 the division
of administration, and two state universities. 23 The council has all the
powers formerly exercised by the division of administration as well as new
authority to develop long range plans for uses of data processing equip-
ment and services by state agencies, and a corresponding duty to report to
the legislature on the current state of data processing use by state agencies
and to make recommendations for future utilizations.
24
A significant change in the acquisition of property and services by the
state is made by the Small Business Procurement Act, Act 711 of the 1977
regular session. 25 Under its terms, which supplement state contract laws
and only supersede in cases of clear incompatibility, the commissioner of
administration must designate up to ten percent of the value of all anti-
cipated state procurements of goods and services as the amount to be
awarded to small businesses each fiscal year. 26 However, before a contract
is granted the commissioner must determine whether the small business
has the production capacity, financial ability, and technical competence to
17. Id.
18. 1977 La. Acts, No. 638, amending LA. R.S. 39:361(2) (Supp. 1976).
19. Id. Exempted vehicles include those purchased for the Department of
Public Safety, for major department heads of the executive branch, and for other
persons approved by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee.
20. See 1977 La. Acts, No. 511, adding LA. R.S. 39:364; 1977 La. Acts, No.
638, amending LA. R.S. 39:361(2) (Supp. 1976).
21. 1977 La. Acts, No. 599, amending LA. R.S. 39:100-01 (Supp. 1972), repeal-
ing LA. R.S. 39:102-04 (Supp. 1972).
22. LA. R.S. 39:100 (Supp. 1972), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 599. The
six departments are: transportation and development; natural resources; revenue
and taxation; public safety; labor; and health and human resources.
23. Id.
24. LA. R.S. 39:101 (Supp. 1972), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 599.
25. 1977 La. Acts, No. 711, adding LA. R.S. 38:2227-32.
26. LA. R.S. 38:2229(A) (Supp. 1977).
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perform the desired task or supply the needed product.27 In the event that it
cannot perform the contract, the commissioner is required to set aside
additional state procurements of an equivalent value to be awarded to other
small businesses28 and must thereafter notify the commissioner of
economic development who is authorized to assist the small business in
correcting its deficiencies.29 The Act also requires that ten percent of these
awards be made to businesses conducted by socially or economically
deprived persons, 30 as defined in rules to be promulgated by the commis-
sioner.3 The Louisiana Office of Minority Business Enterprise is created
to aid the commissioner in the Act's administration and to evaluate the
program in annual reports to the governor and legislature, 32 who must also
hear the commissioner's report on the program's financial aspects. 33
The disposal of surplus state property was also the subject of regula-
tion by the 1977 legislature. Act 494 authorizes the commissioner of
administration to sell at public auction surplus movable property belonging
to any commission, agency, board, or department of the state. 34 To
conduct the sale, the commissioner may hire licensed auctioneers who are
to be compensated from its proceeds. 35 Act 86 permits local school
boards, upon obtaining the approval of the Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education, to sell library books and textbooks which are no
longer in use to any citizen for twenty-five cents or less per book.3 6 These
enactments expedite the disposal of property which is not used and which
costs the state for storage.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE*
Act 596 effects an important change in the way a small claimant can
27. Id. 38:2229(B)-(C) (Supp. 1977).
28. Id. 38:2229(E) (Supp. 1977).
29. Id. 38:2230 (Supp. 1977).
30. Id. 38:2229(D) (Supp. 1977).
31. Id. 38:2231 (Supp. 1977).
32. Id. 38:2230, 2232(B) (Supp. 1977).
33. Id. 38:2232(A) (Supp. 1977). The Commissioner's report must include the
total number and value of set-aside awards identified during the year, the number
actually awarded, the number awarded to businesses owned and operated by the
economically or socially disadvantaged, and the number of contracts earmarked for
small businesses which were awarded to other enterprises, including therein the
amount bid by the small business and the price at which the contract was awarded.
34. 1977 La. Acts, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 39:330.1.
35. Id.
36. 1977 La. Acts, No. 86, adding LA. R.S. 17:8.1.
* See also the discussion of Act 5% in the Civil Procedure section of this
symposium, 38 LA. L. REv. 152, 162-63 (1977).
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have his dispute settled with the state. 37 Even after the abrogation of
sovereign immunity by the Constitution of 1974,38 a person settling a
claim with the state based on an alleged offense had to be paid from funds
appropriated specifically by the legislature. 39 Act 596 creates the Small
Claims Fund in the Department of the Treasury as an aid to the expeditious
settlement of claims against the state or its agencies for $2000 or less.4°
Claimants must fill out forms prepared by the Attorney General4' and
submit them to the affected state agency which then must investigate and
report on any incident which could be the basis for a claim against the
state. 42 These reports are forwarded to the attorney general who must
review and prepare a memorandum on each claim which shall include an
opinion on liability and amount of damages. 43 The acceptance of any
settlement is binding on both parties unless the settlement has been
procured by fraud.' All monies paid in settlement of claims must be
accounted for in an annual report made by the attorney general .45
The Act only covers claims for $2000 or less and exempts the state
from paying interest, court costs, costs incurred by the claimant in prepar-
ing and presenting the claim, punitive damages, and attorney fees. 46
Moreover the Small Claims Fund may only compensate victims of certain
classes of offenses; no claim based on property detention or interference
with contract rights can be settled under these provisions, nor can a
plaintiff receive damages for assault, battery, false imprisonment or arrest,
slander, libel, misrepresentation, malicious prosecution, or abuse of proc-
ess. 47 The chief beneficiaries of this enactment may be claimants injured
37. 1977 La. Acts, No. 596, adding LA. R.S. 13:5141-57.
38. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10.
39. LA. R.S. 13:5109(B) (Supp. 1976): "Any judgment rendered in any suit filed
against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, or any compromise
reached in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such suit shall be exigible,
payable, and paid out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature
40. LA. R.S. 13:5142 (Supp. 1977).
41. Id. 13:5146 (Supp. 1977). The claimant must supply his name, address, a
description of the incident and the damages he sustained thereby, and the amount of
damages he claims. The form must contain a bold print statement of the penalties
for filing fraudulent claims or for making fraudulent statements. Id. 13:5157 (Supp.
1977) ($500 fine and/or six months imprisonment).
42. Id. 13:5146(B)-(C) (Supp. 1977).
43. Id. 13:5146(C)(Supp. 1977).
44. Id. 13:5148 (Supp. 1977).
45. Id. 13:5156 (Supp. 1977).
46. Id. 13:5149 (Supp. 1977).
47. Id. 13:5152 (Supp. 1977). Also exempted from the act's coverage are:
claims arising from employees' acts and omissions if they were executing a law,
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by a minor act of negligence on a state employee's part, who previously
may not have gone to the trouble to file their suits because of the costs of
courts and attorneys. 
48
Act 704 may expedite the settlement of claims against the Depart-
ment of Transportation and Development by giving the Department's
general counsel the authority to settle claims for less than $1,000,000
without the concurrence of the attorney general.49 This provision was
evidently enacted in recognition of the frequent suits filed against the
Department. 5° The Act, however, does not create a special fund to setile
claims, and thus the claimant must still wait for an appropriation by the
legislature. 51
PUBLIC MEETINGS
The 1977 amendments to the public meetings law may prove signifi-
cant for the agencies covered by them. Act 70752 was enacted to clarify
some vague areas of the prior law by defining the terms "administrative
conference" and "administrative session" 53 and by providing that such
conferences and sessions cannot be closed to the public except for the
same reasons that an ordinary meeting could be held behind closed
doors. 54 The Act permits any public body to dispense with the written
public notice of each meeting if the body is required by a bylaw, resolu-
tion, ordinance or statute to hold meetings at specified times, dates, and
places; hereafter these bodies may give notice once a year of the provision
which fixes the time, date and place of all meetings. 55 The Act also
rule, or regulation; claims based upon the exercise of or failure to exercise a
discretionary function or duty; claims arising from a tax assessment or collection;
claims arising from armed forces activities in times of crisis or natural disaster;
claims by members of the state's armed services which are incident to their service;
claims for which workmen's compensation benefits are available; and any claim
predicated on a strict liability theory.
48. Of the fifty-eight bills introduced to appropriate money to satisfy judg-
ments against the state or to settle claims, only eight were for amounts of $2000 or
less. See 1977 La. Acts, Nos. 11, 13, 74, 80, 363, 432, 541, 584.
49. 1977 La. Acts, No. 704, amending LA. R.S. 13:5109(A) (Supp. 1976).
50. Twenty-one of the fifty-eight appropriations bills introduced to satisfy
judgments or to settle claims involved the Department of Highways which was
made part of the Department of Transportation and Development by the executive
reorganization. See 1977 La. Acts, Nos. 1-3, 5-7, 9-13, 15, 17, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 79,
80, 374.
51. See LA. R.S. 13:5109(B) (Supp. 1976).
52. 1977 La. Acts, No. 707, amending LA. R.S. 42:5, 6, 7(A), 10 (Supp. 1976).
53. LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No 707.
54. LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 707. See LA.
R.S. 42:6.1 (Supp. 1976).
55. Id. 42.7 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 707.
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changes the law by permitting the district attorney to enforce the open
meeting provisions upon receiving a citizen complaint or on his own
initiative.56 Formerly the district attorney could enforce these provisions
only upon indictment by a grand jury. 57
DUAL OFFICEHOLDING
Although prohibitions against dual officeholding were not successful
during the regular session, the extraordinary session produced an Act to
define, regulate, and prohibit this practice. Act 24 prohibits any person
from holding more than one elective office at the same time in federal,
state, and local government. 58 The attorney general, district attorneys, and
private citizens are authorized to file civil suit for a declaratory judgment
to determine whether someone is violating the terms of the Act 9 Upon
finding a violation, the court must declare the office whose term expires
first to be vacated and must enjoin the officer from exercising its duties
and functions. 6° The Act also requires that all compensation which was
received for service in the vacated office in violation of the new law be
returned unless the dual officeholder had obtained an opinion from the
attorney general6' stating that the combination of offices did not violate the
new law. 62
PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION*
One of the few important remaining functions of state government is
to protect the health of its citizens. Several enactments of the 1977 regular
session seek to improve the public health in Louisiana by increased
regulation, new programs, or stricter licensing requirements for health
care professionals. However, other considerations have become intermix-
ed in the legislation bearing on public health, and the result has in some
56. Id. 42:10 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 707. Citizens
could always bring citizen suits under Revised Statutes 42:10. The present act adds
the proviso that an unsuccessful plaintiff can be forced to pay court costs and
reasonable attorney fees if his suit is deemed frivolous.
57. Id. 42:10 (Supp. 1976) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
58. 1977 La. Acts, Extraordinary Sess., No. 24, adding LA. R.S. 42:31.1. The
new law allows those persons presently holding dual elective offices to serve out
their terms.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The opinion must have been issued prior to the suit for declaratory
judgment.
62. Id.
* See also the discussion of medical legislation in the Consumer Protection
section of this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 135, 138-41 (1977).
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cases been a trade-off between health improvement and other desired
goals.
Food regulation is one method of improving public health and has
frequently been used in Louisiana.6 3 This year strawberries came under
regulation by the creation of the Louisiana Strawberry Marketing Board.'
Under the new legislation the Board has the power to make rules and
ordinances for the processing, marketing, distributing, and storing of the
fruits, to establish state grades of strawberries, and to control classifica-
tion, inspection, grading, and container marking.65 Yet there is some
question whether the chief purpose of this regulation is to improve public
health or to improve the financial position of Louisiana strawberry grow-
ers. Certainly the Board's composition could suggest that the well-being
of consumers of strawberries is secondary, 66 and that the chief aim may be
to improve market conditions for Louisiana producers by setting standards
too difficult or costly for new or non-resident growers to meet. 67
A similar conclusion could be drawn about the Louisiana Meat
Industry Commission created by Act 35168 The Commission's duties
include advising the Commissioner of Agriculture, suggesting changes in
policy to the state and federal agriculture departments, and hearing griev-
ances about conditions in the meat industry and assisting in their settle-
ment, although the Commission is given no adjudicative powers. 69 The
most interesting provision of the Act empowers the Commission to devel-
op a method to assist in the administration of the state meat inspection
63. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 40:601 (1950) (adulteration, substitution, misbranding,
or false advertising of food and drugs), 711 (1950) (soft drinks), 751 (1950) (oleomar-
garine). 1
64. 1977 La. Acts, No. 577, amending LA. R.S. 3:472-77 (Supp. 1958 & Supp.
1974).
65. LA. R.S. 3:474 (Supp. 1958), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 577. Rules
and ordinances promulgated to control classification, inspection, grading, container
marking, and strawberry marketing are to have the effect of law.
66. The Board is composed of eight members appointed by the governor, all of
whom must be from Ascension, Livingston, and Tangipahoa parishes, and the
Commissioner of Agriculture. The eight appointees must be four growers, the
director of the Louisiana Strawberry Festival, one banker with knowledge of the
strawberry industry, one person with a financial interest in the strawberry industry,
and one consumer with knowledge of the strawberry industry. LA. R.S. 3:473
(Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 577.
67. A similar combination by the strawberry growers alone would perhaps
violate anti-trust laws, but given state sanction the Board's acts are legal under the
rule of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
68. 1977 La. Acts, No. 351,.adding LA. R.S. 3:711-15.
69. LA. R.S. 3:713 (Supp. 1977).
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program and to report to the legislature concerning this method.7" Since
the Commission is clearly controlled by members of the meat industry,7" it
is questionable whether its assistance in meat inspection would be benefi-
cial to the health interests of all Louisianians.
Interest in public health was also overcome by a desire to maintain
traditional methods of preparing certain foods. Acts 166 and 29072 serve to
exempt jambalaya and cochon de lait from the requirements of the state
sanitary code and to permit their preparation in the traditional manner for
public consumption. Act 166 specifically permits the use of iron pots,
wood fires, and preparation in the open for jambalaya.73 Both acts,
however, provide that they shall not be construed to permit the distribution
or sale of any unwholesome food.74
Public health can also be improved by providing programs for those
in particular need of certain services, such as the program for
hemophiliacs created in the Department of Health and Human Resources
by Act 292. 75 The program is designed to assist those persons suffering
from hemophilia who cannot afford the costs of treatment on a continuing
basis, even though they receive aid from various types of hospital cover-
ages, Medicaid, Medicare, and other assistance programs administered by
the government or private charities. 7 6 The Act calls for extending financial
assistance to hemophiliacs to obtain blood, blood derivatives, and blood
concentrates as well as starting educational programs about hemophilia for
schools, members of health professions, and the general public.77
A similar enactment is the creation of health screening and mainte-
nance programs for elderly persons by Act 654.78 The program, to be
located in existing parish health units, 79 is available to those over sixty
70. Id.
71. The Commission's members are one cattle producer, one swine producer,
one producer of cattle or swine, one auction market operator, two slaughterhouse
operators, one meat processor who does not slaughter, one representative of banks
and lending institutions, the Commissioner of Agriculture, and one consumer. LA.
R.S. 3:712 (Supp. 1977).
72. 1977 La. Acts, No. 166, adding LA. R.S. 40:4.1; 1977 La. Acts, No. 290,
adding LA. R.S. 40:4. 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 1977 La. Acts, No. 292, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.5.
76. Id.
77. Id. The act also authorizes the state to participate in the cost of blood
processing if such assistance would facilitate supplying blood and blood concen-
trates and derivatives at an economical cost, thereby increasing the effectiveness of
the appropriations for the program.
78. 1977 La. Acts, No. 654, adding LA. R.S. 46:161-65.
79. LA. R.S. 46:161 (Supp. 1977).
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who either are eligible under Title XX of the Social Security Act or have
gross incomes which are less than eighty percent of the median per capita
income in Louisiana. 0 All programs centers must have, at the minimum, a
licensed physician and registered nurse, a social worker, a health educa-
tor, an outreach worker, and a clerical worker.8" The services furnished by
the program fall into two categories: screening services which consist of
interviews, physical examinations, nursing and social work evaluations,
health education, conferences, referrals, and follow-ups; and diagnosis
and referral services which include conferences after the initial physical
examination to decide on the best care for the patient, follow-ups on each
patient to discover whether additional care is necessary, and referrals to
public or private hospitals if additional care is needed.8 2
Legislation was also enacted to improve health care for pregnant
women and their infants. Act 721 establishes the Commission on Perinatal
Care, a body composed of twenty doctors, one non-voting administrator,
two non-voting nurses, and a designee of the Department of Health and
Human Resources. 3 The Commission is charged with a large number of
duties to advance perinatal care, such as developing standards for certify-
ing obstetrical and neonatal units, creating a pregnancy risk identification
system, and establishing regional transport systems for high risk mothers
and newborns 84
A third method to protect the health of the public is to license persons
engaged in health care professions, a practice which Louisana has fre-
quently followed.8 5 Five acts passed in the regular session dealt with
80. Id. 46:162 (Supp. 1977).
81. Id. 46:163 (Supp. 1977). The social worker's duty is to interview the patient
and his family, evaluate the patient's special needs, and assess the patient's and
family's attitude toward further care. The health educator shall impart basic nutri-
tional education to patients and impress upon them the importance of following the
recommended care. The outreach worker is to recruit, train, and supervise volun-
teer outreach workers.
82. Id. 46:164 (Supp. 1977).
83. 1977 La. Acts, No. 721, adding LA. R.S. 40:2018.
84. Id. Other responsibilities include identifying at an early stage of pregnancy
patients with potentially handicapping disorders, developing new methods for pa-
tient education, and creating a public health data mechanism for coordinating and
monitoring information on risk identification, birth-death linkage, and follow-ups in
relation to a person's community of residence and pattern of health care delivery.
85. Presently Louisana licenses or authorizes the practitioners in eleven fields
related to health. See LA. R.S. 37:611-28 (1950 & Supp. 1975) (podiatrists), 751-90
(1950 & Supp. 1976) (dentists), 911-1004 (1950 & Supp. 1976) (nurses), 1021-25
(Supp. 1976) (medication attendants), 1041-66 (1950 & Supp. 1975) (optometry),
1111-23 (1950) (osteopaths), 1171-1208 (1950 & Supp. 1976) (pharmacists), 1261-91
(1950 & Supp. 1975) (physicians, surgeons, and midwives), 1356-60 (Supp. 1975)
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license requirements for health care professionals. Act 753 provides for
the certification of physician's trained assistants, 86 a new category of
health personnel who are needed to meet shortages in skilled health care
caused by a growing maldistribution of health services in Louisiana.87
These assistants must take a program sponsored by a medical school and
approved by the State Board of Medical Examiners. 8 An assistant may
only perform medical functions while under a doctor's supervision, may
not dispense drugs, and may not exercise independent judgment except in
emergency situations.89 Act 595 puts slightly more stringent requirements
on the granting of reciprocity licenses to chiropractors who move to
Louisiana from other states. 9 Formerly a chiropractor was required only
to be licensed by another state and to demonstrate that he had complied
with the requirements for licensing in Louisiana to qualify for the reciproc-
ity license. 9' The new legislation permits a license to be granted to the new
resident chiropractor only if he graduated prior to 1962 from a chiropractic
college recognized by certain chiropractic associations and has practiced
for more than ten years. 92 In addition the new resident must be examined
by the state board on x-ray procedures and chiropractic principles and
practices. 93
Three acts deal with the causes for which the Louisiana Board of
Medical Examiners may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew a
doctor's license. Act 498 adds the stipulation that the Board can refuse to
license a doctor on the grounds that the licensing authority of another state
has in some manner restricted his practice in that state.' Act 99, on the
other hand, prevents the Board from suspending, revoking, or refusing to
issue or renew a doctor's license if he prescribes or administers laetrile to a
patient with cancer, provided the doctor informed the patient of the drug's
present medical status and obtained the patient's consent in writing. 95 Act
(acupuncturists), 2401-17 (Supp. 1966) (physical therapists), 2801-18 (Supp. 1974)
(chiropractors).
86. 1977 La. Acts, No. 753, adding LA. R.S. 37:1360.21-1360.27.
87. LA. R.S. 37:1360.21 (Supp. 1977) (statement of policy).
88. Id. 37:1360.24 (Supp. 1977).
89. Id. 37:1360.23 (Supp. 1977).
90. 1977 La. Acts, No. 595, amending LA. R.S. 37:2808 (Supp. 1974).
91. LA. R.S. 37:2808 (Supp. 1974) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
92. Id., as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 595.
93. Id.
94. 1977 La. Acts, No. 498, adding LA. R.S. 37:1285(28).
95. 1977 La. Acts, No. 99, adding LA. R.S. 37:1285.1, 40:676. See also the
discussion of this Act in the Consumer Protection section of this symposium, 38
LA. L. REV 135, 140-41 (1977).
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99 to some degree demonstrates the influence of other considerations on
health legislation; the availability of laetrile to cancer patients had become
a rallying point for those who believe that freedom of choice in medical
treatment is more important than protecting the public from palliatives
which may discourage the use of proven remedies.
Act 525 most clearly demonstrates the interplay of political and
philosophical considerations in health legislation. The Act declares that
the Board of Medical Examiners may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue a
license to a physician or midwife for failing "to take such measures as
may constitute good medical practice, necessary to encourage or sustain
the life and health of an aborted viable infant, when the death of the infant
results," or for "taking the life of a viable infant aborted alive."% This
Act may cause all persons performing late abortions to consider after each
operation whether the fetus could possibly survive in an artificial life
support system, and the consequences of an error in judgment would be so
severe that it seems almost certain that the effect of this enactment will be
to deter abortion in Louisiana, as was almost assuredly one of the Act's
purposes. While the unavailability of abortion by licensed practitioners
could possibly result in more women carrying their babies to term, it is
also possible that this will increase the number of kitchen-table abortions
and arguably impair public health.
Another important duty of state government is to provide for the care
of the mentally ill. Act 714, which amends and supplements the state's
Mental Health Law, attempts to improve the position of mentally disturb-
ed persons and persons who abuse certain substances.97 The Act provides
for five methods of admission98 into treatment facilities and establishes
different procedures for release for each admission status. 99 Officials of
96. 1977 La. Acts, No. 525, amending LA. R.S. 37:1285(27) (Supp. 1975)
adding LA. R.S. 37:1285(28)-(29). The Act defines viable as "that stage of fetal
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supporting systems," which is almost
exactly the same definition of viable approved by the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976). For a discussion of
permissible state regulation of abortion of a viable fetus after Danforth, see Note,
37 LA. L. REV. 270 (1976).
97. 1977 La. Acts, No. 714, amending LA. R.S. 28:2, 50-57, 59, 61,171 (1950&
Supp. 1976), adding LA. R.S. 28:52.1-52.3, 63, 64.
98. The five methods are informal voluntary, formal voluntary, noncontested,
emergency, and judicial. LA. R.S. 28:52.1-52.3 (Supp. 1977); id. 28:53-54 (Supp.
1972 & Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
99. For example, a patient admitted on an informal voluntary basis may leave
the facility at any time during the normal day-shift hours of operation; a person
admitted on a formal voluntary or on a noncontested basis must make a written
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treatment facilities must inform patients in writing of the different proce-
dures for release at the time of their admission, and must allow patients
admitted on an involuntary basis to apply by writ of habeas corpus to
convert their status to a voluntary one. 1  In addition, during their commit-
ment patients may not be subjected to electroshock therapy or major
surgery without the informed consent of voluntarily admitted patients or
the consent of a court for those admitted by emergency certificate or
committed by judicial procedure. 10'
One of the most significant changes made by the Act involves the
procedures for judicial commitment hearings. Under the prior law, these
hearings were to be conducted as informally as possible, and little atten-
tion was given to the requirements of due process.'0 2 The new law
provides that the hearing is to be conducted in as formal a manner as
possible and that the normal rules of evidence must be applied.0 3 The
respondent has the right to privately retained counsel or to be assigned an
attorney from the mental health advocacy service, °4 and may present
evidence at the hearing and cross-examine witnesses. 05 A person may be
committed only upon a finding by the court on clear and convincing
evidence that he is dangerous to himself or others or is gravely disabled. '06
Commitments must be reviewed by the court after sixty days, then after
one hundred and twenty days, and subsequently every one hundred and
eighty days.' 07 Directors of treatment facilities are required to furnish the
request for release which must be granted within seventy-two hours unless an
emergency certificate is executed or judicial proceedings are instituted. LA. R.S.
28:52.1-52.3 (Supp. 1977). Patients admitted on an emergency basis must be ex-
amined by the coroner within forty-eight hours of admission, and after forty-eight
hours must either be released or.have judicial commitment proceedings instituted
against them. Id. 28:53 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
100. LA. R.S. 28:52 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
101. Id. Such treatment may, however, be used if the director and two physi-
cians of the treatment facility certify that a voluntarily admitted patient is incompe-
tent to give consent and that his condition is so critical as to threaten lives unless the
treatment is given. For involuntarily admitted patients, the director and two physi-
cians need only show the critical condition of the patient in order to use such
treatment without prior consent of the court. LA. R.S. 28:55 (Supp. 1972), as
amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
102. See LA. R.S. 28:53 (Supp. 1973) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
103. LA. R.S. 28:55 (Supp. 1972), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
104. See text at notes 110-13, infra.
105. LA. R.S. 28:55 (Supp. 1972), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
106. Id. Gravely disabled is defined as the condition of a person who is unable to
provide for his own physical needs as a result of serious mental illness or substance
abuse and is unable to survive safely in freedom or to protect himself from serious
harm. LA. R.S. 28:2(10) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
107. LA. R.S. 28:56 (Supp. 1972), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
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court with reports of the patient's response to medical treatment and must
justify any continued involuntary commitment.108 Commitments may also
be appealed devolutively.'°9
The Act creates the Mental Health Advocacy Service, a body govern-
ed by a nine member board of trustees 0 which will provide legal services
to patients on such matters as admission, commitment, change of status,
transfer, and discharge. "' Counsel provided by the service are assured
access to copies of all the patient's records unless the patient objects, but
in the event the patient eventually retains private counsel these copies must
be destroyed." 2 The attorney may consult with the patient whenever the
need arises and the treatment facility must provide adequate space and
privacy for these meetings." 3
Patients in treatment facilities are also benefitted by the greatly
expanded rights granted them under the new law. Formerly, patients were
assured only of such rights as the right to wear their own clothes, to keep
personal possessions, and to spend their own money at canteens,'" 4 where-
as the new Act provides that no patient shall be denied any rights granted
under the United States and Louisiana Constitutions solely because he is a
patient in a treatment facility. ' The Act also provides that restraints and
seclusion may be used only as therapy or to protect the patient or others,
and that they may never be used for punishment or merely for the staff's
convenience. "6 Rights to an individualized treatment plan and to periodic
review for progress are also recognized. 7 A final provision requires the
patient to be released if the treatment facility is unable to provide him with
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. LA. R.S. 28:64 (Supp. 1977). The trustees are to be the deans or selected
faculty members of the state's four law schools, the deans or selected faculty
members from the Louisiana State University and Tulane University Medical
Schools, the president of the Mental Health Association of Louisiana or his repre-
sentative, and representatives of the Louisiana Medical Society and the Louisiana
State Bar Association.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The patient also had the right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, to be
visited in private by his attorney, to request an informal court hearing, and to be
diagnosed by a privately retained physician. See LA. R.S. 28:171 (Supp. 1974) (prior
to the 1977 amendment).
115. Id., as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 714.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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an active and appropriate medical treatment program.1 8 This last provi-
sion was apparently inserted to comply with recent decisions of federal
courts which have found commitment without adequate treatment to be a
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 9
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution requires that all agencies, depart-
ments, and offices of the executive branch, with the exception of the
offices of governor and lieutenant governor, be organized by functions
into a maximum of twenty departments by the end of 1977.1 In compliance
with this mandate, the legislature enacted Act 720 of 19752 which created
a skeleton system of nineteen departments and commissioned the Joint
Legislative Committee on Reorganization of the Executive Branch to
study the reorganization and to report any conclusions to the legislature.
Suggestions from the committee were embodied in Act 513 of 19761
which designated twenty departments, detailed the organization of the
twelve departments4 which were newly created, and continued the eight
departments5 headed by elected officials.
This extended process of reorganization was completed by the pas-
sage of Act 83 of 1977,6 which expressly organizes the eight departments
118. Id.
119. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
1. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; art. XIV, § 6.
2. 1975 La. Acts, No. 720, adding LA. R.S. 36:1-960.
3. 1976 La. Acts, No. 513, amending LA. R.S. 36:1-960 (Supp. 1975).
4. The new departments are: Department of Commerce; Department of Cor-
rections; Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism; Department of Health
and Human Resources; Department of Labor; Department of Natural Resources;
Department of Public Safety; Department of Revenue and Taxation; Department of
Transportation and Development; Department of Urban and Community Affairs;
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries; and Department of State Civil Service. Act
513 created the first eleven departments, but the Department of State Civil Service
was created by Louisiana Constitution article X, § 1.
5. The eight departments under the control of statewide elected officials are:
Department of Agriculture; Department of Education; Department of Elections;
Department of Insurance; Department of Justice; Department of Public Service;
Department of State; and Department of Treasury.
6. 1977 La. Acts, No. 83, amending LA. R.S. 36:1-960 (Supp. 1976), adding
LA. R.S. 36:621-769.
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headed by statewide elected officials, and slightly amends the organization
of the twelve departments created by Act 513 of 1976. In addition, the Act
transfers several agencies to the office of the governor in the executive
branch,7 and abolishes two agencies and transfers their duties and respon-
sibilities to the governor himself. 8
The eight departments under the control of elected officials have one
important similarity which distinguishes them from the other twelve de-
partments: all subordinate positions in the former are filled by the officials
themselves rather than by the governor. 9 The governor's broad appointive
power over the other twelve departments has been criticized as limiting the
flexibility of department heads who must supervise important management
personnel whom they have not hired and cannot fire,' 0 but it is certainly
arguable that such a structure is desirable because the governor is responsi-
ble to the voters for the efficient operation of these departments. On the
other hand, officials such as the Commissioner of Insurance or the mem-
bers of the Public Service Commission have their own constituencies and
are answerable to the electorate for their departments, factors which
militate for giving them the power to appoint their own subordinates,
subject to the Senate's approval.'I
The structure of the eight new departments is varied to reflect differ-
ences in size and complexity among the departments. The Departments of
Agriculture, Education, and the Treasury are each headed by an elected
official' 2 who must appoint a deputy for management and finance' 3 and a
varying number of assistants, to be in charge of the offices in the depart-
ment. 1 4 The department head also has the discretion to appoint a deputy
7. LA. R.S. 36:4(b)(1) (Supp. 1977).
8. Id. 36:4(B)(2) (Supp. 1977). The agencies abolished are the Public Buildings
Board and the Louisiana State Planning Advisory Commission.
9. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 36:647 (Supp. 1977).
10. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-
Administrative Law and Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 136, 139 (1976).
11. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 36:663 (Supp. 1977).
12. These officers are the Commissioner of Agriculture, the Superintendent of
Education and the State Treasurer. LA. R.S. 36:622, 643, 762 (Supp. 1977).
13. These officers are, respectively, the deputy commissioner for management
and finance, the deputy superintendent for management and finance, and the
deputy state treasurer for management and finance. LA. R.S. 36:622, 643, 762
(Supp. 1977). The Department of Education varies somewhat from this scheme
since it also contains the Governor's Special Commission on Education Services,
which is responsible for the supervision and administration of state programs for
higher education assistance and scholarships, thus somewhat limiting the powers of
the deputy superintendent for management and finance. LA. R.S. 36:642(D)(2)
(Supp. 1977).
14. Id. 36:622, 643, 762 (Supp. 1977).
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officer and to define his duties and functions.' 5 The Departments of
Insurance and Justice have a similar structure except that no assistants are
authorized for these departments' 6 since they are not divided into offices
by the Act. A third sort of structure is exhibited by the Department of
Elections and Registration and the Department of State, which are limited
to an elected department head 7 and a deputy whose appointment is
mandatory, but whose duties are still defined by the department head.' 8 A
final method of organization was used for the Department of Public
Service. The Public Service Commission serves as the executive head of
the department' 9 and appoints an executive secretary, who is the chief
administrative officer of the department, and an undersecretary who con-
trols the department's management and finances.2'
A special consideration in any form of reorganization concerns the
problems which arise when numerous entities are consolidated into a
limited number of departments. Act 83 provides a variety of transfer
mechanisms to reflect policy decisions concerning the duties and powers
to be retained by agencies which were once largely independent but are
now structured into twenty departments. Act 513 of 1976 provided four
basic types of transfers which are reenacted by the new Act, 2' and which
range in effect from loss of agency power over only certain administrative,
budgetary and accounting functions 22 to a complete transfer of agency
functions to the department head with the agency serving only in an
advisory capacity. 23 The 1976 Reorganization Act also provided for nine
specialized types of transfers, 24 all of which are continued in the present
15. Id. 36:625 (deputy commissioner of agriculture), 646 (deputy superintend-
ent of education), 765 (deputy state treasurer) (Supp. 1977). If this deputy official is
appointed, he must be the first assistant appointed to the department head pursuant
to article IV, section 13 of the Constitution. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 36:643 (Supp. 1977).
16. LA. R.S. 36:681-85, 701-05 (Supp. 1977).
17. Id. 36:661(C) (Commissioner of Elections), 741(B) (Secretary of State)
(Supp. 1977).
18. Id. 36:663, 743 (Supp. 1977).
19. Id. 36:721(B) (Supp. 1977).
20. Id. 36:723-24 (Supp. 1977).
21. Id. 36:801, 802, 851, 901 (Supp. 1976) (prior to the 1977 amendments).
22. Id. 36:801 (Supp. 1976) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
23. Id 36:901 (Supp. 1976) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
24. Id. 36:803 (licensing agencies), 804 (toll authorities), 805 (Department of
Employment Security), 806 (Department of Conservation), 807 (State Mineral
Board), 808 (Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Criminal Justice), 907 (Board of Commerce and Industry), 908 (Board of Directors
of Louisiana State Museum), 909 (Board of Commissioners of the Louisiana State
Library) (Supp. 1977) (prior to the 1977 amendments).
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legislation.2 5 Act 83, however, adds seven new specialized transfers, 26 of
which the most important ones concern college management boards and
the Public Service Commission, the Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education, and retirement boards.
The special transfer for the college management boards and the
Public Service Commission provides that these agencies will continue in
their present composition, will retain their duties and powers in all areas,
including accounting and budget control, and "shall administer and imple-
ment the program authorized . . . independently of the secretary, the
undersecretary, and any assistant secretary."27 The extraordinary transfer
for the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education attempts to de-
lineate the respective spheres of authority of the Board and the Superin-
tendent of Education. Although the Board is assured of its right to employ
its own personnel, the transfer provision also specifies that the superin-
tendent shall administer and implement the Board's programs, except as
otherwise provided by law or the Constitution, in accordance with the
Board's policies and rules. 28 The autonomy of retirement boards within
the Department of the Treasury also appears certain, since the transfer
provision for these boards provides that the boards will retain their present
composition and powers, as well as the exclusive authority and discretion
to manage and control the assets of the respective retirement systems .29
One obvious consequence of the constitutional mandate for reorgani-
zation was the eventual abolition of some state agencies. The duties and
powers of abolished agencies are transferred to the designated department
heads who may reassign the duties to any office within the department.
Act 513 of 1976 abolished sixty-eight agencies, committees, and commis-
25. All sections are the same except 907-08, 908-09, 909-10. 1977 La. Acts, No.
83, amending LA. R.S. 36:907-09 (Supp. 1976).
26. LA. R.S. 36:801.1 (college management boards, the Board of Regents, and
the Public Service Commission), 801.2 (Board of Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation), 801.3 (retirement boards), 802.1 (agricultural promotion boards), 802.2
(Louisiana Sweet Potato Advertising and Development Commission), 809 (Louisia-
na Commission on Governmental Ethics and Louisiana Board of Ethics for State
Elected Officials), 911 (Louisiana State Arts Council) (Supp. 1977).
27. Id. 36:801.1 (Supp. 1977). This provision is particularly appropriate since
the Public Service Commission is the only entity in the Department of Public
Service.
28. Id. 36:801.2 (Supp. 1977). This provision is an attempt to follow the delinea-
tion of duties expressed in Board of Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Nix, 347 So.
2d 147 (La. 1977).
29. Id. 36:801.3 (Supp. 1977).
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sions, 30 and the present Act eliminates thirteen more governmental en-
tities. 3'
A final step in the executive branch reorganization requires the heads
of the eight new departments to submit implementation plans to the
Reorganization Committee for approval.32 Moreover, all departments
must continue to submit to the committee annual plans which detail their
goals and budget requests in light of the reorganization principles ex-
pressed in Act 83. 33
Four other reorganization bills were submitted to the legislature by
the Reorganization Committee, but only two were enacted. House Bill
751, enacted as Act 482, 31 changes the powers of the assistant secretary of
the Office of Conservation of the Department of Natural Resources 35 by
removing his power to represent the state in matters relating to energy 36
and giving him new authority to establish and collect fees for evaluations
made by his office of radiation sources, devices, and shielding equip-
ment.37 The assistant secretary also loses the duties of preparing energy
source studies and conservation plans, 3 but he is given the new responsi-
bility of investigating and monitoring hydrocarbon users and requiring
30. Id. 36:921 (Supp. 1976) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
31. Id. 36:53(D) (Louisiana State Employees Merit Award Board), 651(K)
(T.H. Harris Scholarship Foundation Board of Trustees, Louisiana Higher Educa-
tion Assistance Commission), 651(H) (State Department of Education), 769(E)
(Deferred Compensation Commission for State Employees) (Supp. 1977); Id.
36:109(E) (Louisiana State Science Foundation), 509(F) (Board of Public Works,
State Board of Highways, Regional Transit Authority, Board of Commissioners of
the Regional Transit Authority, Louisiana Expressway Authority, Larose-Lafitte
Toll Road Authority, South Central Louisiana Toll Road Authority) (Supp. 1976),
as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 83. The Louisiana Regional Airport Authority,
abolished in 1976, was apparently spared in 1977. Compare LA. R.S. 36:509(F)
(Supp. 1976) with LA. R.S. 36:509(F) (Supp. 1977).
32. Id. 36:954(A)(2) (Supp. 1977). In addition, the Commissioner of Agricul-
ture, the Superintendent of Education, and the State Treasurer may submit plans to
the legislature to consolidate, merge, or eliminate existing offices or to establish
new ones upon a showing that a change would result in efficiency. See, e.g., id.
36:621(C) (Supp. 1977).
33. Id. 36:957 (Supp. 1977).
34. 1977 La. Acts, No. 482, amending LA. R.S. 30:541, 546 (Supp. 1973),
repealing LA. R.S. 30:681 (Supp. 1975).
35. Formerly the Commissioner of Conservation.
36. LA. R.S. 30:541 (Supp. 1973) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
37. Id., as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 482.
38. LA. R.S. 30:546 (Supp. 1973) (prior to the 1977 amendment). This power is
now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources. Id. 36:354(10) (Supp. 1976), as
amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 83.
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them to report to him on the use of hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon
products. 3
9
House Bill 753, designated Act 667,° changes the composition of the
State Mineral Board from its present composition of seventeen members4'
by giving the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources ex officio
status.42 However, at noon on the second Monday of March in 1980, the
Board's composition will change to consist of nine members appointed by
the governor with the governor and secretary retaining their ex officio
membership. 43 The Act also modifies present leasing procedure by requir-
ing all proposals to be submitted to and examined by the secretary," and
by removing the Board's authority to advertise for lease bids without prior
approval by the secretary. 4 Records of mineral leases once kept by the
Register of the State Land Office4 are now kept by the secretary, 47 and all
monies received from mineral leases are paid to the office of mineral
resources in the Department of Natural Resources .48
EXPROPRIATION
Acts 452 and 453 exclude municipalities from the general expropria-
tion procedure and establish special procedures to be followed by those
subdivisions.' The acts are not limited to expropriation for electric light,
gas, or water works purposes as was the prior law, but extend to all
immovable property including servitudes and other rights in or to immov-
39. LA. R.S. 30:546 (Supp. 1973), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 482. The
Act also repeals LA. R.S. 30:681 (Supp. 1975), relative to the Louisiana Energy
Commission.
40. 1977 La. Acts, No. 667, amending LA. R.S. 30:121, 125-26, 130, 135-36
(1950 & Supp. 1975).
41. LA. R.S. 30:121 (Supp. 1962) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
42. Id., as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 667.
43. Id.
44. LA. R.S. 30:125 (Supp. 1973), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 667.
45. LA. R.S. 30:126 (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 667.
46. LA. R.S. 30:130 (Supp. 1958) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
47. Id., as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 667.
48. LA. R.S. 30:136 (Supp. 1969), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 667. The
funds were formerly paid to the register of the State Lands Office. See LA. R.S.
.30:136 (Supp. 1969) (prior to the 1977 amendment).
I. 1977 La. Acts, No. 452, repealing LA. R.S. 19:2(8); 1977 La. Acts, No. 453,
adding LA. R.S. 19:101-15 (Supp. 1977). In 1974, the legislature repealed LA. R.S.
19:101-15 (1950). See 1974 La. Acts, Ex. Sess., No. 11.
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able property. Under the new law, the plaintiff in the expropriation
proceeding must file a petition in the district court of the appropriate parish
describing the property and stating the purpose for the expropriation. All
claims for damages are prescribed by two years commencing from the date
on which the property was actually occupied and used for the purposes of
the expropriation. 2 The procedure for filing the petition and for answering
follow the existing general expropriation procedure.
Act 561 provides a method whereby coal or lignite slurry pipeline
owners or operators may expropriate private property under the general
expropriation laws.3 It is anticipated that such pipelines will become more
common as domestic oil and gas reserves are depleted.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS
Act 473 revises the method of instigating recall elections of public
officers, and provides that no recall petition can seek an election for the
recall of more than one official. Furthermore, the number of electors
necessary to effectuate a recall petition has been increased from twenty-
five percent to thirty-three and one-third percent of the total electors of the
voting area. Each person signing the petition must also sign his address as
well as his name, or his signature cannot be counted as that of an elector.'
Local bond elections are often most confusing to the electorate
because voters seldom understand the ramifications of their vote on each
bond proposition. In an attempt to alleviate some of this confusion, Act
250 provides that in each election ordered by the governing authority of a
local subdivision for the purpose of authorizing the issuance of bonds, the
proposition on the ballot submitted to the voters must state the kind and
source of revenues which are pledged to retire the bonds. 2
The Legislature amended the provisions of the election code concern-
ing the publication, distribution, content, and transmittal of campaign
2. See LA. R.S. 9:5624 (1950).
3. 1977 La. Acts, No. 561, adding LA. R.S. 30:721-24. For a full discussion of
Act 561, see the Environmental Law section of this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV.
141, 149-50 (1977).
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 473, amending LA. R.S. 42:342 (1950), 343(A) (Supp.
1952).
2. 1977 La. Acts, No. 250, adding LA. R.S. 39:504.1.
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literature. 3 Acts 513, 544, and 545 provide for the procedure for certain
special elections and for the registration of voters in all elections, while
Act 588 concerns the method of placing the names of presidential and vice
presidential electors in national elections on the ballot. 4 Act 477 revises
the qualification requirements, training methods, selection procedures,
duties, and compensation of election commissioners and poll watchers.
5
INCREASED FEES
The Legislature enacted a lengthy series of acts which increases many
of the fees charged by state agencies for various services. These increased
fees will affect many areas of an attorney's daily practice, and thus should
be noted with care. 6
3. 1977 La. Acts. No. 543, amending LA. R.S. 18:1463 (Supp. 1976).
4. 1977 La. Acts, Nos. 513, 544, 545, and 588 made numerous changes in the
election provisions of Revised Statutes title 18.
5. 1977 La. Acts, No. 477, amending LA. R.S. 18:444(G) (Supp. 1976).
6. The most important of these acts are as follows: 1977 La. Acts, No. 409,
amending LA. R.S. 51:214 (Supp. 1954) (increasing the fees charged by the Secre-
tary of State in connection with the registration of trademarks and tradenames);
1977 La. Acts, No. 415, amending LA. R.S. 47:477 (Supp. 1958) (increasing the fees
charged by the office of state police in the Department of Public Safety to stencil
semitrailers, trailers, and tandem semitrailers); 1977 La. Acts, No. 416, amending
LA. R.S. 32:727(E) (1950) (increasing the fees charged for certification of docu-
ments supplied to the public to two dollars per page); 1977 La. Acts, No. 417,
amending LA. R.S. 47:519(A) (Supp. 1970) (increasing the fee for temporary license
plates to two dollars); 1977 La. Acts, No. 418, amending LA. R.S. 32:728(5), (6)
(Supp. 1966 & Supp. 1972) (increasing the fee for notation of any chattel mortgage
on a certificate of title and for cancellation of such notation); 1977 La. Acts, No.
419, amending LA. R.S. 32:874 (Supp. 1977) (increasing the fees charged for
reinstating driving privileges of suspended drivers to fifteen dollars); 1977 La. Acts,
No. 420, amending LA. R.S:- 47:509(B) (Supp. 1952) (increasing the fee charged to
transfer owner registrations of motor vehicles to three dollars); 1977 La. Acts, No.
421, amending LA. R.S. 32:393.1(C), 853(B) (Supp. 1958) (increasing the fees
charged by the Department of Public Safety for information about licensed drivers
to two dollars); 1977 La. Acts, No. 422, amending LA. R.S. 32:412(D) (Supp. 1968)
(increasing the fee to be paid for delinquent drivers licenses to two dollars); 1977
La. Acts, No. 424, amending LA. R.S. 32:728(1), (2) (Supp. 1966) (increasing the
fees for a certificate of title and a certified copy of a certificate of title to a motor
vehicle to seven dollars); 1977 La. Acts, No. 492, amending LA. R.S. 22:1522
(Supp. 1958) (instituting a ten dollar charge for each request of insurance informa-
tion from the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission); 1977 La. Acts, No. 580,
amending LA. R.S. 22:1169(A) (Supp. 1960) (increasing the license fees of certain
brokers, solicitors, and agents); 1977 La. Acts, No. 749, amending LA. R.S.
26:71(A)(2), (3) (1950) (increasing the fees charged for permits for the selling of
alcoholic beverages at wholesale or retail).
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DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
In many areas district attorneys and assistant district attorneys may
engage in the private practice of law. Senate Concurrent Resolution 15
authorizes the Senate Committee on Judiciary and the House Committee
on the Administration of Criminal Justice to establish a joint committee to
study the feasiability of prohibiting district attorneys from engaging in the
private practice of law.7 The resolution notes that with all the respon-
sibilities of a district attorney, "the duties and workload [have] risen at
such a rate and to such an extent that it is practically impossible for him to
efficiently fulfill his duties as district attorney and at the same time engage
in the private practice of law." The joint committee must make a written
report of its findings to the legislature prior to the 1978 Regular Session,
together with any any specific proposals for legislation.
SHERIFFS
Under a consistent line of Louisiana Attorney General's opinions,
sheriffs could pay attorney fees for suits brought against them from the
sheriff's salary fund only where a final judgment was rendered in favor of
the sheriff. 8 Act 58 now allows "reasonable attorney fees for legal serv-
ices" as a permissible expense from the sheriff's salary fund. 9 The broad
language of the amendment might be interpreted as a legislative overruling
of the prior opinions of the attorney general, thus allowing public funds to
be expended in a suit brought against a sheriff who is found guilty of civil
or criminal misconduct. The amendment could conceivably allow sheriffs
to employ full-time legal counsel, a practice the attorney general has
expressly forbidden under the former law.'°
HOME RULE CHARTER COMMISSIONS
The Louisiana Constitution allows any local governmental subdivi-
sion to adopt a home rule charter."I The constitution requires that an
election of members of a home rule charter commission shall be called
when the local governing authority is presented with a petition signed by
not less than ten percent of the electors, or ten thousand electors, which-
ever is fewer, who live within the boundaries of the affected subdivision. 12
7. S. Con. Res. 15, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
8. LA. Op. ATry. GEN. 339 (1960-1962); id. 662 (1948-1950); id. 991 (1946-
1948); id, 989 (1946-1948); id. 891 (1936-1938); id. 889 (1936-1938); id. 495 (1924-
1026).
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 58, amending LA. R.S. 33:1422(A) (Supp. 1975).
10. LA. Op. ATY. GEN. 341 (1960-1962).
11. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(A).
12. Id. art. VI, § 5(B).
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However, there are no provisions for the method of proposing a home rule
charter, the term of office of the commission, or submission of the charter
to the electors. Act 145 provides the procedure to be followed for estab-
lishing home rule charters by elected charter commissions. 3 Each charter
commission member may serve until the charter is either adopted or
rejected by a majority of the electors. Once adopted, the charter superse-
des any existing charter under which the local governmental subdivision
may be operating. The charter must provide for the method and frequency
of amending the charter subject to the provisions of the constitution.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
The Louisiana Constitution forbids levying new taxes or increasing
existing taxes during a regular session held in an odd-numbered year.I
Thus the number of bills relative to state and local taxation introduced in
the regular session was comparatively small. 2 Nevertheless, several laws
of interest were enacted.
SALES TAXES
Louisiana imposes a sales tax on the retail sale of tangible personal
property, on the lease or rental of tangible personal property, and on all
sales of services.3 This results in several taxes being imposed on a dealer
who leases equipment, for the tax is required to be paid not only on the
ultimate sale of the property, but also on the rental payments and at the
first use of the equipment when it is withdrawn from inventory for rental.'
Act 510 exempts retailers who ordinarily purchase certain heavy self-
propelled equipment from the use tax, thus eliminating one incident of
taxation.5 The exemption applies only to farm, earth moving and construc-
13. 1977 La. Acts, No. 145, adding LA. R.S. 33:1395-4.
1. LA. CoNsT. art. III, § 2(A).
2. After this article was prepared for publication, the Legislature convened
the 1977 Special Session. Numerous taxes were raised-in the session, primarily to
fund pay raises for state employees. The most important of these increases are:
1977 La. Acts, Special Sess., No. I (adjusting the personal income tax tables); 1977
La. Acts, Special Sess., No. 2 (increasing the corporate income tax).
3. LA. R.S. 47:302 (Supp. 1962 & Supp. 1968).
4. See LA. R.S. 47:321 (Supp. 1970 & Supp. 1974).
5. 1977 La. Acts, No. 510, adding LA. R.S. 47:305.22.
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tion equipment and attachments having a cost to the dealer in excess of
three thousand dollars.6 A similar provision was enacted for the benefit of
automobile lessors and lessees. However, Act 4477 exempts the rental
payments from sales taxes rather than the first use. In order to qualify for
the exemption, the lease must be on an automobile or truck for greater than
six months and the sales and use tax (imposed on the sales or cost price)
must have been paid to the state at the time the vehicle was transferred (or
titled) into the state.8 This exemption, however, applies only to state taxes
and not to local taxes, and does not become effective until January 1,
1978.9
The legislature failed to enact a controversial bill that would have
excluded from sales taxes the sale of services in the furnishing of repairs to
tangible personal property when the repaired property was to be delivered
to a customer in another state.' 0 It was argued that the loss in revenue
would have been more than offset by increased business for Louisiana
firms in repairing property owned by out-of-state businesses."
AD VALOREM TAXATION
The Louisiana Constitution requires the Legislature to restructure the
ad valorem taxation system of the state, 12 a change precipitated by Levy v.
Parker"3 and Bussie v. Long. '4 In 1976 the Legislature enacted provisions
concerning valuation and the determination of use value.15 This year the
legislature turned its attention to the constitutional requirement that the
6. Id. The exemption applies to those taxes levied by the state under LA. R.S.
47:302 (1950), 321 (Supp. 1974), as well as taxes levied by municipalities, parishes
and school boards under LA. R.S. 33:2711 et. seq. (Supp. 1974).
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 447, adding LA. R.S. 47:305.23.
8. Id. The requirement that the lease be for six months or more was enacted to
prevent the exemption of short term daily and weekly leasing that commonly occurs
with the national car rental firms.
9. Id. §§ 1, 2.
10. La. S.B. 12, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
I. The bill did not consider offshore areas to be "out of state." Id.
12. LA. CONST. art VII, § 18. The effective date for implementation of the new
system is January 1, 1978. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 13.
13. 346 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. La. 1972).
14. 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1973), writs denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La.
1974). These cases held that the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment were violated because the state did not uniformly assess
property of the same class throughout the parishes and the state. See The Work of
the Louisiana Legislature-State and Local Taxation, 37 LA. L. REV. 158 (1976).
15. 1976 La. Acts, Nos. 702, 705 constituted the major portion of the package
of bills. See the Work of the Louisiana Legislature-State and Local Taxation, 37
LA. L. REV. 158 (1976).
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correctness of assessments by the assessor shall be subject to review first
by the parish governing authority, then by the Louisiana Tax Commission,
and finally by the courts.
16
The key to the revision of the ad valorem taxation system is providing
an effective enforcement mechanism. Act 385 is a comprehensive and
detailed measure aimed at preventing future inequities in property assess-
ment.' 7 All laws relating to the state supervision of local property tax
assessments will now be administered and enforced by the tax commis-
sion. 18 The commission has the responsibility to measure the level of
appraisals, assessments and the degree of uniformity of assessments for
each major class and type of property in each parish throughout the state, 19
and then to notify in writing the assessor and tax recipient bodies in every
parish of the result of its measurements. A public hearing must be held
following the notification in order to receive any complaints, and subse-
quently the commission must publish annual reports of the results of its
measurements. The published reports shall constitute prima facie evidence
of the uniformity (or lack thereof) that is required by the constitution and
statutes. Where the assessment levels of a parish deviate by more than ten
percent from the percentage of fair market or use valuation as mandated in
the constitution and statutes,20 the tax commission shall order the assessor
to reappraise all property within the parish (or within one or more property
classifications) within one year. The issuance of this order will also be
communicated to the appropriate tax recipient body. The Act requires the
commission to certify the deficient tax lists for the year in which the order
is issued, but the assessment lists for the following year may not be
certified "until all deviations or discrepancies are corrected to conform to
the constitutional or statutory requirements." 2' This is the real impetus for
guaranteeing uniformity, for if the assessment lists are not certified, the
tax recipient bodies will be deprived of their property tax revenues. Thus
police juries, school boards, parish and city councils, and other tax
recipient bodies are expected to exert political pressure on local assessors
to conform to the new provisions. The remainder of Act 385 allows the tax
16. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(E).
17. 1977 La. Acts, No. 385, adding LA. R.S. 47:1837.
18. Id.
19. Id. Under LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18, land and improvements for residential
purposes are to be assessed at ten percent, and other property is to be assessed at
fifteen percent, of fair market value. However, bona fide agricultural, horticultural,
marsh, and timber lands are to be assessed at ten percent of use value rather than
fair market value.
20. See note 19, supra.
21. LA. R.S. 47:1837(B) (Supp. 1977), as added by 1977 La. Acts, No. 385.
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commission to make the necessary inspections, investigations, and studies
for the adequate administration of its responsibilities pursuant to the new
laws.
22
Acts 381-384 concern procedural aspects of the new ad valorem
taxation system. 23 Assessments in each parish will be subject to review by
a board whose membership shall consist of the governing authority of each
parish plus the assessor or his designate as a nonvoting advisory mem-
ber.24 The assessor must complete the preparation and listing on the
assessment lists of all real or personal property (Orleans Parish excepted)
on or before July 1 of each year. 25 After each assessor has prepared and
made up the lists, the list shall be available for daily inspection by
taxpayers and other interested persons for fifteen calendar days. Notice
must be given of the availability of the lists for inspection. Following the
fifteen day period, the lists are to be certified within three days to the
board of review which must proceed to conduct public hearings on the
assessments. The board shall consider written or oral complaints during
the hearing, 26 and may make a determination to increase or decrease the
assessments in accordance with the fair market or use value. Determina-
tions are final unless appealed to the tax commission, and on the fifteenth
calendar day after the board has convened its public hearings, the assess-
ment lists and any changes in connection therewith shall be certified and
forwarded to the tax commission.27 Within ten days of receipt of the
22. LA. R.S. 47:1837(C)(4). The tax commission may require any taxable entity
to make virtually any information available to the commission in order to enforce
the assessment laws. All such reports, however, will be confidential and used only
for the purpose of securing a correct assessment, and thus not subject to public
inspection. The commission may also require the production of books and papers;
summon and compel attendance of witnesses, and place them under oath and
examine them; and issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. Failure to comply
with any such requirements subject the offender to criminal penalties.
The Act also provides for training programs for assessors, issuing rules and
regulations containing minimum standards of assessment performance, devising
appropriate forms, and generally fulfilling the requirement to "develop, maintain,
and enforce a uniform statewide system for the preparation of assessment lists, tax
rolls, and all other necessary forms."
23. 1977 La. Acts, No. 381, amending LA. R.S. 47:1931, 1932 (Supp. 1975);
1977 La. Acts, No. 382, amending LA. R.S. 47:1987 (Supp. 1950), repealing LA.
R.S. 47:1994 (Supp. 1958); 1977 La. Acts, No. 383, amending LA. R.S. 47:1992
(Supp. 1950), repealing LA. R.S. 47:1995, 1996 (Supp. 1974); 1977 La. Acts, No. 384,
amending LA. R.S. 47:1989 (Supp. 1972).
24. 1977 La. Acts, No. 381.
25. 1977 La. Acts, No. 382.
26. The complainant must have timely filed reports required by 1976 La. Acts,
Nos. 702, 705.
27. 1977 La. Acts, No. 383.
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certified assessment lists, the tax commission must conduct public hear-
ings to hear appeals of taxpayers or assessors from the action of the board
of review. The commission has the power to affirm, reverse, or modify the
contested determination of the board. All decisions of the commission are
final unless appealed to the district court within thirty days. The assess-
ment lists, together with any changes in connection therewith, shall be
certified and returned to each assessor on or before October 15 of each
year.28
The constitution also requires the legislature to set up procedures to
compel tax recipient bodies to roll back or roll forward property tax
millages to keep receipts generally in line with those prior to the
reappraisal-reassessment program. 29 Act 617 fulfills this mandate by per-
mitting the Legislative Auditor to review the millages levied by each tax
recipient body to determine whether the millages levied are in compliance
with law.3° The auditor has the power to order changes in the amount of
millage levied if he determines that an error has been made in the
adjustment.
This package of bills, together with last year's legislation, fulfills the
requirements of the constitution. The tax commission will inherit much of
the power formerly exercised by local assessors, and will in effect become
the ultimate arbiter of assessments in the state. Local tax recipient bodies
are expected to oversee assessors to be certain that assessments are kept
within the limits required by the constitution. It is to be hoped that the new
administrative procedures will cure many of the inequities which persisted
under the 1921 Constitution.3'
NATURAL GAS TAX CREDIT
Act 546 allows every municipality that operates a manufacturing
establishment in the state a direct credit for money paid for natural gas
against any tax or combination of taxes owed by the municipality to the
state or any other taxing authority32 within the state. The amount of the
credit shall be proportionate to the amount of gas used or consumed in
28. 1977 La. Acts, No. 384.
29. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 23.
30. Act 617 will not appear in the Revised Statutes. Seea so 1977 La. Acts, No.
605, adding LA. R.S. 33:9005.1 (Supp. 1977).
31. By virtue of the legislation enacted in the past two sessions, the constitu-
tional mandate to revise Louisiana's system of property taxation has been substan-
tially completed. However, some clarification of the process for judicial review of
the decisions of the tax commission is necessary and will probably be made in the
next regular session.
32. 1977 La. Acts, No. 546, amending LA. R.S. 47:7(A), (B), (D)(1), (D)(4), (E),
(1) (Supp. 1976).
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Louisiana by the municipality in the operation of the manufacturing
establishment at a rate of two cents per thousand cubic feet of gas used or
consumed during each calendar year. (Three cents credit is allowed for
municipally operated electric generating plants.) The Act sets up a detailed
voucher system to be followed in applying for the credit.
REPEAL OF SEVERANCE TAX EXEMPTION
Under prior law, the gas severance tax did not apply to gas consumed
as fuel in the operation of a gasoline or recycling plant within the state.
Act 548 repeals this exemption, and the prior exemption is now limited to
gas consumed in the production of natural resources in the state.33
The legislature also adopted a resolution34 calling for the Board of
Commerce and Industry to review its industrial tax exemption policy to
determine whether current policies, regulations, and guidelines provide
for the maximum economic advantage to the state. The Board is to report
its findings to the Legislature on or before October 15, 1977.
ADVANCE SALES TAX
Louisiana has a unique system whereby sales tax must be paid in
advance by certain manufacturers or wholesalers.3 5 The Secretary of
Revenue and Taxation, however, often exempted certain wholesalers from
the requirement of having to pay to the state the expected sales tax,36
inasmuch as the law did not clearly define "wholesalers." Act 30437
defines "wholesaler dealer" as a dealer fifty percent of more of whose
sales are sales for resale. Sales made in interstate commerce or sales where
delivery is made outside of the state are not considered retail sales for the
purpose of determining whether a person qualifies as a wholesale dealer. 38
However, the Act contains a "grandfather clause" excluding any
wholesaler whose business had received an exemption identification num-
ber and had thus not been required to pay advance sales taxes in 1965.39
The Act also gives the Secretary of the Department of Revenue and
Taxation the authority to promulgate regulations necessary to enforce the
Act.
33. 1977 La. Acts, No. 548.
34. 1977 La. Acts, H. Con. Res. 297.
35. LA. R.S. 47:306(B) (1950).
36. Such exemption numbers are called "W numbers."
37. 1977 La. Acts, No. 304, amending LA. R..S. 47:306(B)(1) (Supp. 1975).
38. The collection of the tax on motor vehicles, however, will still come under
the provisions of LA. R.S. 47:303(B) (1950).
39. See also La. H. Con. Res. 218, 38th Reg. Sess. (1975); La. H. Con. Res.
171, 39th Reg. Sess. (1976) (reprinted following LA. R.S. 47:306 (Supp. 1977)).
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CRIMINAL LAW
SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Act 657 of 1976, which amended the first and second degree murder
statutes,' redefined the crime of second degree murder to consist only of
felony murder.2 The penalty for second degree murder was set at life
imprisonment at hard labor without eligibility for parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence for forty years. 3 First degree murder is defined as
"the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm," 4 and carries a penalty of death or life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or sus-
pension of sentence.5 Act 694 of 19766 provided sentencing guidelines in
accordance with Roberts v. Louisiana.'
Act 121 of 1977 adds a second definition of second degree murder:
"the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to
kill," provided that there are no aggravating circumstances. 8 Thus, a
responsive verdict for first degree murder is now possible as long as a
specific intent to kill is shown, and there is now a vehicle for plea
bargains.9 The new definition may'cause problems, however, since killing
with a specific intent to kill, but without aggravating circumstances, is
already defined as a species of first degree murder in Revised Statutes
14:30 and article 905.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. i The effect of
1. 1976 La. Acts, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30, 30.1 (Supp. 1975).
2. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-
Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 193, 197 (1976).
3. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1976).
4. Id. 14:30.
5. Id.
6. 1976 La. Acts, No. 694, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905-905.9.
7. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976
Regular Session-Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 193, 197 (1976).
8. 1977 La. Acts, No. 121, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1976). The
statute now provides:
Second degree murder is: . . .
(B) The killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to
kill, under circumstances that would be first degree murder under Article 30,
but the killing is accomplished without any of the aggravating circumstances
listed in Article 905.4 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
9. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Criminal Trial Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 554, 562 (1977). Note that the second
degree murder statute, as amended, does not include the language "or to inflict
great bodily harm." See note 8, supra.
10. LA. R.S. 14:30 provides:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a
specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Act 121 is to establish two different penalties for the same crime without
any standard for determining which is appropriate.
THEFT
What is the "value" of an item stolen from a retail store? Act 128 of
1977 adopts "actual retail price of the property at the time of the offense"
as the criterion for the value of goods in determining the penalty for
shoplifting. 1I
Acts 308 and 349 continue the trend of piecemeal additions to the
theft provisions. Act 308 makes the theft of utility service a crime.' 2 It
would appear that the new provision is unnecessary since the basic theft
article' 3 is broad enough to cover the theft of utility services. On the other
hand, the legislature may have felt that a separate penalty for this crime
was justified.
Act 349 makes it unlawful to take commercial crawfish from craw-
fish farms.' 4 The addition of this article may be justified on the basis of
our cultural heritage or because it settles the debate over the proper
spelling of "crawfish," but it appears otherwise to be an unnecessary
addition to the general theft provisions.
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE
Act 655 of 1976 made homicide justifiable in cases where a person
reasonably believes a burglar is likely to use any unlawful force against a
person in a dwelling. 15 Act 392 of 1977 makes the rule applicable to a
place of business as well as a dwelling.16
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by
death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence in accordance with the recommendation of the jury.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.3 provides:
A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists
and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommends that the
sentence of death be imposed. The jury shall be furnished with a copy of the
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
11. 1977 La. Acts, No. 128, amending LA. R.S. 14:2(2) (Supp. 1962).
12. 1977 La. Acts, No. 308, adding LA. R.S. 14:67.5.
13. LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1972).
14. 1977 La. Acts, No. 349, adding LA. R.S. 14:67.5.
15. 1976 La. Acts, No. 655, adding LA. R.S. 14:20(3). See The Work of the
Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session--Criminal Law, 37 LA. L. REV.
151, 155 (1976).
16. 1977 La. Acts, No. 392, amending LA. R.S. 14:20(3) (Supp. 1976).
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LEGAL ETHICS
One subject which formerly was solely a matter of professional
responsibility is now a part of the criminal law as well. Apparently feeling
that Bar Association sanctions for solicitation were insufficient in some
cases, the legislature passed Acts 758 and 759. Act 75817 adds two new
sections to the Revised Statutes. The first provides that a law enforcement
official who refers an individual to an attorney is subject to removal from
office.' 8 The latter provides criminal penalties for wrecker drivers or
owners who refer an individual to an attorney.19 Act 759 deals with the
attorney's role in improper solicitation by providing criminal penalties for
an attorney who pays anyone to obtain cases for him.
20
OBSCENITY
Act 71721 revises the former obscenity article. A thorough discussion
of the article is beyond the scope of this symposium, but the major
changes can be reported. Subsection (C) was amended to conform to State
v. Johnson ,22 which declared part of the former subsection unconstitution-
al because it denied equal protection of the law to a certain class of clerical
employees. 23 In addition, a new subsection (H) was added to provide for
corporate defendants.
SEX OFFENSES
Act 4924 responds to the increased notoriety of male prostitution.
Formerly, the prostitution article applied only to women, but as amended,
it applies to any "person." 25 Moreover, the scope of the crime was
expanded to include "the solicitation by one person of another with the
17. 1977 La. Acts, No. 758, adding LA. R.S. 14:356.1, 42:1413.
18. LA. R.S. 42:1413 (Supp. 1977).
19. Id. 14:356.1 (Supp. 1977).
20. 1977 La. Acts, No. 759, adding LA. R.S. 37:219. The crime carries a
maximum penalty of a five thousand dollar fine and/or imprisonment for not more
than six months. One might wonder about the scope of this statute in light of Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) (where the United States Supreme
Court allowed advertising by attorneys). See Note, 38 LA. L. REV. 259 (1977).
21. 1977 La. Acts, No. 717, amending LA. R.S. 14:106 (Supp. 1974).
22. 343 So. 2d 705 (La. 1977).
23. Under the prior statute, the criminal responsibility of non-managerial, non-
proprietary theatre and bookstore employees depended improperly on whether a
person having managerial duties or a financial interest was subject to immediate
arrest and prosecution. State v. Johnson, 343 So. 2d 705, 707-08 (La. 1977).
24. 1977 La. Acts, No. 49, amending LA. R.S. 14:82 (1950).
25. LA. R.S. 14:82 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 49.
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intent to engage in indiscriminate sexual intercourse with the latter for
compensation." 2 6 The expansion of coverage may be broader than the
legislators intended, since the language appears to be susceptible of an
interpretation which would include not only the prostitute but the person
who seeks out the prostitute as well.
Revised Statutes 14:43.1, prior to amendment by Act 90 of 1977,
also applied only to women. Act 90 amends the article to apply to a
forcible rape perpetrated upon a "victim," thus encompassing homosexu-
al rape.27
INSURANCE
The impact of laws passed this session on the Louisiana insurance
law was significant. Most prominent among the insurance bills passed are
the ones requiring motor vehicle liability insurance, limiting stacking of
uninsured motorist coverages, and relaxing the Entire Contract Policy
Statute. Less sweeping changes were made in several other statutes which
regulate funeral, fire, group and health insurance.
COMPULSORY LIABILITY INSURANCE
Act 115 of 1977 requires liability security for every self-propelled
motor vehicle registered in the state. I Such security may consist of liability
insurance, money or securities deposited with the State Treasurer or
liability bonds as defined in the revised statutes. 2 The statute requires
coverage of at least $5,000 for property damage, $5,000 for one person's
personal injury or death, and $10,000 for personal injury or death of more
than one person.3 All persons registering motor vehicles or applying for
inspection stickers must file a written declaration that the vehicle is
properly covered and that they intend to maintain such security. Further-
more, the parents or guardians of minors applying for driver's licenses
must declare that all vehicles owned by the family comply with the
provisions of the Act. 4 This legislation significantly affects the Louisiana
26. LA. R.S. 14:82(b), added by 1977 La. Acts, No. 49.
27. 1977 La. Acts, No. 90, amending LA. R.S. 14:43.1 (Supp. 1975).
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 115, adding LA. R.S. 32:861-863. Motor vehicles used
primarily for exhibit and parades are exempted from the legislation.
2. LA. R.S. 32:861(B) (Supp. 1977).
3. Id. 32:861(A), (C) (Supp. 1977).
4. Id. 32:862 (Supp. 1977).
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Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, 5 which previously provided for
suspension of driving privileges and automobile registration only upon
failure to furnish, after the occurrence of an accident, evidence of insur-
ance sufficient to satisfy resultant liability.6 If a driver could not post
security, the sole penalty was the suspension of driving privileges and
vehicle registration, 7 which obviously provided no pecuniary benefit to the
injured claimant. The new law, while not guaranteeing payment, does
mandate a declaration by all owners that they are insured before they may
obtain plates or inspection stickers, and also provides criminal sanctions
for false declarations.'
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Major changes were enacted in the law regulating uninsured motorist
coverage (U.I.M.C.) this summer. Uninsured motorist coverage must be
included in all automobile liability policies issued in Louisiana. 9 Should
the insured become legally entitled to recover damages due to the negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist, he may sue and recover from his own
insurance company under the provisions of such coverage."o The action is
considered ex contractu and therefore subject to the prescription of ten
years.'" Upon payment, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of its
5. Id. 32:851-1043 (1950). For an excellent though somewhat dated commen-
tary on the motor vehicle law, see Comment, Compensation For Motor Vehicle
Accident Victims: The Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 27 TUL.
L. REV. 341 (1953). The author clearly distinguishes the deposit of security after
accident from the prospective protection afforded under the proof of financial
responsibility portions of the motor vehicle law.
6. LA. R.S. 32:872(B) (1950). Furthermore, licenses are never to be suspended
where the owner is not legally liable for damages. Id. 38:873(6) (1950).
7. Id. 32:872(B) (1950).
8. Id. 32:864 (Supp. 1977). The new provisions overlap somewhat with older
law. Thus, a solvent owner who falsely declares that he has the necessary coverage
may have his license suspended (id. 32:863(B) (1950)), and be convicted of a
misdemeanor (id. 32:864 (Supp. 1977)). By thereafter posting security as required
under LA. R.S. 32:874(A)(3)(b) (1950), he is entitled to a new license as he has
demonstrated financial responsibility. It is suggested that the newer provisions
should apply in such conflicting situations in order to effectuate the legislative
intent to require owners to provide evidence of security before accidents and to
establish criminal penaltie§ for those falsely claiming to have done so.
9. Id. 22:1406(D)(l)(a) (1976).
10. These policies normally contain language whereby the insurer agrees "To
pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury
... . E.g., Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521,218 So. 2d 580 (1968).
11. Until the cases of Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So.
2d 580 (1968), and Thomas v. Emp. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 253 La. 531, 218 So. 2d 584
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insured against the uninsured tortfeasor. 12 However, the insured may have
only a prescribed cause of action to subrogate to his insurer if the one year
ex delicto prescriptive period has expired.' 3 Thus, the insured by his delay
may effectively destroy any meaningful subrogation. 14 Although the new
legislation will not totally alleviate these inequitable results, Act 44415
does reduce the prescriptive period for an insured's claim under his
uninsured motorist coverage from the judicially established ten years to a
more reasonable two years.
Last year a bill designed to prevent "stacking" of uninsured motorist
coverages failed to gain approval of the senate. 16 This year, a compromise
bill was passed which allows an insured to obtain U.I.M.C. to any
amount17 but limits stacking if his injuries exceed that amount. No stack-
ing is allowed in situations where several motor vehicles are covered by
the same policy of insurance or where coverage is available under other
policies containing U.I.M.C. provisions.' 8 An exception to this prohibi-
(1968) (consolidated with Booth), the courts of appeal were divided on the nature of
the action and the applicable prescriptive period. 253 La. at 523 n.4, 218 So. 2d at
582 n.4. See Comment, Insurance-Prescription For Uninsured Motorist Action-
Tort or Contract? 14 Loy. L. REV. 250 (1967).
12. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) provides that the insurer is subrogated to the extent
of any payment made to the insured. Fouquier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 So. 2d 400
(La. App. Ist Cir. 1967).
13. E.g., Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521,218 So. 2d 580(1968);
Gremillion v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 305 So. 2d 134 (1974). When the insurer files suit against the tortfeasor,
a peremptory exception of prescription bars the action.
14. Affirmatively releasing a third-party tortfeasor and thereby defeating sub-
rogation will cause an insured to lose his right to recover under his uninsured
coverage. Cf. Washington v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970).
15. 1977 La. Acts, No. 444, adding LA. R.S. 9:5604.
16. The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-
Insurance, 37 LA. L. REV. 156, 157 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Regular
Session ].
17. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(b) (Supp. 1976), provided that an insured may
obtain uninsured coverage to his own liability limits. 1977 La. Acts, No. 623,
amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(b) (Supp. 1976), allows an insured to select
coverage "to any amount."
18. 1977 La. Acts, No. 623, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406 (Supp. 1976). This will
result in a substantial reworking of the law of stacking as judicially developed in
Louisiana. Under the jurisprudence, a person is entitled to stack all uninsured
motorists provisions within whose terms he is an "insured." Thus, A, owner of two
vehicles insured with U.I.M.C. who is injured by an uninsured motorist while
occupying B's insured car is an "insured" within the definition of his own two
policies as well as B's policy and may stack the three policies. See Seaton v. Kelly,
339 So. 2d 731 (La. 1976). Cf. Barbin v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 315 So.
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tion is provided for a claimant injured in a non-owned automobile who
may use his own U.I.M.C. as excess coverage to the primary coverage on
the non-owned vehicle. 9 However, only one uninsured motorist policy is
available as excess above the primary coverage.2' These changes abruptly
end the heady days of stacking by allowing the claimant to stack only one
policy and to stack it only if he is injured in an automobile owned by
another.
ENTIRE CONTRACT POLICY STATUTE
An amendment to section 628 of the Insurance Code relaxes the
requirement that all agreements modifying, extending, or conflicting with
a contract of insurance be contained within the four corners of the policy
or be physically attached to it. 2' Act 312 permits policy modifications to
be "incorporated within the policy . . . by specific reference to another
policy or written evidence of insurance." 2 2 The Act also provides that its
provisions shall apply if a policy is coupled by specific reference with
another policy of insurance in existence or issued thereafter. In Spain v.
Travelers Insurance Co. 23 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under
section 628 an excess insurer could not rely on exclusions in a primary
policy which was not attached physically to the excess policy. In 1976,
section 628 was amended 24 to overrule the Spain case by exempting
excess and reinsurance policies from the statute's operation. 25 Act 312
thus abrogates the specific exemptions for excess and reinsurance con-
tracts and seemingly permits modification of all policies by specific
reference to other policies of insurance. A similar enactment 26 provides
2d 754 (La. 1975). Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 915 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974). Should B have another car insured with U.I.M.C., A is not an
"insured" within that policy's definitions and cannot stack B's second policy.
Seaton v. Kelly, 339 So. 2d 731 (La. 1976).
19. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(c) (Supp. 1977).
20. Id.
21. 1977 La. Acts, No. 312, amending LA. R.S. 22:628 (Supp. 1976). This
statute is often called the Entire Contract Policy Statute. The requisite physical
attachment, specifically required in other statutes, was judicially required under
Section 628 before the 1977 amendment. Spain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 827
(La. 1976).
22. 1977 La. Acts, No. 312, amending LA. R.S. 22:628 (Supp. 1976). The
apparent effect of the Act is to provide that modifications may be incorporated by
inclusion in the body of the contract of insurance by physically attaching the written
modification, or by specific reference to a policy then existing or thereafter issued.
23. 332 So. 2d 827 (La. 1976).
24. 1976 La. Acts, No. 150.
25. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Insurance, 37 LA. L. REV. 494, 495 (1977).
26. 1977 La. Acts, No. 438, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1976).
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that any document signed by the named insured of an automobile liability
policy which rejects uninsured motorist coverage or selects lower limits
shall be conclusively presumed to become part of the policy without
regard to actual physical attachment.
FIRE INSURANCE
A new section was added to the fire insurance provisions which
regulate all insurers issuing fire policies in Louisiana. Under the standard
policy the insured, in case of loss, is required to give immediate written
notice of loss to the insurer.27 After the notice, but within sixty days of
loss, the insured must file a sworn proof of loss detailing the time and
origin of loss, the actual cash value of items damaged or destroyed, and
other required information relevant to his claim.28 Compliance with these
requirements is a prerequisite to a suit under the policy.29 Act 202 states
that within thirty days of receiving written notice of loss the insurer must
furnish the insured with a suitable "proof of loss" form and advise the
insured that sworn submission of the same is required under policy
provisions. 30
In another bill, the legislature changed the time when fire policies
take effect from noon to 12:01 a.m. Standard Time. 3
OTHER INSURANCE BILLS
Numerous minor adjustments were made this session to various
insurance regulations. Act 309 reduces the number of employees or
members required for the issuance of group life insurance policies from
ten to one, 32 and thus allows smaller groups and firms to qualify for such
policies.
Refunds due insureds for unearned premiums because of cancella-
tion, reduction of coverage or elimination must now be accompanied by
interest at the rate of 1 1/2% monthly accruing from thirty days after
27. LA. R.S. 22:691(F) (1950).
28. Id. These provisions are mandatory and proof of loss must be detailed,
Germiere v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 La. 341, 33 So. 361 (1903);
Weinberg, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 274 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
The insurer may, by its actions, waive them. Brocato v. Sun Underwriters Ins.
Co., 219 La. 495, 53 So. 2d 246 (1951).
29. LA. R.S. 22:691(F) (1950).
30. Id. 22:691.1 (Supp. 1977).
31. 1977 La. Acts, No. 335, amending LA. R.S. 22:691(F) (1950).
32. 1977 La. Acts, No. 309, amending LA. R.S. 22:175 (Supp. 1975).
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delivery of notice of cancellation.33 However, health and life policies are
excluded from this provision as are policies issued by companies requiring
audits, and refunds due by a local agent.34
All health and accident insurance policies providing surgical cover-
age must now pay any claim arising from treatment in "outpatient"
hospitals35 if the service would have been covered as an inpatient serv-
ice.36
The legislature this year effected changes in the law relative to
funeral insurance although it defeated similar legislation in 1976. 37 Act
116 requires the insurer to pay one hundred percent of the policy's face
value if the beneficiary of a burial policy declines the services for any
reason; formerly the required return was seventy-five percent.3" Perhaps
the "cogent example" 39 of Wilson v. Reliable Insurance Company4° did
little to comfort members of the legislature during the past cold winter.
The amendment applies prospectively to policies issued after January 1,
1978.41
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
SECOND INJURY FUND
In 1974 the legislature established a Workman's Compensation Sec-
ond Injury Fund to reimburse employers or insurers for excess liability
when injuries to employees merge with pre-existing permanent physical
33. LA. R.S. 22:637.1 (Supp. 1977).
34. Id. 22:637.1(A), (B) (Supp. 1977).
35. LA. R.S. 40:2133 (Supp. 1976) defines "ambulatory surgical centers" to
which Act 350 applies. They are permanently equipped and staffed facilities for
performing surgical procedures which do not provide for overnight stay.
36. LA. R.S. 22:223 (Supp. 1977).
37. 1977 La. Acts, No. 116, amending LA. R.S. 22:253 (Supp. 1973); LA. R.S.
22:292(B) (Supp. 1973). Last year, two' bills were introduced in the House. La.
H.B. 1062, 1063, 39th Reg. Sess. (1976). The former sought completely to prohibit
funeral insurance and the latter required that any cash paymgcnt in lieu of services
be 100% of the policy face value. Both were defeated. 1976 Regular Session, supra
note 16, at 157.
38. LA. R.S. 22:253 (Supp. 1972); id. 22:292(B)' (Supp. 1972).
39. See discussion in 1976 Regular Session, supra note 16, at 157.
40. 333 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). The decedent paid premiums for
thirty-one years totalling $735.08. Her beneficiary received a cash benefit of only
seventy-five percent of the $150.00 cash face value of the policy when it became
impracticable due to rising costs for the company to bury decedent.
41. LA. R.S. 22:253(B) (Supp. 1977).
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disabilities.' Act 267 of 1977 provides a definition of merger which is
limited to subsequent injuries proximately caused by the pre-existing
injury or made materially or substantially greater than would have resulted
had there been no preexisting injury. 2 The time limit for filing claims for
reimbursement was extended from 180 days to fifty-two weeks following
the first payment of benefits after the second injury.3 Additionally, spinal
fusions and mental retardation were added to the list of permanent partial
disabilities.4 These may be registered with the second injury fund for the
benefit of the employer should the employee thereafter receive a subse-
quent compensable injury which merges with the pre-existing condition.
OTHER BILLS
In other workman's compensation bills, the legislature made minor
adjustments in the operation of the Second Injury Board5 and provided for
lump sum settlement of disability benefits if no term had been set for
payments.6 Act 530 provides for reimbursement for actual travel expenses
necessary to obtain medical care, rather than computation of mileage
geared to the deduction provided in the Internal Revenue Code, section
213.' Actual reimbursement of proven travel expenses has long been
recognized as compensable under the Louisiana jurisprudence. 8 However,
until the legislature tied the expenses to the Internal Revenue Service
standard rates in 1976, 9 wide variations in judicial awards resulted. ° It
I. LA. R.S. 23:1371-79 (Supp. 1974).
2. Id. 23:1371(C)(Supp. 1977).
3. Id. 23:1378(B) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 267. The
time limit for claiming reimbursement, originally 10 days (1974 La. Acts, No. 165),
was extended in 1976 to 180 days. 1976 La. Acts, No. 298.
4. 1977 La. Acts, No. 267, adding LA. R.S. 23:1378(F)(30) - (31).
5. 1977 La. Acts, No. 235, amending LA. R.S. 23:1372-73 (Supp. 1974).
6. 1977 La. Acts, No. 40, amending LA. R.S. 23:1274 (1950). 1975 La. Acts,
No. 538, amending LA. R.S. 23:1221 (Supp. 1968) removed the term for which
benefits were payable for injuries causing permanent or temporary total disabilities.
Instead, it provided for recovery "during the period of such disability." It is
believed that the 1977 amendment was enacted to confirm the authority of the
judiciary to approve lump-sum settlements reached in cases where the durations of
the award are uncertain. This authority was not expressly provided under LA. R.S.
23:1274 (1.950), a statute originally designed for approval of discounted lump-sum
settlements figured upon awards of a particular duration.
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 530, amending LA. R.S. 23:1203 (Supp. 1976).
8. Romano v. Davis, 339 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976); Southall v.
Kingsville Timber Co.,. 168 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Murry v. Southern
Pulpwood Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
9. 1976 La. Acts, No. 400, amending LA. R.S. 23:1203 (Supp. 1975).
10. E.g., Jack v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 326 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (15
cents per mile); Walters v. General Accident & Fire Assurance Co., 119 So. 2d 550
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remains to be seen whether a standard measure will evolve under the new
act.
Louisiana's workman's compensation law provides that benefits paid
to an applicant on the basis of a materially false statement or representa-
tion are immediately due upon demand by the administrator, and that the
offending applicant is not entitled to further benefits until repayment has
been made or until fifty-two weeks have expired from the determination. "
Act 648 provides that false statements of the reason of separation from
employment do not trigger these provisions unless the employer delivers a
"separation notice alleging disqualification" to the employee within sev-
enty-two hours of the separation.'
2
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Although no changes were enacted in the basic Louisiana consumer
legislation, several acts more readily identified with other fields of law
will affect consumers. Among these are the bills concerning Homestead
Exemptions, Repairman's Privilege, eyeglass advertising, and the use of
prescribed actions as defenses to suit. Also, the Displaced Homemaker
Act defies proper classification in another section of this symposium and is
briefly discussed here due to its humanitarian purpose.
PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
The legislature retreated from the position it took in 1976 concerning
the repairman's privilege on automobiles for work, parts, and labor per-
formed.' Act 3692 abrogates the requirement of written estimates for jobs
over one hundred dollars. Authorization to perform work above the cost of
the estimate is still required for the repairman to have a privilege on the
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (5 cents to 40 cents per mile). See The Work of the
Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-Employment and Labor Law,
37 LA. L. REv. 178, 185 (1976).
11. LA. R.S. 23:1601(8) (Supp. 1971).
12. 1977 La. Acts, No. 648, amending LA. R.S. 23:1601(8) (Supp. 1971).
1. 1976 La. Acts, No. 102 required that written estimates be furnished consumers
for any job exceeding one hundred dollars. Should the job costs exceed the estimate, the
repairman was required to obtain written authorization from the consumer in order for
his privilege to attach to the excess above the estimate. The act was suspended by 1976
La. Acts, H. Con. Res. 244.
2. 1977 La. Acts, No. 369, amending LA. R.S. 9:4501 (Supp. 1976).
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amount that exceeds the estimate, but such authorization need not be
written. 3
In related legislation, the anachronistic exemptions from seizure were
somewhat modernized by Act 360. 4 Clothes dryers, living room suites,
heating and cooling equipment, and a cow were added to the list of items
immune from seizure under any writ or process.5 The procedure for
claiming the constitutionally provided homestead exemption6 was also
clarified in Act 446. 7
TRUTH IN LENDING
Article 424 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that
prescribed causes of action may be used as defenses if they are incidental
to or connected with the main demand sought to be enforced. 8 However,
this article was amended by Act 254 to restrict the scope of protection
given to Louisiana consumers. 9 Act 254 provides that prescribed actions
arising under the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act'0 may not be
raised as defenses.'" Therefore, Termplan Mid-City, Inc. v. Laughlin12
and Reliable Credit Service, Inc. v. Bernard13 have been legislatively
overruled.' 4 In each case, the defendant debtor pled as an affirmative
defense a prescribed violation of provisions of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal determined that such
was proper under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 424.
LOAN PREPAYMENTS
The legislature limited penalties which may be assessed for partial
3. See note I, supra.
4. 1977 La. Acts, No. 360, amending LA. R.S. 13:3881(4) (1950).
5. Id.
6. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 9.
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 446, amending LA. R.S. 20:1 (1950). For a discussion, see the
Civil Procedure section of this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 152, 161 (1977).
8. LA. CODE CIV. P. 424.
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 254, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. 424.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-91(F) (Supp. 1976). The most fruitful source of prescribed
claims is undoubtedly the sub-title of the Consumer Credit Protection Act popularly
known as Truth-in-Lending.
II. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970) (sets a one year prescriptive period for bringing claims
arising under the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
12. 333 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
13. 339 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 215 (1977).
14. For a brief discussion of these two decisions, see The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts For the 1975-76 Term-Consumer Law, 37 LA. L. REv. 450-54
(1977).
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and total pre-payment of loans secured by mortgages of rural property. 5
Each instrument secured by such property must contain a clause authoriz-
ing prepayment of the balance prior to the date of maturity. This act does
not apply to consumer credit transactions, t 6 as rebates for such are deter-
mined by the "Sum of the Digits" method. 7 Persons attempting to apply
or applying more restrictive prepayment schedules are subject to criminal
and civil penalties. 1
8
EYEGLASS ADVERTISING
The prohibition against advertising prices for eyeglasses was re-
moved by the legislature this session. Previously the Revised Statutes
prohibited the advertising, as free or for a price, of glasses, frames, or contact
lenses. 9 Act 48820 now allows such advertising, but retains the prohibition
against advertising the prices of contact lenses. Each advertisement must
include a statement that the offer covers materials only and does not
include vision examinations. Further, it must state whether the offered
lenses are clear or tinted, glass or plastic, and the country of manufacture
and the identity of the manufacturer of the glasses.2' The Act should result
15. LA. R.S. 9:5321-26 (Supp. 1977). See also the Security Devices section of this
symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 86-87 (1977).
16. By definition, a "Consumer Credit Transaction" is a consumer loan, credit sale
or lease (LA. R.S. 9:3516( 1) (Supp. 1972), which by definition are sales, leases or loans
not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars. Id. 9:3516(10), (12), (13) (Supp. 1972); See
Symposium, Consumer Protection Legislation 34 LA. L. REV. 597, 598-604 (1974).
17. LA. R.S 9:3527-29 (Supp. 1972). These statutes provide only for rebate of the
unearned finance charge upon prepayment in full of precomputed consumer credit
transactions.
18. LA. R.S. 9:5326 (Supp. 1977). Violators are subject to imprisonment for not
more than six months, fines of not more than five hundred dollars, or both.
19. The prohibition applied to retail merchants as well as optometrists. Louisiana
State Bd. of Optometry Examiners v. Pearle Optical, Inc., 248 La. 1062, 184 So. 2d 10
(1966); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So. 2d 99 (1953).
20. 1977 La. Acts, No. 488, amending LA. R.S. 37:1063, 1065 (1950).
21. Pretermitting discussion of the retained prohibition of advertising contact lenses,
the new act should bring the law within constitutionally permissible regulation of the
advertising of professional services and products. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), the Supreme Court recognized that commercial speech is within the protection of
the first amendment, abrogating the former distinction" of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942). Thereafter the Court found prohibitions against advertising certain
"routine" professional services violative of the first amendment. Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) (attorneys); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pharmacists). The Court's migration from the "prepack-
aged" drugs of Virginia Pharmacy to the "routine services" in Bates suggests that the
precise dilineation between protected and non-protected commercial advertising of
professional services is not yet clear. See Note, 38 LA. L. REV. 259 (1978). In
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in lower eyeglass prices for Louisiana consumers. 22
DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS
In recognition of the increasing number of persons who find them-
selves displaced from their role as homemakers due to the death of spouses
or dissolution of marriages and who are subsequently unemployed because
of a lack of education, training or paid work experience, the legislature
enacted the Displaced Homemaker Act,23 which establishes a service
agency to assist such persons. The agency's function is to counsel dis-
placed homemakers and to refer them to appropriate job opportunities,
existing training programs, or service agencies specializing in financial,
legal, educational and nutritional advice. The Bureau of Women within
the Office of Human Services of the Department of Health and Human
Resources administers the program.
MEDICAL LEGISLATION*
The medical malpractice insurance system enacted in 197524 under-
went minor amendments this year. The position of "Risk Manager,"
originally the private insurance company appointed to manage the under-
writing authority, 25 has been redefined to comply with the public bid laws
of the state in the selection of the manager.2 6 Further, the compensation of
the company is now subject to approval by the Division of Administra-
tion. 27 In other minor changes, applicants for coverage must now submit
proof of their inability to obtain insurance from private insurers, 28 and
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court found that prohibitions
against the advertising of eyeglass frames are permissible, and in Head v. New
Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963), the Court upheld prohibitions against advertising
the cost of prescription lenses. Neither case, however, dealt with the first amend-
ment issue.
22. Benson, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAW & ECON.
337 (1972). The author reports significantly lower prices in those states permitting
advertising of lenses.
23. 1977 La. Acts, No. 664, adding LA. R.S. 46:1991-96.
* See also the discussion of health regulation in the Administrative Law Section of
this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 96, 102-10 (1977). •
24. Louisiana has established the Residual Malpractice Insurance Authority to pro-
vide malpractice policies unobtainable from private companies. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41-.48
(Supp. 1975), as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 183. See Comment, Recent Medical
Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as First Checkup].
25. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41(10) (Supp. 1975) (as it appeared prior to the 1977 amend-
ment).
26. Id. 40:1299.41(10) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 261.
27. LA. R.S. 40:1299.46(E) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 261.
28. LA. R.S. 40:1299.46(F) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 261.
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premiums for policies issued by the authority are pegged to those of
private insurers for similar coverage.29 Additionally, each policy must
now contain a clause limiting the liability of the authority to its reserves. 30
Medical Review Panel
Changes enacted in the method of allocating the costs of proceedings
before the medical review screening board should provide broadened
access to such panels by poorer claimants.31 The fees of the panel must be
borne by the prevailing party.32 Heretofore, no law provided for payment
of costs which have been charged to claimants unable to bear such
expenses. These costs must now be paid by the health care provider if the
claimant establishes under oath that he is unable to pay them.33 If the
claimant thereafter obtains a judgment against the defendant or receives a
settlement from him the award shall be offset by the amount of such
advance payment.
Emergency Care
Necessary legislation dealing with emergency medical care was
passed this session. Act 62631 provides for the certification of emergency
and advanced emergency medical technicians and for the employment of
such technicians by ambulance and ancillary medical service organiza-
tions. Broad power to "practice medicine" is granted advanced emergen-
cy technicians while rendering emergency care upon the orders of a
physician maintaining direct contact with the technicians. 35 The advanced
technicians are granted immunity from civil liability for all but intentional-
ly harmful or grossly negligent acts while performing emergency treat-
ment pursuant to physicians' instructions.3 6 Hospitals allowing the use of
contact or telemetry communication facilities 37 are liable only for grossly
29. LA. R.S. 40:1299.46(l) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 261.
30. LA. R.S. 40:1299.46(J) (Supp. 1977).
31. Id. 40:1299.47 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 143.
32. LA. R.S. 40:1299.47(5) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 183, § 7.
For a discussion of the operation of Louisiana medical review panels, see First Checkup,
supra note 24.
33. LA. R.S. 40:1299.47(l) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 143.
34. 1977 La. Acts, No. 626, amending LA. R.S. 40:1231-32 (Supp. 1976), adding LA.
R.S. 40:1233-36.
35. LA. R.S. 40:1234 (Supp. 1977).
36. Id. 40:1235 (Supp. 1977). Louisiana law appears settled that a person undertak-
ing to provide medical services is subject to the same standards as a physician perform-
ing the same service. Butler v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 331 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 334 So. 2d 230 (1976); Thompson v. Brent, 245 So. 2d 751 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971); Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co. 144 So. 2d 249 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1962).
37. These are devices which transmit to a remote location pressure, temperature and
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negligent acts by hospital personnel.38 However, a community standard of
skill and care, considering the circumstances of providing emergency
instructions, is required of directing physicians. 39
In other action, the legislation covering malpractice by state em-
ployed health care providers4° was amended to include voluntary profes-
sional services rendered in facilities by or on behalf of the state.4"
Laetrile*
Of the proposals before the legislature this summer, none drew more
public attention than the laetrile bill. Act 99 of 1977 provides that the
manufacture, sale, possession, and use of laetrile is lawful in this state,
with the sale of laetrile's parental form subject to physician's prescrip-
tion. 42 The Act specifically exempts laetrile from the scope of several
statutes43 which incorporate the findings of federal agencies relative to
other vital medical signs thereby allowing physicians to transmit orders to the attending
emergency technicians at the scene of an emergency.
38. 1977 La. Acts, No. 626. The usual duty of care required of hospitals is to
exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence used by hospitals in the area. Pettis v.
State Dept. Hosp., 336 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 340 So.
2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs granted on other issues, 339 So. 2d 855 (1976); Killgore
v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
39. 1977 La. Acts, No. 626. This retains the general duty of care owed by physi-
cians. See, e.g., Mills v. Levy, 537 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976); Caldwell v. Packer, 340 So.
2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 1120 (1977). The general standard
of care is legislatively incorporated in LA. R.S. 40:1299.41 (Supp. 1975).
40. LA. R.S. 40:1299.38-.39 (Supp. 1975) (as it appeared prior to the 1977 amend-
ment). This legislation was rushed through the legislature in 1975 to diffuse an impending
crisis in state provided medical care. It limited the liability of state employed health care
providers to $500,000 and established a fund to pay for the defense and satisfaction of
any judgments rendered against these employees. See First Checkup, supra note 24. The
fund was abolished this year and judgments are paid by legislative appropriation. 1977
La. Acts, No. 744, amending LA. R.S. 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1975).
41. LA. R.S. 40:1299.39(A)(1) (Supp. 1975), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 628.
* See also the discussion of Act 99 in the Administrative Law section of this
symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 96, 106-07 (1977).
42. 1977 La. Acts, No. 99, amending LA. R.S. 40:676, adding LA. R.S. 37:1285.1.
43. The manufacture, use, and sale of laetrile is exempt from: LA. R.S. 40:607 (1950)
(unnumbered paragraph one, incorporated the findings of any department of the U.S.
Government with respect to adulterated food); id. 40:608 (1950) (unnumbered paragraph
one, providing the same for misbranded foods); id. 40:617 (1950) (unnumbered para-
graph one, findings of misbranded drugs); id. 40:618 (1950) (pharmacopoeia codes). Note
that laetrile is subject to all other provisions of the above cited statutes concerning
adulteration and labelling.
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adulteration, misbranding, and regulation of drugs and provides that the
sale, manufacture and use of laetrile shall not be restricted or limited on
the grounds that it is ineffective in the prevention or treatment of cancer.
Physicians prescribing or administering laetrile to cancer patients are
protected against disciplinary actions by the Louisiana Board of Medical
Examiners and from civil action by patients based solely upon such
treatment.44
The insulation from Board action is conditioned upon the physician's
informing the patient of the present medical status of the drug and obtain-
ing his written consent on forms provided by the Louisiana Board of
Medical Examiners.45 However, immunity from civil liability under the
Act requires only that the physician procure the prescribed consent agree-
ment, with no requirement that the patient be informed of laetrile's
medical status.
In similar action, the manufacture, use and possession of saccharin
was declared lawful in this state, 4 6 and exempted from several statutes
incorporating by reference federal findings and regulations.4 7
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
Five years ago Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act'
for the protection and development of the nation's coastal areas.2 Under
the provisions of the Act, coastal states3 are given annual grants to assist
them in developing a state coastal zone program which must conform to
44. LA. R.S. 37:1285.1 (Supp. 1977).
45. Id. 37:1285.1 (Supp. 1977).
46. Id. 40:1059 (Supp. 1977).
47. See note 43, supra. Saccharin was exempted from these same statutes.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. 1973 & Supp. 1976).
2. See generally Implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972:
A Symposium, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 717 (1975). The Act defines coastal zone to
include coastal waters and the lands therein and thereunder, adjacent shorelands
strongly influenced by and in proximity to the shoreline of coastal states, transi-
tional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(a)
(Supp. 1973).
3. Coastal states are those which border on the Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic
oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or more of the Great Lakes.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (Supp. 1973).
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various requirements of the federal act.4 After the program has been
approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the states receive administrative
grants to aid them in managing the coastal zone.' States are not required to
develop a coastal zone program, 6 but only forego certain benefits if they
choose to refrain from participation. 7
After several unsuccessful attempts in past sessions, proponents of
coastal zone management prevailed in the legislature this year. Act 7058
creates a twenty-one member Coastal Commission composed of the secre-
tary of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,9 one representative from
each of the ten coastal parishes,' ° and ten members appointed by the
governor to represent ten interest groups. I" The Commission's chief duty
is to establish broad standards and criteria to serve as minimum require-
ments for state agencies and local governments when they set up manage-
ment programs over their respective areas of jurisdiction.' 2 The Commis-
sion's standards must reflect certain policies, such as the interest held by
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (Supp. 1975). The state program must identify the coastal
areas subject to the management program; define permissible land and water uses in
the zone; make an inventory of areas of particular concern in the zone; identify the
legal means for controlling land and water uses; state broad guidelines on the
priority of uses in particular areas; and describe the organizational structure which
will implement the program. Additional requirements must be met by October 1,
1978. See 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(7)-(9) (Supp. 1976).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (Supp. 1976). These grants may cover up to eighty per cent
of the program's administrative costs.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (Supp. 1976): "The key to more effective protection
and use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the
states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone
7. E.g., to participate in the revenues of the Coastal Energy Impact Program,
16 U.S.C. 1456(a) (Supp. 1976), a state must have an approved management plan,
be receiving development grants for coastal zone management, or be making
significant progress toward developing a management program which conforms to
the federal requirements. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(g)(1) (Supp. 1976).
8. 1977 La. Acts, No. 705, amending LA. R.S. 49:213.1-213.6 (Supp. 1976),
adding LA. R.S. 49:213.7-213.12.
9. LA. R.S. 49:213.4 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705.
10. Id. The ten coastal parishes are Cameron, Vermilion, Iberia, St. Mary,
Terrebonne, Lafourche, Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and Orleans.
I. Id. The ten interest groups are: the oil and gas industry; agriculture and
forestry; commercial fishing and trapping; sport fishing, hunting, and outdoor
recreation; ports, shipping, and transportation; nature preservation and environ-
mental protection; coastal landowners; municipalities; producers of solid minerals;
and industrial development. Six of the appointees must be from coastal parishes,
and one must be from St. Tammany parish.
12. LA. R.S. 49:213.5 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705.
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state and local governments in protecting the coastal zone and multiple
compatible uses of the coastal zone. 13
The management program which the Act creates demonstrates a
strong belief that most land use decisions should be made on the local
level. Although the Act requires certain state agencies to develop manage-
ment plans, 4 the bulk of authority in the coastal zone is left with local
governments. For example, local governments have jurisdiction over
water and erosion control, dredging, effluent, fill and drainage, habita-
tion, and local roads and bridges.' 5 Local governments may also adopt
regulations for land use which affect the uses controlled by state agencies
so long as the local regulations are not in conflict with the jurisdiction of
the state agencies.
16
The Act requires agencies and local governments to institute a permit
procedure under which any person desiring to act within the coastal zone
must secure a permit from the agency or local government having juris-
diction over the proposed use. ' 7 After an application is made, the agency
may hold a public meeting to obtain the views of interested parties or to
develop data on which to base its decision.' s Any applicant who is not
granted a permit may require a public hearing to be held, and the subse-
quent decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing and
state the reasons for the decision.' 9 If the agency persists in refusing to
grant the permit, the applicant may seek injunctive relief from the district
court where the proposed use is to take place.20 The Act also allows
agencies or local governments to issue general permits if an independent
review of each instance of a particular use appears unnecessary.
2
'
13. Id.
14. LA. R.S. 49:213.6 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705. For
example, the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries controls wildlife and aquatic
life, the Louisiana Forestry Commission has jurisdiction over forestry matters, and
the assistant secretary of the Office of Conservation has control of mineral explora-
tion, production, and transportation.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. LA. R.S. 49:213.8 (Supp. 1977).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Any adversely affected party may also seek injunctive relief.
21. Id. 49:213.9 (Supp. 1977). However there is clearly some question about the
breadth of uses which the Act regulates. The Act was amended to provide that the
regulation of the coastal zone would be adjusted by subsequent acts in direct
relation to a relinquishment by the Corps of Engineers of its authority over Louisia-
na wetlands. This retraction of the Corps' authority would require congressional
action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. 1972).
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Act 705 contains several provisions preserving the status quo. The
Act .defines "use" to exclude the construction, maintenance, repair, and
normal use of any non-industrial structure "when these activities occur on
high ground or on lands which have already been drained or filled."'22 The
original bill23 also excepted fast lands and lands used for agriculture,
aquaculture, and silviculture, and these exceptions were expanded in
committee to include numerous other uses.
24
There is some question whether the Act will receive federal approval
due to what critics term its inadequacies.25 Certainly the most obvious area
of controversy is the designation of the coastal zone's inland boundary as a
line three miles inland from the Louisiana coast as defined in the Submerg-
ed Lands Act 26 and established in United States v. Louisiana.27 Although
numerous other boundaries were suggested, 28 the legislature chose the
most restrictive boundary proposed. The Act may also fall short of federal
requirements by failing to provide for areas of unique biological or
ecological value, 29 and by placing undue emphasis on development of the
22. LA. R.S. 49:213.2 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705.
23. La. S.B. 425, 40th Reg. Sess. (1977).
24. LA. R.S. 49:213.7 (Supp. 1977). Added to the list of exceptions were: uses
without a direct and significant effect on coastal waters; hunting, fishing, trapping,
and preservation of scenic, historical, and scientific areas as well as wildlife pre-
serves; normal maintenance and repair of existing structures; construction of a
single family residence or camp; construction of a private, non-commercial dock
with cost or fair market value less than $2500; construction and change of naviga-
tional aids; construction of normal protective bulkheads; and emergency construc-
tion.
25. A failure to receive federal. approval would delay the effect of sections
213.5 through 213.11. See LA. R.S. 49:213.12 (Supp. 1977). Failure to secure
approval could also make Louisiana ineligible for the Coastal Energy Impact Pro-
gram since a rejection of the management program could be construed by the
Commerce Department as a failure to make significant progress in developing a
coastal zone program. See note 7, supra. The governor has told the Department of
Transportation and Development, the agency designated to administer all programs
pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, to prepare a bill for the 1978
session to amend Act 705 in order to bring it into line with the federal law. See 8
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 34 (1977).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1301-15 (Supp. 1953)..
27. 422 U.S. 13 (1975). See LA. R S. 49:213.3 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977
La. Acts, No. 705.
28. E.g., Senate Bill 740, defined the coastal zone to include all the land south
of Interstate 12 from the Mississippi state line to Baton Rouge and, from Baton
Rouge to the Texas state line, all the land south of Interstate 10, excluding only East
Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, and Acadia Parishes.
29. See 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (Supp. 1975); 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.4, 923.10, 923.13
(1977).
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coastal zone and encouragement of multiple uses within it. 3' The Act may
also be faulted for making the adoption of certain, management plans
discretionary with local governments 3' and for failing to provide for any
review at the state level of these management plans if the local govern-
ments decide to adopt them. 32 Another source of criticism is the provision
forbidding the public acquisition of privately owned land without the
owner's consent.33 The federal act provides that the state must have the
authority to acquire private property by expropriation "when necessary to
achieve conformance with the management program;" 34 the Louisiana
Act seeks to avoid the effect of this provision by declaring the acquisition
of private property unnecessary for the Act's purposes.
35
GILL NETS
Another environmental issue which provoked great controversy in the
1977 session concerned the regulation of fishing nets, particularly the
monofilament gill net which is considered by some to have caused a
depletion in the stock of spotted sea trout and red drum. Act 653 made
significant changes in the law on fishing nets and instituted a complete ban
on certain types of nets in a large section of the state's waters. 36
The new law divides the state's waters by designating a line which
roughly follows the Intracoastal Waterway from Texas to the New Orleans
area where it then traces segments of the Harvey Canal, Industrial Canal,
and Intracoastal Waterway until it follows the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad right of way to the Mississippi state line.3 7 The Act then uses this
30. LA. R.S. 49:213.5 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705.
31. "A local government may grant regulations for land use .... ." Id.
49:213.6(B) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705 (emphasis added).
32. 15 C.F.R. § 923.22 (1977): "[Wlhile individual state programs may have a
wide range of interstate, local or areawide agency roles to play, the program will be
reviewed closely for assurance that it constitutes an organized and unified program.
Consistent with this principle, there must be a clear point of responsibility for the
program, although program implementation may be undertaken by several state
entities."
33. Id. 49:213.5(c) (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 705:
"Acquisition, directly or indirectly of privately owned property is not necessary to
achieve the intents and purpose of this Part. No rule, regulation, ordinance, order
or standard, the purpose or application of which is to effect an involuntary acquisi-
tion or taking of such property shall be adopted, enacted,. or implemented pursuant
to the provisions of this Part by the commission or any agency."
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2) (Supp. 1972).
35. See note 33, supra.
36. 1977 La. Acts, No. 653, amending LA. R.S. 56:311, 322, 333-34 (Supp.
1974), adding LA. R.S. 56:325.1.
37. LA. R.S. 56:322 (Supp.. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
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boundary line to differentiate mesh requirements for seines, trammel nets,
and gill nets. Seines, which are nets that entrap fish when. the net ends
meet, 38 may have a minimum mesh of two inches square north of the line,
and a maximum mesh of not more than one inch square south of the line. 39
Trammel nets, which trap fish in pockets formed by layers of netting
material, 4° may have a three-inch square or six-inch stretched minimum
mesh in the northern waters, but an inner layer maximum mesh of one-
inch square or two-inch stretched is prescribed for the area south of the
line. 4"' Gill nets have the same requirements as the trammel nets north of
the line, but in the southern waters they must have a minimum mesh of
two inches square or four inches stretched. 42
The Act completely bars monofilament gill nets and trammel nets,
devices made from a single, untwisted filament,43 from all waters south of
the line as well as Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Maurepas, Lake St.
Catherine, Toledo Bend Lake, Lake Calcasieu, and the portion of the
Calcasieu ship channel which adjoins the lake.44 The new law also reduces
the maximum length of these nets from two thousand feet to twelve
hundred feet. 45 Violations of this section are punishable by a mandatory
fine of $500 and revocation of all fishing and gear licenses for one year.46
A separate section of Act 653 creates new limits on the daily catch of
red drum and spotted sea trout. 47 The two species were in the center of the
gill net controversy since many of the opponents of the devices contended
that the recent decreases in trout and red drum catch were caused by gill
netting. The new law provides that no more than fifty of either species
may be caught in one day and allows fishers to have a maximum of two
day's catch in their possession. 48 The Act also prohibits a saltwater sports
fisherman from keeping more than two red drum per day which are longer
than thirty-six inches. 49
However, the mesh requirements for the waters south of the described line also
apply to Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Calcasieu, and Sabine Lake.
38. LA. R.S. 56:311 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
39. LA. R.S. 56:322 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
40. LA. R.S. 56:311 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
41. LA. R.S. 56:322 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
42. Id.
43. LA. R.S. 56:311 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
44. LA. R.S. 56:322 (Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 653.
45. Id.
46. Id. Act 604 also dealt with gill nets by adding control structures to the list of
water bodies which cannot be obstructed by the devices. See LA. R.S. 56:329
(Supp. 1974), as amended by 1977 La. Acts. No. 604.
47. LA. R.S. 56:325.1 (Supp. 1977).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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A similar determination to protect Louisiana's fishery resources is
displayed by Act 549 which greatly increases the penalties for shrimping
by double rig trawls in the state's inside waters during the closed season. 50
The penalties range from a fine of $500 to $750 and a mandatory fifteen to
thirty day sentence for a first offense to a fine of $750 to $1000 and
mandatory incarceration for ninety to one hundred and twenty days for
third and subsequent offenses.51 Violations shall also be punished by
revoking fishing licenses and by confiscating trawls, tackles, and other
equipment, and any shrimp found on the vessel. 52
ENERGY
The legislature responded to the energy program proposed by the
Carter administration by passing two important Acts which seek to im-
prove Louisiana's position in energy matters. The Natural Gas Pricing Act
of 1977 is a ground-breaking measure which regulates the minimum price
of intrastate sales of natural gas53 under the theory that low prices have
encouraged consumption and discouraged production. The Act only ap-
plies to new natural gas, which is defined to include all gas discovered
after the Act's effective date 4 unless it was sold or to be sold under
contracts executed prior to that date or had been committed to commerce
by the producer under transactions effected prior to the effective date. 55
The Act also only regulates first sales, which include all transfers of
ownership from a producer, including the sale of gas which has been
stored in reservoirs or other structures.56 Two methods for determining a
minimum price are established, and the price is to be set at the smaller of
the two figures. 57
50. 1977 La. Acts, No. 549, amending LA. R.S. 56:495.1(B) (Supp. 1974),
adding LA. R.S. 56:495.1(C).
51. LA. R.S. 56:495.1(C) (Supp. 1977).
52. Id.
53. 1977 La. Acts, No. 650, adding LA. R.S. 30:1001-11. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 717-
717w (1938 & Supp. 1954), the Natural Gas Act of 1938, which provides for
regulation of "the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale
in interstate commerce of natural gas for ultimate public consumption ....
natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to
any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural
gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of
natural gas." 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1938). '
54. The Act became effective upon signature of Governor Edwards on July 20,
1977.
55. LA. R.S. 30:1003 (Supp. 1977).
56. Id.
57. Id. 30:1004(A) (Supp. 1977).
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The first method requires determining the average refiner acquisition
cost of imported crude petroleum through statistics supplied by the Federal
Energy Administration, 58 which cost is then used as a base cost for a
certain number of British Thermal Units.59 Under this method of calcula-
tion, the price of one thousand cubic feet of natural gas would bear the
same proportion to its BTU content that a barrel of imported oil has to its
BTU content. 6° In determining what the price of imported oil is, the
reference is made to the average price on the last day of the calendar
month which ended four months prior to the month in which the sale of the
new natural gas is contracted. 6 The second method for establishing the
minimum price requires an examination of the weighted price of all first
sales made by producers of a comparable size, excluding any sale which is
clearly unusual.62 In this case, data are taken for the first three months of
the six month period ending with the month the relevant contract is entered
into. 6 1 Under either method of determining the price, the contract price
remains the same for one year and then may be reestablished at the lower
price calculated under either method. 6"
The Act requires that copies of all contracts be filed within thirty days
of their execution with the assistant secretary for the office of conservation
in the Department of Natural Resources. 65 This same official has broad
58. Certain information collected by the agency must be made available under
the Freedom of Information Act, 5.U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1%7). See 10 C.F.R. §
202.1-202.26 (1977).
59. LA. R.S. 30:1004(B) (Supp. 1977). A British Thermal Unit (BTU) is defined
as "a unit or quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of
water one degree Fahrenheit." Id. 30:1003 (Supp. 1977).
60. Id. 30:1004(B) (Supp. 1977) gives an example of how this pricing works. If
1000 cubic feet of gas is found to contain 1,000,000 BTU's, and a barrel of imported
oil contains 5,800,000 BTU's and sells for $12.00, the price of the natural gas should
be 10/58 of the oil, or $2.07.
61. Id. Thus, if the contract is entered into on July 8, 1978, the BTU equivalen-
cy price is established on the basis of statistics for February 28, 1978.
62. Id. 30:1004(C) (Supp. 1977).
63. The statute states: "[T]he weighted average of the first sale of intrastate
natural gas by producers of like kind and quantity . . . within the earliest three
months of a six month period beginning with and including the month in which the
sale or other transfer of ownership is to be completed." Id. (emphasis added).
However, this would require-basing a present sale on statistics from future sales
and is obviously an error in drafting. The Office of Conservation construes the
statute as though "beginning" were "ending." Telephone conversation with Ar-
nold Chauvier, assistant commissioner of conservation, October 15, 1977. Thus, if a
contract is entered into on January 1, 1978, records of prices received in July,
August, and September 1977 would be checked.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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enforcement powers to administer the price regulations, 66 to investigate
possible violations, 67 and to conduct hearings. 68 The assistant secretary's
most significant power, however, is his ability to reduce the minimum
price upon being presented with evidence that its enforcement will result
in the producer's gas remaining in the ground, thereby creating undue
hardship on the producer. 6
9
The second important enactment relative to energy resources is Act
561 which establishes a regulatory scheme for coal or lignite slurry
pipelines. 70 This Act is designed to assure that coal can reach Louisiana by
an inexpensive means of transport if Louisiana industries are required to
convert to coal under new federal energy legislation. The Act authorizes
pipeline companies which have obtained state licenses from the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources to expropriate property 7l in corridors fifteen
feet in width72 and to lay, maintain, and operate the pipeline and any
necessary telephone and telegraph wires. 73 Only one pipeline can be laid
in each corridor unless the landowner permits additional pipelines to be
located there.
71
The Act contains numerous clauses to protect the interests of Louisia-
na citizens against the pipeline companies. One provision states that if the
66. Id. 30:1007 (Supp. 1977). His powers include the power to make expendi-
tures, to adopt and amend rules and regulations, to employ personnel, to issue and
modify orders, to contract for professional services, and to represent the state
before federal agencies, and congressio nal committees, and in all judicial actions.
67. Id. 30:1008 (Supp. 1977). The-assistant secretary may administer oaths,
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the prod-
uction of materials he deems relevant to his inquiry.
68. Id. 30:1009 (Supp. 1977). Hearings for the promulgation of rules and regula-
tions or for the issuance of orders must be held publicly after at least fifteen days
notice except in cases of emergency. All hearings, investigations, and proceedings
are to be governed by rules of practice and procedure adopted by the assistant
secretary, and the technical rules of evidence are not required.
69. Id. 30:1005 (Supp. 1977). However, the assistant secretary must then set a
new minimum price for the gas, which must be the highest feasible price.
70. 1977 La. Acts, No. 561, adding LA. R.S. 30:721-24, amending LA. R.S.
19:2 (Supp. 1974). See Hershman & Fontenot, Local Regulation of Pipeline Sitings
and the Doctrines of Federal Preemption and Supremacy, 36 LA. L. REV. 929
(1976).
71. LA. R.S. 30:723A (Supp. 1977).
72. The corridor is to be seven and one-half feet on each side of a center line,
with the right of entrance and exit along the permanent right of way area. During
construction the pipeline company may use a working space of one hundred and
fifty feet in width, with extra space permitted for road crossings, stream crossings,
canal crossings, or pipeline crossings. LA. R.S. 30:723C (Supp. 1977).
73. Id.
74. Id. 30:724"(Supp. 1977).
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pipeline is not built due to the company's inability to secure the necessary
state or federal permits, the company has no right to the money it paid to
the landowner to acquire the right of way but cannot use the property
except for the purpose stated in the judgment of acquisition.75 A second
protection for the local landowner provides that the landowner can sue the
company for trespassing on any land outside the construction right of way,
and that the landowner's measure of recovery is five times the square foot
value of the expropriated land (as measured by the compensation for
expropriation) multiplied by the number of square feet trespassed upon by
the company.76 The Act also prohibits the use of any Louisiana water to
transport the coal until the assistant secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources determines that the area's water supply will not be adversely
affected." Local authorities can require that a public meeting be held if
they disagree with the assistant secretary's decision that local water sup-
plies can be used. 78 A final protection for Louisiana citizens provides that
in the absence of federal or state price controls, contract prices for a
pipeline deemed interstate in character cannot discriminate between
Louisiana purchasers and those in other states.79
NUCLEAR WASTE
By passing Act 193, the legislature took a cautious approach to the
disposal of radioactive wastes within the state.80 The new law prohibits the
use of any salt dome as a temporary or permanent storage site for radioac-
tive wastes or materials, and provides for fines of $1000 for each day the
violation occurs or for a term of imprisonment up to six months.8 No tests
to determine the feasibility of storing radioactive wastes within
Louisiana's geological structures can be conducted unless the local gov-
ernment, Natural Resources Committees of the legislature, and secretary
of the Department of Natural Resources are informed of all details con-
cerning the tests .82 The results of any test conducted under these condi-
tions are then to be reported to the House and Senate Natural Resources
Committees which then may recommend removing or continuing the
restriction embodied in this Act. 83
75. Id. 30:723E (Supp. 1977).
76. Id. 30:7231 (Supp. 1977).
77. Id. 30:723F (Supp. 1977)
78. Id.
79. Id. 30:723H (Supp. 1977).
80. 1977 La. Acts, No. 193, adding LA. R.S. 51:1071.
81. Id. The person will also be ordered by the court to remove the radioactive
material or waste from the salt dome.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Although the legislature's action is obviously intended to benefit the
health and safety of Louisiana citizens, there is some question whether the
ban on radioactive waste disposal is within the legislature's competence.
Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,84 the Atomic
Energy Commission 85 may enter into agreements with the governors of the
states by which the Commission can relinquish its regulatory authority
over such matters as by-products, source materials, and special nuclear
materials in quantities insufficient to form a critical mass.8 6 However, the
Commission may not delegate its authority to the states over certain
matters, including the disposal of waste by-products, unless it believes that
their disposal will not be hazardous. 87 Thus, it seems possible that Louisi-
ana cannot control the disposal of radioactive wastes in its salt domes since
an amount of waste large enough to warrant storage in a salt dome would
probably be too hazardous to fall into the exception for state jurisdiction. It
is possible, however, that political factors will cause federal officials to
avoid pressing for resolution of the legal issues, and that some form of
shared state-federal decision making will be used when storage sites for
large amounts of nuclear wastes must be selected.88
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1946).
85. Now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Pub. L. No. 93-438, Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1946).
87. Id. § 2021(c). See also 10 C.F R. § 8.4(e): "However, section 274c (42
U.S.C. 202 1(c)) provides that the Commission shall retain authority and responsibil-
ity with respect to the regulation of . . . . (3) the disposal into the ocean of waste
by-product, source or special nuclear materials; and (4) the disposal of such other
by-product, source or special nuclear material as the Commission determines
should because of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of
without a Commission license."
88. See Morning Advocate, September 27, 1977, at 12-A, col. 3: "Bill Bishop,
assistant director of waste management for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
said federal officials will give up on a proposed storage site if local political pressure
gets too hot . . . . Karl Kuhlman of the Energy Research and Development
Administration also said that states will have some veto power over federal deci-
sions in choosing storage sites."
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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The 1977 legislature made several major changes in appellate proce-
dure. Most of the changes were proposed by the Louisiana State Law
Institute, and the result should make appeals both more accessible and less
difficult.
Security to be Furnished for An Appeal
The requirement of a devolutive appeal bond has often proven to be a
hindrance to efficient judicial procedure. I Inasmuch as a devolutive appeal
does not suspend the execution of a judgment,2 and payment of costs is
now assured by the fact that the appellate coutt has no jurisdiction unless
costs are paid,3 there is no compelling reason for a devolutive appeal
bond. Therefore, Act 176" now provides that no security is required for a
devolutive appeal. This will not only simplify the appellate process for
litigants, but will also increase the efficiency of the judicial administration
of appeals. Appeals are favored in the law, 5 and Act 176 serves to dispose
of an anachronism while streamlining appellate procedure. This Act also
eliminates the last paragraph of article 2124, requiring appeal bonds to
secure the costs due by the appellant including those due the clerk of the
trial court for the preparation of the record on appeal. Such costs must now
be paid upon receipt of their estimation of the costs by the clerk. 6
Return Day
In 1976, the legislature amended article 2125 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 7 to permit only one automatic extension of the return date in the
1. See Cousin v. La. State Bd. of Health, 138 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962); Doll v. Dearie, 37 So. 2d 61 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948).
2. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 2087.
3. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2i26. See discus-
sion in text at note 13, infra.
4. 1977 La. Acts, No. 176, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2124.
5. Guilliot v. City of Kenner, 313 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), aff'd,
326 So. 2d 359 (La. 1976); Babineaux v. Great American Ins. Co., 245 La. 718, 160
So. 2d 591 (1964).
6. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2126. See text at
note 13, infra.
7. 1976 La. Acts, No. 426.
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trial court. However, due to an error in punctuation, the article provided
that the return day was initially to be set on motion of the clerk.8 This was
not the intent of the legislature, however, for the return date is fixed in the
order of appeal, and not on the application of the clerk. Act 177 of 19779
corrects the punctuation to accord with legislative intent, and rewords the
article so as to clarify the procedure for fixing the return day.' ° Act 177
also changes the procedure for fixing the return day. Under prior law, the
trial judge was required to fix the return day at sixty days or less from the
date the appeal was granted. Under Act 177, the return day will be sixty
days unless the trial judge fixes a shorter period."1
Payment of Costs on Appeal
In 1976 the legislature amended article 2126 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 2 to require the appellant to pay the clerk of the trial court all
estimated costs for the preparation of the record on appeal, including the
filing fee of the court of appeal, not later than twenty days after the
granting of the order of appeal. Any difference between the estimated
costs and the actual costs is to be paid within three days of the return day.
Act 198 continues some of these requirements and adds others in order to
clarify the procedure for payment of costs. 13 Specifically, article 2126
now requires the clerk to estimate immediately the costs of preparing the
record on appeal, including the fee of the court reporter for preparing the
transcript and the filing fee of the court of appeal, once the order of appeal
has been granted and the security, if required, has been furnished. The
clerk must send a notice by certified mail of the estimated costs to the
appellant, who must pay the costs within twenty days of the mailing ofthe
8. As it appeared in Act 426 of 1976, article 2125 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provided that -[t, he return day of the appeal shall be fixed by the trial
court at not more than sixty days from the date the appeal is granted on the
application of the clerk .... . (emphasis added).
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 177, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2125.
10. Id.: "The return day of the appeal shall be sixty days from the date the
appeal is granted, unless the trial judge fixes a lesser period. The trial court may
grant only one extension of the return day and such extension shall not be more
than thirty days. A copy of the extension shall be filed with the appellate court.
Subsequent extensions of the return day may be granted by the appellate court for
sufficient cause."
II. By virtue of this act, LA. R.S. 13:4438 is now superfluous, and hence is
repealed by 1977 La. Acts, No. 135.
12. 1975 La. Acts, No. 708, § 2.
13. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2126.
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notice' 4 unless an extension is granted.' 5
One major new provision allows the appellant to question excessive
estimated costs by rule in the trial court. 16 Once the record on appeal has
been prepared and completed, the clerk must refund any excess costs, or,
if additional costs are due, he must send notice by certified mail to the
appellant, who has twenty days from the mailing of the notice to pay the
difference. The trial court is also given flexibility to impose sanctions for
failure to pay timely the estimated costs or the difference between the
estimated costs and the actual costs. Prior law only gave the trial court the
power to dismiss the appeal, but the new provision gives the court the
discretion either to grant a thirty day extension without penalty within
which to pay the costs (presumably for cases where payment is delayed
through no fault of the appellant or his attorney), or to fine the appellant
and/or his attorney (where the attorney is at fault) a maximum of one
hundred dollars, Thus, the dismissal of an appeal will now only be used in
the most extraordinary of circumstances where costs are not timely paid.
Finally, the amendment prohibits the dismissal of an appeal because of the
passage of the return day without an extension having been obtained or
because of an untimely lodging of the record on appeal if the appellant has
paid the costs as required. Thus, even if costs should be paid untimely, the
appeal may not be dismissed without the making of a motion under the
provisions of the article.'
7
14. The new provision requires that this delay be calculated from the date of
mailing rather than from the date of the granting of the order of appeal due to a
possibility of a significant delay between the two dates. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198, § 2.
15. As under prior law, only one extension of a maximum of twenty days may
be granted, upon written motion showing good cause.
The requirement that the clerk notify the appellant of the estimated costs by
certified mail should solve -many of the problems encountered in the appellate
process. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 255 La. 579, 232 So.
2d 278 (1970); Bensel v. Goitia, 329 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Tropicana
Hotel & Country Club v. Dantoni, 287 So. 2d 817 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974); Hunt v.
Winn Dixie La. Inc., 276 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1973); Gremillion v. Rinaudo,
240 So. 2d 237 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Patout, 199 So. 2d 199 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967); McMillen Feeder Fin. Corp. v. Thompson, 171 So. 2d 827 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writs denied, 247 La. 715, 174 So. 2d 130 (1965); Mathies v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 170 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964). This amendment comports with
the result reached in Thompson v. Warmack, 229 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969).
16. This solves such problems as that encountered in Martin v. Garlotte, 245
So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
17. This amended provision now makes LA. R.S. 13:4445 obsolete, and thus
section 1 of Act 198 repeals this statute.
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Prepayment of Fees
Act 17818 deletes the reference to timely payment of fees in article
2127 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was done to avoid any implica-
tion that the reference related to the return day. 9 The timeliness of
payment of costs is now governed by article 2126.20
Divesting of Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Act 17521 amends article 2088 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
several ways. The amendment distinguishes between the devolutive and
suspensive appeal in defining the time at which the trial court is divested of
jurisdiction.22 Furthermore, the list of matters over which the trial court
retains jurisdiction has been made illustrative rather than exclusive. Thus
the trial court now has jurisdiction over all matters not reviewable under
the appeal, whereas under prior law this was not clear. This should solve
many of the problems that have been apparent in the jurisprudence. 23
Finally, the amendment specifically allows the trial court to retain juris-
diction to dismiss the appeal or to impose the sanctions provided in article
2126 when the appellant fails to pay timely the estimated costs and the
actual costs of the appeal. The latter provision recognizes that in most
cases, the issue of whether costs have been timely paid is a question of
fact, and as such should be determined by the trial court. In addition, if
costs have not been timely paid, then the appellate court has no jurisdiction
over the matter, under the new provision; rather, the trial court retains
jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal or to impose appropriate sanctions. 24
Delay for Taking Devolutive Appeal
A party who seeks to have a judgment modified, revised, or reversed
may take a devolutive appeal therefrom. If an appeal has been taken
18. 1977 La. Acts, No. 178, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2127.
19. See, e.g., Connell v. Sowers, 270 So. 2d 171 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1972);
Downey v. Bellue, 178 So. 2d 778 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
20. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2126, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 198.
21. 1977 La. Acts, No. 175, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2088.
22. Id. The Act provides in pertinent part: "The jurisdiction of the trial court
over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the
appellate court attaches, on the granting of the order of appeal and the timely filing
of the appeal bond, in the case of a suspensive appeal, or on the granting of the
order of appeal, in the case of a devolutive appeal." This was made necessary
because of the elimination of the requirement of a bond for devolutive appeal. 1977
La. Acts, No 176. See text at note 4, supra.
23. See Acosta v. Masters, 336 So. 2d 948 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
24. Any ruling by the trial court relative to sanctions for such failure is clearly
reviewable by the appellate court.
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timely, an appellee may then also take a devolutive appeal. Under prior
law, the appellee was required to appeal within the remainder of the
regular delays or within ten days of the granting of the first devolutive
appeal in the case. Act 174 now allows the ten day period for such an
appeal to start on the day of the mailing by the clerk of the notice of the
first devolutive appeal in the case. 25 This is equitable inasmuch as article
2121 requires the clerk to mail notice of an appeal to all other parties, and
in that such mailing may be delayed by unforeseeable circumstances. This
Act also alters the language of the last paragraph of article 2087 so that an
appellee may now take a devolutive appeal against any other party, rather
than just against "any other appellee." 26 Originally, the legislature enact-
ed this provision to allow an appellee against whom a devolutive appeal
was taken on the final day of the time period for appealing to have an
additional period in which to perfect a devolutive appeal, thus eliminating
both possible injustice and unnecessary protective appeals. The amend-
ment makes clear that this provision applies not only to appeals against
other appellees, but also to appeals against any other party who may not
have been named as an appellee. 27 Finally, the legislature eliminated the
reference in article 2087 to the security for devolutive appeal, inasmuch as
the requirement for a devolutive appeal bond has been eliminated.
28
Application for Certiorari in the Supreme Court and
Rehearing in the Appellate Courts
Under prior law, application for rehearing in the court of appeal was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to application for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court. 29 Inasmuch as the vast majority of such applications for
rehearing are denied, clients are exposed to needless delay and costs, and
the effectiveness of the judicial system is hindered. Therefore, by virtue of
25. 1977 La. Acts, No. 174, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2087.
26. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2087 (as it appeared prior to Act 174 of 1977).
27. See, e.g., McCoy v. Pacific Coast Fire Ins. Co., 248 La. 389, 178 So. 2d 761
(1965); Barrois v. Noto, 215 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Gray v. Gray, 189
So. 2d 735 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
This provision, of course, allows an appellee to appeal devolutively against an
appellant. Usually, the appellee's answer suffices as an appeal. See LA. CODE CIv.
P. art. 2133. The delay to answer would be permitted long after the delay for appeal
has run, and thus in most cases will still be preferable. Nevertheless, this article
gives the appellee an option to seek modification by a separate appeal instead of an
answer, but in such instances the appellee is granted no additional delay.
28. 1977 La. Acts, No. 176. See text at note 4, supra.
29. State v. Moore, 175 La. 607, 143 So. 707 (1932); In re Huddleston, 106 La.
594, 31 So. 147 (1902); Colomb v. Rolling, 106 La. 37, 30 So. 293 (1901); State v.
Charles E. Wermuth Co., 140 So. 699 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
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new legislation, a litigant now has the option of applying for a rehearing in
the court of appeal or applying directly to the supreme court for a writ of
certiorari within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of the judgment of
the court of appeal. 30 Failure to do either in a timely fashion will cause the
judgment of the court of appeal to become final and definitive. However, a
timely application for rehearing in the court of appeal by any party stays
the time limit within which any other party may apply to the supreme court
for a writ of certiorari for a period of thirty days from the mailing of the
notice of a denial of rehearing. If no application for a writ of certiorari is
filed within thirty days of the mailing of such notice of denial, the
judgment of the court of appeal becomes final and definitive. 3'
The delay for application for rehearing in the court of appeal runs
from the mailing of the notice of judgment 32 Act 180"3 now applies the
same rule to an application for rehearing in the Supreme Court.
3 4
DIRECTED VERDICT
While summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings are integral
parts of Louisiana procedural law, 35 there has never been a provision for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict is made in a jury trial at
the close of the evidence offered by the adverse party, and in effect usurps
the power of the jury to decide the case. It is argued that such a device
serves judicial efficiency by allowing the judge to conclude the litigation if
the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving
party that the court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a
contrary verdict. 36 The legislature adopted verbatim the provisions of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), thus allowing directed verdicts in
Louisiana civil jury trials. 37 However, in a system that allows appellate
review of facts, directed verdicts may prove inefficient. For instance, if a
30. 1977 La. Acts, No. 179, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2166. In the event
that one party applies for a rehearing in the court of appeal and one party applies for
a writ of certiorari to the supreme court, the proceeding in the supreme court would
most likely be stayed pending the disposition of the rehearing.
31. Id. By virtue of this amendment, as well as Rule X, section 4 of the
Supreme Court Rules, LA. R.S. 13:4450 is unnecessary and is thus repealed by Act
181.
32. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2166, as amended by La. Acts 1977, No. 179.
33. 1977 La. Acts, No. 180, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2167.
34. Under prior law, the fourteen day period for applying for a rehearing in the
supreme court ran from rendition of the judgment.
35. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 965, 966.
36. Williams v. Slade, 431 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. 1977 La. Acts, No. 699, adding LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1810.
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directed verdict is issued at mid-trial, the record will be incomplete and the
appellate court will not have all of the facts before it on review. Further-
more, if the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the mover as to
support a directed verdict, usually a motion for summary judgment will
have been made earlier, or the defendant may simply rest after the
presentation of the plaintiff's case. A provision for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict would thus be more practical in Louisiana.
LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
The Louisiana long-arm statute 38 allows a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident concerning a cause of action arising from
five different circumstances, including "causing injury or damage by an
offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission in this
State." A common jurisdictional problem arises where a spouse or former
spouse seeks alimony or child support from a nonresident. Louisiana
courts have refused to consider a failure to pay such an obligation of
support as capable of causing sufficient injury or damage within the state
to permit use of the long-arm statute. 39 Act 734 allows a Louisiana court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who fails to pay child
support or alimony to a spouse or former spouse with whom the nonresi-
dent formerly resided in the state.'
JURIES AND JURORS
Act 18241 was enacted at the request of the Louisiana Judicial Coun-
cil. It permits district judges42 to direct a person who has been summoned
but has not yet served as a civil juror to serve as a juror in a criminal
action, and vice-versa. It is anticipated that in those parishes where this is
feasible, the district judges will implement this procedure by a local rule.
District judges have the power to order the jury commission to draw
the names of persons to serve for a petit jury venire. 43 Prior law did not
explicity allow the sheriff to summon the jurors by mail, thus increasing
judicial costs due to the requirement of personal service. Act 57 amends
the statute in accordance with a request by the Louisiana Judicial Council
to allow the sheriff, at the election of the district judge, to serve such
38.. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964).
39. Martin v. Martin, 250 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
40. 1977 La. Acts, No. 734, adding LA. R.S. 13: 3201(f).
41. 1977 La. Acts, No. 182, adding LA. R.S. 13: 3057.
42. Orleans Parish is explicitly excluded. 1977 La. Acts, No. 182 § 2.
43. LA. R.S. 13:3044(B) (Supp. 1970).
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summons by personal or domicilary service, or by certified mail." When
the service is made by mail, the sheriff must attach to his return the return
receipt of delivery from the postal service showing the disposition of the
envelope bearing the summons to the juror. The law provides that the
return, with the attached receipt of delivery, shall form part of the record
and be considered prima facie correct. While this new provision should
greatly facilitate the summoning process for the sheriffs, it is possible that
a juror might not receive the summons if the mail is delivered to another.
If such situations occur often, the court is still free to require personal
service, or may continue to serve notice by certified mail with the provi-
sion that the notice be delivered to the addressee only.
When jury service would result in undue hardship or extreme incon-
venience to the juror, the trial judge has the authority to excuse the
prospective juror from service.45 However, under prior law there was no
provision allowing the excused jurors to be placed back into the jury pool
after discharge. Act 37746 now allows the court to order that the dis-
charged juror's name be placed again in the general venire or in a central
jury pool. 47
NOTARIES PUBLIC
The powers of notaries public have historically been limited to
parishes where they are commissioned.4" Even the power of a notary to
administer oaths and take acknowledgements was considered to be limited
to the parish where the notary was commissioned. 49 Act 354 overrules this
limitation of powers, and allows each notary public to administer oaths to
parties appearing before such notary in any parish of the state.50 The oaths
which can be administered include those for the taking or execution of
depositions,5 interrogatories,5 2 and statements to be used in Louisiana
courts. The oaths as well as the certificates issued by the notary "shall
44. In 1972, the legislature amended LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 417(C) to allow
service in a similar manner on jurors in criminal cases.
45. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1767. See also LA. CODE CRIM P. art. 783.
46. 1977 La. Acts, No. 377, adding LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1767(D).
47. An identical provision is incorporated in LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 783 by
virtue of Act No. 378.
48. LA. R.S. 35:2 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 354).
49. LA. Op. ATT. GEN. 818 (1934-36); LA. Op. Arty. GEN. 899 (1920-22). See
also State ex rel Wootan, 313 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writs denied, 318
So. 2d 47 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976).
50. 1977 La. Acts, No. 354, amending LA. R.S. 35:2 (1950).
51. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1434.
52. See id. art. 1458.
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have legal efficacy, including legal efficacy for purposes of the laws on
perjury." ,53 The new provision, which somewhat expands notarial powers,
should eliminate many of the problems which formerly affected parties
and witnesses, as well as notaries. The legislature also enacted legislation
to make it more convenient for notaries to live in one parish and have their
principal office in another.
54
Act 451 provides for uniform qualifications and appointment of
notaries public. 55 The act provides for the situation in which a notary
resides in one parish but maintains his office in another by allowing a
notary who has been validly appointed for five years and who changes his
residence to be issued a notarial commission for the parish of his new
residence. The act also changes the composition of the committee for the
examination of applicants for notaries by providing that the committee is
to be composed of the clerk of court or his designee, an attorney, and a
non-attorney notary.
SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
The legislature authorized each district court to establish one or more
small claims divisions. 56 It is anticipated that local rules will provide for
such divisions. Among other provisions, the new legislation allows for
evening and Saturday hours of operation and provides that subject matter
jurisdiction shall be the same as that provided for justices of the peace
courts." The procedural rules of the small claims court are very informal.
The technical rules of evidence are relaxed, reconventional demands are
permitted, and no depositions, interrogatories or other discovery proceed-
ings are allowed. The judge may refer the matter to an arbitrator if the
parties agree to such reference. The small claims courts are not bound by
statutory rules of procedure, evidence, or pleading, except provisions
relating to privileged communications, and hearings shall be conducted so
"as to do substantial justice between the parties." A plaintiff waives his
right to appeal by proceeding in small claims court, as does a defendant,
except that a defendant may file a written notice of removal of the action to
the ordinary civil docket of the district court within a specified delay. This
53. LA. R.S. 35:2 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 354.
54. LA. R.S. 35:651 (Supp. 1975), repealed by 1977 La. Acts, No. 359.
55. 1977 La. Acts, No. 451, amending LA. R.S. 35:1, 191-94, 197-98 (1950),
adding LA. R.S. 35:1.1, 200-01, repealing LA. R.S. 35:197, 251-257, 391-395, 601-04,
631, 651, 661, 671 (1950).
56. 1977 La. Acts, No. 710, adding LA. R.S. 13:5200-10. St. Mary and Ter-
rebonne Parishes are explicitly exempted from the act.
57. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4832.
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Act will provide for efficient judicial administration in those areas where
there currently are no small claims courts.58
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The transitional provisions in the 1974 Louisiana Constitution59 pro-
vide that the provisions of the 1921 Constitution6° concerning homestead
exemptions shall be continued as a statute until the legislature enacts the
homestead exemption required by the new constitution. 61 Act 44662 fulfills
this mandate. Basically, the Act follows the provisions of the 1921
Constitution, providing that fifteen thousand dollars in value of a home-
stead is exempt from seizure and sale under any writ, mandate, or process.
The Act also continues the provisions for certain exceptions to the exemp-
tion. However, the Act goes beyond prior'law by providing that whoever
claims the benefit of the exemption must execute a written declaration of
homestead containing specified statements which must be sworn to and
recorded in mortgage records of the parish where the homestead claimed is
situated. Under prior law, this was only required in cities with a population
exceeding 250,000 persons (i.e., New Orleans) .63 The Act, however,
makes no such restriction. This requirement for recordation could pose
serious problems if a debtor were to seek to record the declaration after the
seizure of his property. The Act does not anticipate such a situation and
makes no provision for it. If the purpose of the homestead exemption is to
protect the debtor and preserve for him a certain amount of assets, a
declaration and recordation subsequent to seizure, should be held valid. 64
58. The Declaration of Purpose of the Act is as follows: "The purpose of this
Part is to improve the administrationof justice in small noncriminal cases, and make
the judicial system more available to and comprehensible by the public; to simplify
practice and procedure in the commencement, handling, and trial of such cases in
order that plaintiffs may bring actions in their own behalf, and defendants may
participate actively in the proceedings rather than default; to provide an efficient
and inexpensive forum with the objective of dispensing justice in a speedy manner;
and generally to promote the confidence of the public in the overall judicial system
by providing a forum for small claims."
59. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 34.
60. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XI.
61. LA. CONST. art. X1I, § 9.
62. 1977 La Acts, No. 446, amending LA. R.S. 20:1 (1950).
63. See Barlow v. Estate of Carr, 292 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
64. See Lee v. Cooper, 155 La. 143, 98 So. 869 (1924); Becker v. Hampton, 137
La. 323, 68 So. 626 (1915); Barlow v. Estate of Carr, 292 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1974).
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CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO SUPPLY NATURAL GAS
Act 674 provides that in the event of a failure to supply natural gas in
Louisiana which is the direct result of compulsory reallocation or curtail-
ment procedures (other than such procedures implemented pursuant to an
emergency), the former recipient of the gas shall have a right and cause of
action against the ultimate industrial user or local distribution company to
whom the gas was reallocated and who knowingly received such gas. 65 No
ultimate user is liable if such user itself is a victim of compulsory
curtailment. The Act also provides for jurisdiction over, and service of
process on, non-resident defendants against whom the cause of action is
created. There may, however, be a problem in obtaining jurisdiction over
a non-resident industry whose only contact with Louisiana is that it
received gas originally destined for a Louisiana resident.
SMALL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT LAW*
There is no statutory authority allowing state officials to compromise
tort claims against the state. The result is that small claims will often result
in litigation where the costs of such litigation far exceed the value of the
claim. Furthermore, court dockets are frequently crowded with such small
claim cases because the state does not allow its officials to use the
judicially-favored compromise. Thus Act 596 provides a substantive and
procedural basis for the swift non-judicial settlement of tort claims against
the state or any of its agencies in amounts of two thousand dollars or
less.' Claims susceptible of settlement are those for damages to or loss of
property, as well as personal injury claims caused by the negligent act or
omission of any state employee while acting within the scope of his
employment, under circumstances where the state, if it were a private
person, would be liable to the claimant under state law. A small claims
fund is to be established by legislative appropriations. All claims must be
in writing, and each department of the state government must investigate
each accident within the department which results in a claim. The report of
the investigation must be forwarded to the attorney general with specific
findings and recommendations concerning liability and amount of dam-
age. The liability of the state is not extended to interest on the principal
amount, punitive damages, attorney fees, court costs nor other costs
incurred by the claimant in presenting his claim. The attorney general has
65. 1977 La. Acts, No. 674, adding LA. R.S. 30:411-14.
* See the discussion of this legislation in the Administrative Law and Proce-
dure section of this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 96, 99-101 (1977).
66. 1977 La. Acts, No. 5%, adding LA. R.S. 13:5141-47.
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the authority to settle the claims; the settlement is final and conclusive on
the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of the claim against
the state. Certain claims are not susceptible of settlement.67
OTHER LEGISLATION
Generally, attorney fees are not permitted in any action unless ex-
pressly granted by statute.68 In alimony and child support cases, however,
the jurisprudence has allowed attorney fees in some cases while denying
them in others. 69 Act 462 resolves the conflict among the circuits by
allowing the court to award reasonable attorney fees in favor of the
prevailing party when the court renders an executory judgment incorporat-
ing the payment of child support or alimony in arrears. 7" Act 686 provides
for attorney fees in suits for the prosecution and collection of a claim
arising out of a check dishonored for insufficient funds. 7
Act 192 amends the provisions regarding the nature of the security to
be deposited by a tutor for the faithful discharge of his duties. 72 Previous-
ly, the court could approve only a bond secured either by a domestic surety
company, by bonds of the state or a political subdivision or shares of
domestic building and loan or homestead associations. Under the new
provision, certificates of deposit in any domestically or nationally char-
tered bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may be
used as security.
67. Two areas where the attorney general has no settlement authority are (1)
any claim based on assault or battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, or deceit; and (2)
any claim invoking a cause of action based on absolute liability or liability without
fault.
68. Maloney v. Oak Builders, 256 La. 85, 235 So. 2d 386 (1970).
69. The early case of Newson v. Newson, 176 La. 699, 146 So. 473 (1933),
allowed attorney fees. However, in Wainwright v. Wainwright, 217 La. 563, 46 So.
2d 902 (1950), the supreme court denied attorney fees without discussing Newson.
Wainwright was followed in Stoltz v. Stoltz, 162 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writs denied, 246 La. 349, 164 So. 2d 352 (1964). Gauthreaux v. Gauthreaux, 315 So.
2d 402 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), cited all the above cases, yet followed Newson.
Janise v. Janise, 328 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 333 So. 2d 233 (La.
1976) discussed the cases, yet followed Wainwright and disallowed attorney fees,
and suggested legislative action on the subject. When the Third Circuit was again
presented with the problem,- it refused to follow its own precedent in Janise and
thus allowed attorney fees. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 337 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
70. 1977 La. Acts, No. 462, adding LA. R.S. 9:305.
71. 1977 La. Acts, No. 686, adding LA. R.S. 9:2782.
72. 1977 La. Acts, No. 192, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4132.
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Act 9613 increases the maximum fees that sheriffs74 can charge in all
civil matters. Attorneys should note these increases which will affect most
areas of law practice."
Act 10776 increases the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in civil
matters. Under prior law, they had jurisdiction concurrent with the district
courts where the amount in dispute did not exceed three hundred dollars.
7 7
This ceiling is now increased to five hundred dollars. 78 In all other
respects, the statute remains the same. 79
Act 360 adds several new exemptions from seizure and otherwise
broadens and clarifies the language of the statute. 80 The additions are
clothes dryers, living room suites, heating and cooling equipment, and one
cow.
Several new acts concerning prescription were passed by the Legisla-
ture. Act 444 provides that actions for the recovery of damages sustained
in motor vehicle accidents brought pursuant to uninsured motorist provi-
sions in automobile insurance policies prescribe two years from the date of
the accident. 8' The Act takes effect on July 1, 1978.82 Act 311 provides
that judgments in favor of the state in the principal amount of three
thousand dollars or less prescribe ten years from the date that the trial court
signs the judgment, or the date of rendition by the appellate court.83 The
73. 1977 La. Acts, No. 96, amending LA. R.S. 33:1428 (Supp. 1974).
74. Orleans Parish is explicitly exempt from the provisions of the Act. 1977 La.
Acts, No. 96, § 1
75. The following paragraphs of LA. R.S. 13:1428 were amended (all fees were
increased by one dollar): paragraphs (1) through (14), (16), (22), and (25).
76. 1977 La. Acts, No. 107, amending LA. R.S. 13:2584(A) (Supp. 1975).
77. The amount in dispute is exclusive of interest and attorney fees. LA. R.S.
13:2584 (Supp. 1975).
78. 1977 La. Acts, No. 107, § 1.
79. See also 1977 La. Acts, No. 509, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4835;
1977 La. Acts, No. 593, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4921; LA. R.S. 13:2161
(Supp. 1960). These Acts increase the jurisdiction of New Orleans city courts.
80. LA. R.S. 13:3881(4) (Supp. 1961), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 360,
now provides for the following general exemptions from seizure: "The clothing,
bedding, linen, chinaware, non-sterling silverware, glassware, living room, bed-
room, and dining room suites, cooking stove, heating and cooling equipment,
kitchen utensils, pressing irons, washers, dryers, refrigerators (electric or other-
wise) used by him or a member of his family; the family portraits; his arms and
military accoutrements; the musical instruments played or practiced on by him or a
member of his family; and the poultry, fowl, and one cow kept by him for the use of
his family:" See the discussion of Act 360 in the Consumer Protection section of
this symposium, 38 LA. L. REV. 135, 136 (1977).
81. 1977 La. Acts, No. 444, adding LA. R.S. 9:5604.
82. Id. § 4.
83. 1977 La. Acts, No. 311, amending LA. R.S. 9:5685 (Supp. 1974).
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Act also provides for prescription of liens and privileges in favor of the
state. Act 2548 provides that a prescribed action arising under the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act is not available as a defense, despite the
fact that it may be incidental to or connected with the obligation sought to
be enforced by the plaintiff.
Act 35385 expands the method for service of process in' cases under
the non-resident motor vehicle statute. Under prior law, the plaintiff was
required to send to the defendant a copy of the petition and citation, along
with the notice of service, by registered mail. The Act now allows
attorneys to use less expensive certified mail instead.
Act 60686 increases the fee of witnesses residing outside the parish or
more than twenty-five miles from the courthouse where the proceeding is
to be held from five dollars to eight dollars per day. The mileage rate was
increased from five cents to sixteen cents per mile. Act 31587 raised the
fees of witnesses residing within the parish or within twenty-five miles of
the courthouse to the same levels.
PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AcT
The most significant legislation passed this year relating to criminal
law and procedure was Act 515, which provides for discovery by both the
defendant and the prosecution in criminal cases brought in the district
court. ' Much of the act is based on the Federal Rules, 2 but there are some
significant additions and deletions. The act provides for a relatively broad
scope of discovery, a reciprocal duty to disclose in some situations, a
continuing duty to disclose, a pre-trial conference, and regulation of
discovery.
84. 1977 La. Acts, No. 254, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 424.
85. 1977 La. Acts, No. 353, amending LA. R.S. 13:3475 (Supp. 1956).
86. 1977 La. Acts, No. 606, amending LA. R.S. 13:3661 (Supp. 1961).
87. 1977 La. Acts, No. 315, amending LA. R.S. 13:3671 (Supp. 1962).
1. 1977 La. Acts, No. 515, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 716-729.6; LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.6 limits the application of the act to cases brought in the
district court.
2. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, 12.1, 12.2, 16 & 17.1.
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Discovery by the Defendant-Reciprocal
In some instances, discovery by the defendant may be conditioned on
his own disclosure of similar materials. Such is the case when the defend-
ant seeks to discover (1) books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects, buildings, places, or copies or portions thereof, 3 and (2) any
results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests
or experiments, made in connection with or material to the particular
case.
4
The discovery by the defendant of documents and tangible objects is
limited to those items which are within the state's possession, custody or
control, and (1) are favorable to the defendant and material and relevant to
the issue of guilt or punishment, 5 or (2) are intended for use by the state as
evidence at the trial, or (3) were obtained from or belong to the defend-
ant.6 Most documents or tangible objects of any significance should meet
one of these criteria-most inculpatory items will be used by the state at
trial, and most exculpatory items should be covered under the first crite-
rion.
Discovery of inculpatory reports or results of examinations or tests is
conditioned upon possession, custody, control, or knowledge of the dis-
trict attorney and the state's intent to use the same at trial. 7 However,
exculpatory reports or results are not subject to the "use at trial" limita-
tion.8 Allowing discovery of inculpatory reports and results will prevent
surprise at trial and will give the defense sufficient time to retain its own
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 718; cf. id. art. 724.
4. Id. art. 719; cf. id. art. 725.
5. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C). The source for this standard in both the
Louisiana and Federal rules is Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CRIMINAL RULES 16.06[l], at 16-93 [hereinafter
cited as MOORE].
The court is authorized to make an in camera inspection to determine if
evidence falls into this category. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 718.
6. Id. art. 718.,
7. Id. art. 719. Since most reports would be inadmissible hearsay, the "use at
trial" limitation may have rendered article 719 useless, at least for inculpatory
reports. On the other hand, although the document itself is inadmissible and
therefore not discoverable under this article, it may be argued that the "results" are
discoverable if the state intends to have someone testify as to those results at trial.
But cf. id. art. 725. If the results are not discoverable, then article 719 may be a
trap. It also may be unconstitutional. See note 34, infra.
8. Id. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D) which does not distinguish between
inculpatory and exculpatory reports or results; the Louisiana rule is thus broader
than the federal rule in this instance, since the Louisiana rule allows discovery of
exculpatory material.
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experts to evaluate the reports of the state, to make independent tests, and
to prepare for cross-examination of state witnesses. 9
Discovery by the Defendant-Non-reciprocal
Article 716 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for discovery
by the defense of statements made by the defendant. Subsection (A)
allows discovery of "any relevant written or recorded confessions or
statements of any nature, including recorded testimony before a grand
jury." 0 This should include both inculpatory and exculpatory statements
made to anyone, whether pre-arrest or post-arrest." The statements must
be "in the possession, custody, control, or knowledge of the district
attorney,"2 but there is no requirement that the state intend to use the
statements or confessions at trial in order for them to be discoverable.' 3
The defendant may also discover the substance of any oral statement
which is made in response to interrogation by a known law enforcement
official whether before or after arrest, if the state intends to offer the
statement in evidence.t 4 For other oral statements made by the defendant,
which the state intends to introduce, the defendant may discover only the
existence thereof, with information as to when, where, and to whom such
statements were made. '5 The provisions of article 716 should not affect the
state's duty to give notice required by Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
dure article 768.16
Article 717 allows the defendant to discovera copy of any record of
his criminal arrests and convictions. 17 Articles 720 and 721 provide for
9. MOORE, supra note 5, 16[31, at 16-75. Cf. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967)
(stain on clothing looked like blood but was actually paint; failure to allow dis-
covery resulted in conviction based on state's expert testimony that the stain was
blood). But see note 7, supra.
10. LA. CODE CRIM. P: art. 716(A).
11. See MOORE, supra note 5, 16.05[1l, at 16-65.
12. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 716 (A). It is noteworthy that the "due diligence"
language of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) was not included in the Louisiana provi-
sion.
13. Compare LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 716(B) & (C).
14. Id. art. 716(C). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
15. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 716(B). FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) does not
contain a comparable provision, so the Louisiana rule is broader in this instance.
16. See State v. Sneed, 316 So. 2d 372 (La. 1975). LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 768
requires the state to give notice prior to its opening statement of its intent to
introduce a confession or inculpatory statement.
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(i)(B) is the source for this article. Not only the
district attorney but also the appropriate law enforcement agency may be ordered to
produce the record of the defendant's arrests and convictions.
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notice of evidence of other crimes and hearsay statements of co-con-
spirators. " Article 720 only applies to other crimes which will be used to
show knowledge, intent, or system,' 9 which are not part of the res
gestae, 20 and which will not be used solely to impeach the defendant's
testimony. Article 721 allows only discovery of the state's intent to use
hearsay statements of co-conspirators, not the statements themselves. 2'
Article 722 appears to be quite significant; it provides for discovery
of "any relevant written or recorded confessions or inculpatory statements
made by a co-defendant and intended for use at trial." 2 2 It also provides
for the discovery of exculpatory statements even if the prosecution does
not intend to use them at trial. 23 Discovery under this article will allow a
defendant to be in a better position to decide whether to request a sever-
ance,24 and will provide him with material for the impeachment or corrob-
oration of witnesses.25
Discovery by the State
As noted above, when a defendant moves for discovery of documents
and tangible objects, 26 or reports or results of examinations and tests, 27 he
incurs a reciprocal duty to disclose similar material to the state. 28 The
prosecution cannot initiate discovery under these articles, and the state
may only discover the above items when the defendant intends to use them
at trial.29
18. The defendant must make a motion for such notice. LA. CODE CRIM. P.
arts. 720-21. The discovery allowed by article 720 should not affect the state's duty
to give Prieur notice of other crimes, since Prieur notice should also include the
exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies. State v. Prieur, 277
So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
19. See LA. R.S. 15:445-46 (Supp. 1966).
20. Cf. id. 15:447-48 (Supp. 1966).
21. See id. 15:455 (Supp. 1966).
22. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
"Inculpatory statements" would appear to refer to statements made by a
codefendant which are inculpatory as to the defendant who is seeking discovery.
23. Article 722 differs from proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(I)(ii) in several
respects. Article 722 adds the relevancy requirement and adds the provision for
discovery of exculpatory evidence. "Exculpatory statements" apparently refers to
statements made by a codefendant which are exculpatory as to the defendant who is
seeking discovery.
24. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 704-06.
25. See LA. R.S. 15:497 (Supp. 1966).
26. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 718.
27. d. art. 719. See note 7, supra.
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 724-25. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A) &
16(b)(l)(B).
29. The question may be raised whether discovery by the state violates a
[Vol.. 38
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
Article 726 requires the defendant to notify the state of his intent to
introduce testimony relating to a mental disease or defect which bears
upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense
charged. 30 This article may prove to be a trap for the unwary. The state is
not required to request 726 notice, and failure to give the notice may result
in the exclusion of such testimony at trial-perhaps even the defendant's
testimony.31
Article 727 provides for notice of alibi defense. 32 Its enactment is in
accord with the general purpose of the act, which is to prevent unnecessary
surprise and delays at trial.33 Article 727 is the only provision of the act
which allows discovery of the names of witnesses.
Disclosure of intent to use an alibi defense is state-initiated, and the
prosecution must disclose the time, date, and place the alleged offense was
committed. The defendant must then disclose whether he intends to offer
an alibi defense. If he does, the defendant must also disclose the specific
place he claims to have been and the names and addresses of witnesses he
defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, the
"use at trial" limitation may solve this problem. See MOORE, supra note 5,
16.08[2], at 16-122; 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 256 [hereinaf-
ter cited as WRIGHT].
30. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b); MOORE, supra note 5, 12.2; WRIGHT &
ELLIOT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 20 (Supp. 1976). Louisiana did not
adopt Rule 12.2(a) (defense of insanity) or Rule 12.2(c), which allows the court to
order a psychiatric examination of a.defendant upon motion of the attorney for the
government. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 650-58.
Article 726 does not deal With competency to stand trial. See id. arts. 641-49.
31. Id. art. 726(B) provides: "If there is a failure to give notice as required by
Subsection A of this Article, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness
offered by the defendant on the issue of mental condition." Note that no explicit
exception is made for testimony of the defendant, and that the Federal Rule says
"any expert witness." But cf. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
32. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1. See MOORE, supra note 5, T 12.1: WRIGHT &
ELLIOT, supra note 30, § 201. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970),
which upheld the constitutionality of a similar statute under due process, fair trial,
and self-incrimination attacks.
33. "Given the ease'with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in
protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate."
Id. at 81. See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,473-74 (1973): "Notice-of-alibi
rules, now in use in a large and growing number of States, are based on the
proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal
discovery which gives both parties the maximum amount of information with which
to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial. . ..
The growth of such discovery devices is a salutary development which, by increas-
ing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary
system."
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intends to use to prove his alibi. Upon such disclosure by the defendant,
the prosecution must divulge the names and addresses of witnesses it will
use to establish the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime or to
rebut the testimony of the defendant's alibi witnesses. 31 Subsection (C) of
article 727 provides for a continuing duty to disclose should new witnesses
be discovered after the above information has been exchanged, and sub-
section (D) allows the court to exclude the testimony of any undisclosed
witness, except that of the defendant. 35
As protection for the defendant, and in the interest of fairness,
subsection (F) allows the defendant to withdraw a notice of alibi defense
without fearing that such withdrawal will be used against him. Moreover,
the court is authorized, for good cause shown, to grant exceptions to any
of the requirements of subsections (A) through (D). 36
Article 727 should be beneficial to all parties. Since the alibi issue is
raised prior to trial instead of at the eleventh hour, guilty pleas or dismiss-
als are encouraged and the temptation to fabricate is discouraged.
Matters Not Subject to Discovery
Articles 723 and 728 provide explicit limitations on the scope of
discovery authorized by the Act.3 7 Both incorporate the work product
rule, 38 and both preclude discovery of statements made by witnesses or
prospective witnesses. In addition, article 728 precludes discovery by the
state of the names of defense witnesses or prospective witnesses.39
Manner of Discovery
Most of the discovery articles begin: "Upon motion of X, the court
shall ordei . . . ." The Federal Rules use "request" instead of "mo-
tion," perhaps to ensure or at least suggest informality, but Louisiana
retained the practice of trading motions.4 Notable exceptions are con-
34. This reciprocity is constitutionally required. Cf. Wardius v. Oregon, 412
U.S. 470, which held that an Oregon notice of alibi statute was a denial of due
process because it was non-reciprocal.
35. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78.
36. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 727(E).
37. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) & 16(b)(2).
38. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
39. Although article 723 does not contain a similar prohibition against defense
discovery of state witnesses, article 727 (notice of alibi) is the only article which
authorizes such discovery.
40. "The court shall order" is the language of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 prior to its
amendment in 1975. The 1975 amendments changed the language to "the govern-
ment shall permit" or to "the defendant shall permit." This was to make clear that a
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tained in article 726, requiring notice of defense based on mental condition
to be given without prior demand by the state, and article 727, where
notice of alibi defense is initiated via written demand by the district
attorney rather than by motion and court order. In addition a defendant
must request in one motion all relief sought under the discovery rules.4'
Defense motions for discovery must be filed after indictment or
information,4 2 but not later than "ten days before trial or within such
reasonable time as the court may permit." 4 3 Notice of defense based on
mental condition must be filed at least ten days prior to trial, but here also
the court has discretion to allow late filing." The defendant has ten days to
respond to a notice of alibi demand, and the state in most cases will have
ten days after the defendant's response to file its counter-response.
45
Article 729.4 provides for a pre-trial conference in criminal cases to
dispose of discovery motions and to consider "such other matters as may
aid in the prompt and fair disposition of the charge." Pre-trial confer-
ences may be initiated by special order of the court or authorized by local
rules. 47 As in civil cases, the use of pre-trial conferences in criminal cases
court order was generally unnecessary-that the parties should voluntarily comply.
MOORE, supra note 5, 16.03[1], at 16-48; WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 258. While the
Louisiana statute seems more formal, the discovery act does not preclude the type
of voluntary discovery often used in civil cases, and such informal discovery may
be desirable.
The discovery articles also provide for a pre-trial conference and a formal
hearing. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 729.4,729. 1(A). A two-tier structure appears to be
contemplated: (1) informal discovery, whether voluntary or at a pre-trial confer-
ence, and (2) discovery at a formal hearing.
41. Id. art. 729.
42. Id. art. 729.6.
43. Id. art. 729.
44. Id. art. 726.
45. Id. art. 727.
46. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1, which is substantially different from article
729.4. The federal conference may be invoked by motion of either party as well as
by the court; the rule contemplates, but does not require, the presence of the
defendant; and the rule requires the court to promulgate a memorandum. See
WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 291. Moreover, MOORE, supra note 5, 17.1.02[2][a],
17.11-3, states that the federal conference is intended for complex cases only. Our
rule, on the other hand, contains no such limitation and provides explicitly that the
conference is a proper time for disposing of discovery motions.
MOORE, supra note 5, 17.1.02[3][a], at 17.1-6, provides examples of what
might be included in "other matters": marking exhibits, waiving foundations,
providing voir dire procedures, regulating the order of cross-examination in multi-
defendant cases, as well as making seating and other mechanical arrangements. See
also WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 292.
47. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.4.
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should contribute greatly to efficient use of court time. The broad authori-
ty granted to the district courts to promulgate local rules could result in a
procedure very similar to that used in civil cases.
Continuing Duty to Disclose
Article 729.3 provides for a continuing duty to disclose matters
which arise after the issuance of an order and which come within the scope
of the order.48 This is in keeping with the goal of preventing surprise and
unnecessary delay at trial. An additional effect may be to encourage a
defendant to make his initial motion for discovery very broad in order to
gain the benefit of continuing discovery.
Regulation of Discovery
Discovery is not to be denied to a party without a contradictory
hearing unless it appears on the face of the motion that as a matter of law
the party is not entitled to the relief.49 The court has discretion, however,
to vacate, restrict, or defer an order, upon a "sufficient showing by either
party." '50 The discretion allowed here appears to be analagous to the
court's ability to render protective orders in civil cases.
Article 729.5 provides penalties for failure to comply with orders for
discovery.5 The court is authorized to "order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, order a mistrial on motion of
the defendant,52 prohibit the party from introducing into evidence the
subject matter not disclosed, or enter such other order, other than dismiss-
al, as may be appropriate." Moreover, subsection (B) provides that a
willful non-compliance with discovery rules or orders will be deemed a
constructive contempt of court. 3
In Williams v. Florida,5 4 Mr. Justice White stated, "The adversary
system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which
players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until play-
ed."I 5 The Criminal Discovery Act is in keeping with this sentiment. The
statute allows review of some potentially surprising items in advance of
48. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
49. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.1(A). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(I).
50. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.1(B). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
51. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
52. This possibility is not explicitly provided for in the federal rule. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
53. Subsection (B) is not a part of the federal rule. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
54. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
55. Id. at 82.
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trial, and the continuing duty to disclose prevents parties from withholding
evidence obtained after initial discovery. The pre-trial conference au-
thorized by the Act, if developed and used as in civil cases, can become an
important device for framing the issues for trial. Finally, the regulatory
devices provided by the Act should prevent abuse of the procedures. The
end effect is a more efficient criminal procedure which should result in
greater fairness for all parties.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Prior to amendment, article 230.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provided that a defendant must be brought before a judge within 144 hours
after arrest for the appointment of counsel. It also provided that if good
cause was shown a defendant could be kept in custody after 144 hours
without a hearing. Act 395 reduces the period to 72 hours and deletes the
good cause language.56 Thus a defendant must be released if he is not
timely brought before a judge for appointment of counsel.
NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS
Act 534 expands the scope of cases in which a plea of nolo conten-
dere can be entered.57 Formerly available only in traffic offenses, Act 534
makes the plea of nolo contendere available in all criminal cases except for
capital offenses. In addition, the Act provides that a plea of nolo conten-
dere is inadmissible in any civil proceeding for any purpose.
58
CENTRAL JURY POOLS
The desire for a more efficient jury selection system prompted the
passage of Act 372.59 The Act allows state district courts to pass local
rules to create a central jury pool for civil and criminal cases, and provides
that jurors may serve on civil or criminal juries or both.
56. 1977 La. Acts, No. 395, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 230.1.
57. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 552, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 534.
58. LA. R.S. 13:3737 (Supp. 1977).
59. 1977 La. Acts, No. 372, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 409.3.
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POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
PENALTIES AND SENTENCING
Penalties were increased for prostitution,' simple and aggravated
arson, 2 forcible rape,3 simple burglary, 4 simple robbery, 5 and obscenity. 6
On the other hand, the death penalty for aggravated rape was repealed. 7 In
addition, two "omnibus" penalty bills were passed this year, providing
enhanced penalties for crimes against the elderly8 and for crimes committ-
ed with firearms or explosives.9
Act 105 enables the trial judge to empanel a new sentencing jury
where there is an error in the sentencing hearing which would necessitate
the granting of a mistrial or new trial.'° This prevents having to retry an
entire case if an error occurs in the sentencing hearing.
Act 635 may prove to be quite significant, especially for criminal
appeals and judicial efficiency." The act provides factors for the trial
judge to consider when deciding on the penalty for felonies and misde-
meanors,' 2 and it requires the judge to state for the record the factors taken
into account and the factual basis therefor. '3
Restitution as a criminal penalty has caused some debate recently,
and, Louisiana has decided to join those states which allow restitution as a
sentencing alternative. Act 720'" enables the court to order, as a condition
I. 1977 La. Acts, No. 49, amending LA. R.S. 14:82 (1950).
2. 1977 La. Acts, No. 53, amending LA. R.S. 14:51-52 (1950).
3. 1977 La. Acts, No. 90, amending LA. R.S. 14:43.1 (1950).
4. 1977 La. Acts, No. 133, amending LA. R.S. 14:62 (1950). Although the
maximum penalty was increased, simple burglary was changed to a relative felony
(punishable with or without hard labor). Since theft is also a relative felony, this
raises the interesting double jeopardy question whether a defendant may be tried
for both theft and burglary under the new joinder rules. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 493.
5. 1977 La. Acts, No. 134, amending LA. R.S. 14:65 (1950).
6. 1977 La. Acts, No. 97, amending LA. R.S. 14:106 (1950).
7. 1977 La. Acts, No. 343, amending LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950). See Coker v.
Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977), which held that the death penalty for rape was cruel
and unusual punishment.
8. 1977 La. Acts, No. 506, adding LA. R.S. 14:50.1.
9. 1977 La. Acts, No. 622, adding LA. R.S. 14:95.2.
10. 1977 La. Acts, No. 105, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.1.
I. 1977 La. Acts, No. 635, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1.
12. Cf. ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §
2.5(c) (1968).
13. Cf. id. § 5.6.
14. 1977 La. Acts, No. 720, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 895.1.
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of suspension of sentence and probation, restitution to the victim, payment
to the indigent defender fund, or restitution of court costs.' 5
15. The question may be raised whether requiring a defendant to pay court
costs is an appropriate sanction, since in effect he will be paying the court to try
him. Certainly the policy considerations for restitution to the victim and payment to
the indigent defender fund do not apply here.

